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CRIMINAL REDISTRIBUTION OF STOLEN
PROPERTY: THE NEED FOR LAW REFORM
G. Robert Blakey* and Michael Goldsmith*t
Our society is permeated by a consciousness of theft: triple-locked
doors of city apartments, guard dogs prowling stores and warehouses
at night, retail prices and insurance rates based on the assumption
that large quantities of merchandise are simply going to disappear.
But our consciousness of theft tends to be limited. It is easy to imag-
ine the act itself-the forced lock or smashed window in the dead
of night, the hijacker ordering the driver out of his truck cab at pistol
point. It is harder to keep in mind that these acts aren't random
or self-contained but are usually practical ways of acquiring goodsfor an established buyer. As for the dealer in stolen goods-the
"fence"-there our imagination seldom goes beyond the owner of a
seedy pawnshop or the character who sidles up on the street and mut-
ters, "Hey buddy, wanna buy a watch?"1
THE development of sophisticated fencing systems for the sale of
stolen property to consumers has paralleled the industrialization
of society. Although crimes against property and attempts to con-
trol them have ancient origins,2 most theft before the Industrial
Revolution was committed for immediate consumption by the thieves
and their accomplices rather than for redistribution in the market-
place.3 Society's small population, inadequate transportation and
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Director of the Cornell Institute
on Organized Crime.-Ed.
** Deputy State Attorney, Burlington, Vt. A.B. 1972, J.D. 1975, Cornell Univer-
sity.-Ed.
t These materials originated in work begun during the processing of S.13, 93d
Cong. 1st Sess. (1973); S. REP. No. 93-80, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill
passed the Senate by a vote of 81 to 0 in 1972 as S.16, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)
(118 CONG. REc. 29379 (1972)) and passed again in 1973 by a voice vote (119
CONG. REc. 10319 (1973)). No action was taken in the House Judiciary Committee,
"not .. . [because of] a lack of support for the bill but .. . [because of] the com-
mittee's heavy work load." N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974, at 69, col. 3 (late city ed.).
New legislation was not introduced in the 94th Congress.
1. Chasan, Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, § 6
(Magazine), at 12.
2. Biblical tradition has it that disobedience began with God's first command to
man. See Genesis 2:16-17, 3:4-6. Laws concerning theft and robbery may be found
in many sections of the Old Testament. See, e.g., Exodus 22:1-4; Leviticus 6:1-5,
19:13; Proverbs 29:24. For a discussion of theft in primitive society, see A. DIA-
MoND, THE EVOLUnON OF LAW AND ORDER 12, 35, 50-51, 108-15 (1951).
3. "Until the seventeenth century the amount of movable property available for
theft and the opportunities to dispose of this property except by personal consumption
1512
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communication systems, and technological inability to mass produce
identical goods constrained large-scale fencing because there were
few buyers and because stolen property could be readily identified.'
The unprecedented economic5 and demographic 6 growth in eight-
eehth-century Europe, however, removed these practical constraints
and made possible the profitable fencing operations7 that are now
firmly institutionalized in industrial societies.
Although these social and technological developments are impor-
tant, they do not provide a complete explanation for the rising theft
rate or for the tremendous amount of property successfully redistrib-
uted annually." Instead, these problems must be attributed in large
part to our society's failure to identify properly the economic rela-
tionship underlying theft and redistribution and, consequently, to our
inability to develop successful methods of legal control. 9
An understanding of the economic causes of property theft re-
quires brief consideration of the relationship between the two major
participants in redistribution systems. First, there are the fences
who often find it both profitable and not very risky"' to purchase
were limited." Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked," A Consideration of the
Crime of Criminal Receiving, 20 CIME & DELINQUENCY 157, 160 (1974) [here-
inafter Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked"].
4. Prior to the development of mass production techniques, a fence was faced
with "the situation of highly individualized property owned on a limited scale. .. ."
Id. at 168. Limited production and limited ownership foreclosed the possibility of
fencing stolen goods on a large scale because there were too few buyers, and property
could be too readily identified. See generally P. MANToux, THE INDUSTEIAL REVOLU-
TION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 108-12 (rev. ed. 1961).
5. Eighteenth century England experienced an expansion of trade that was of
"geometric proportions." J. HALL, THFxr, LA W AND SOCIETY 77 (2d ed. 1952). See
P. MANTOIrX, supra note 4, at 99-108. See generally H. BEALEs, THE INDUsTRIAL
REVoLUTtoN 1780-1850: AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY 48-56 (1958).
6. See M. FLINN, AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HIsTORY OF BRITAIN, 1066-1939, at
115 (1965) and B. MUPHY, A HisroRY OF THE BRITISH ECONOMY 1086-1970, at
61-62, 100-01, 229-33, 324-34 (1973) (describing dramatic growth of British popula-
tion). During this period the world population experienced similar growth. See K.
ClEN, WORLD POPULATION GRowTH AND LitiNG STANDARDS 64 (1960).
7. "[fModay's fence . . . faces an economy in which imperceptibly differing con-
sumer goods are mass-produced and mass-owned and for which there seems to be an
insatiable desire." Chappel & Walsh, "No Questions Asked," 168. "The relative im-
personality of property items, and the lack of adequate identifying marks on most
categories of goods, frequently prevents the establishment of a nexus between the
fence and stolen property items, or the return of recovered property to its original
owner." Chappell & Walsh, Receiving Stolen Property: The Need for Systemic
Inquiry into the Fencing Process, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 484, 490 (1974) [hereinafter
Chappell & Walsh, Receiving Stolen Property].
8. See Hearings on Criminal Redistribution (Fencing) Systems Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1973) [hereinafter
Hearings on Fencing].
9. See section H infra.
10. See text at notes 22-29 infra.
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stolen goods from thieves and resell them at retail and wholesale
levels. Frequently masquerading as legitimate businessmen, 1 so-
phisticated fences not only use cheap stolen merchandise to increase
their profits and to undercut legitimate competitors,'2 but also operate
without much risk of detection since they can easily remove identify-
ing labels from the goods, falsify records to hide illegal purchases,
or otherwise "legitimize" the goods, and then quickly dispose of
them in the marketplace.13 Second, there are the thieves who, with
the growth of viable fencing schemes, have available purchasers for
their stolen property. Thus, they too can rapidly dispose of the evi-
dence of their crimes and are then presumably better able to avoid
arrest and conviction.14  In general terms, a symbiotic relationship
between fences and thieves appears to have developed.
Any sketch of this relationship must recognize the primary role
played by receivers. Such recognition is crucial if proper legal tech-
niques for controlling theft are to be developed. Unfortunately, law
enforcement efforts in the United States have traditionally focused
on capturing the thief rather than on eliminating the fence.1 This
"theft-oriented" approach was perhaps sufficient in preindustrial so-
ciety but is inadequate and seriously misdirected today because it
fails to recognize that thieves steal primarily for profit rather than
for personal consumption.'" Fencing systems play a vital role in
11. See note 126 infra. Although criminal redistribution systems function with
varying degrees of sophistication, all successful fences, regardless of caliber, must de-
velop sufficient business acumen and marketing skills to maintain the continued prof-
itability of their operations. See notes 64-88 infra and accompanying text. See gen-
erally J. HALL, supra note 5, at 156-57.
12. This competitive advantage, however, does not necessarily assure the fence a
greater profit margin. See C. KLOCKARS, THE PROFESSIONAL FENCE 77 n.2 (1974).
13. See text at notes 115-53 infra.
14. "[A] ready market for stolen goods is the thief's most urgent need." Chap-
pell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 167. Obviously, thieves are anxious to dispose
of their goods, since prolonged retention increases the possibility of detection. See
Hearings on Fencing 160. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAw 682-91 (1972).
15. Chappell and Walsh have maintained "that the historical neglect of the crimi-
nal receiver has led to a shortsighted view of his actual and potential role in property
crime and to an undeserved relegation of his activities to a category of insignifi-
cance . . ." Chappell & Walsh "No Questions Asked" 158. See STAFF OF SEN-
ATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BusINEss, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., AN ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINAL REDISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS AND THEIR ECONOMIC IMPACT ON SMALL Busi-
NESS 2 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS]. See
notes 16-21 infra and accompanying text.
16. "Nearly all professional theft is undertaken with the aim of selling the goods
thereafter." PRESmENT'S COMM. ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTicp, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 99 (1967)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT, AN ASSESSMENT]. See C. CONWELL, THE PRO-
FESSIONAL THIEF BY A PROFESSIONAL THIEF 146 (1937); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 14, at 682.
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theft activity because most thieves are unable to deal directly with
the consuming public and must therefore operate through middle-
men who have the financial resources to purchase stolen goods and
the contacts to help in their redistribution.1 7  Although thieves usu-
ally receive only a small fraction of the retail value of their goods,""
the ability of most fences to make prompt payment' 9 facilitates rapid
disposal of stolen property and reduces the risk of detection that pro-
longed possession entails. Without fences, few thieves could sur-
vive20 because fences both satisfy their motive for stealing and pro-
vide an incentive for future theft. 2' Thus, the first step in combat-
It was recently noted that, at least according to some researchers, "virtually noth-
ing is stolen today without a prearranged market for its disposal." Chasan, supra
note 1, at 12. "[N'ot even an inexperienced junkie will steal something without be-
ing assured of a ready market." Id. at 17. See generally Hearings on Fencing, 30-
34.
17. See TASK FORCE REPORT, AN ASSESSMENT 99.
18. "[A] norm that has governed the asking price of thieves for centuries says
simply, 'When you take something to a fence you should try to get a third of the
value of the goods.'" C. KLOcnxs, supra note 12, at 114. The thief asks for a
third of the retail price because he knows that he 'cannot get a half, which is the
standard wholesale value. Typically, even though bargaining may begin at the one-
third price level, few fences ever pay this much. Id. at 114 n.6. Most, in fact, pay
much less. See Hearings on Organized Crime, Stolen Securities Before the Perma-
nent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
92d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 39, 212 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on Stolen Securi-
ties]; C. KLocKAsS, supra note 12, at 114 (analyzing fencing from a marketing per-
spective). Frequently, payment may simply take the form of drugs. See, e.g., Cha-
san, supra note 1, at 14; 'U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STRATEGIES FOR COMBATrING THE
CRIMINAL REcEIvER (FENCE) OF STOLEN GOODS 16-18 (August 1976) [hereinafter
STRATmIES] (barter transaction typical of West Coast). Thieves are frequently ig-
norant of the value of their goods, and have little bargaining power against the fence.
See C. KLocKAIs, supra note 12, at 115-26. To avoid paying the one-third price,
the more sophisticated fences have developed a variety of methods to deceive their
suppliers. id. at 115-27. To combat these practices some of the smarter thieves ap-
pear to be taking courses (such as gemmology) so that fences will no longer be able
to "exploit [their] ignorance." Chasan, supra note 1, at 16.
When a fence negotiates a price he must be aware of his economic costs which
include the risk of detection, storage and transportation expenses, cash outlay, repairs,
and other middlemen services. See Roselius & Benton, Stolen and Fenced Goods:
A New Laboratory for Marketing Theory [hereinafter Roselius & Benton, Stolen
Goods], in Hearings on Fencing 182.
19. See Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory and the Fencing of Stolen Goods
in 50 DENVER L.J. 177 (1973) [hereinafter Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory].
20. See R. BARNsS, ARE You SAFE FRoM BURGLARS? 142 (1971). At least one
critic, however, has rejected this explanation as too simplistic:
A history of attentions to criminal receiving and the trade in stolen property
could be written about the saying "if there were no receivers there would be no
thieves." . . . Mhe observation itself is better understood as an hyperbolic
plea for attention to the criminal receiver than as an accurate statement of his
relationship to theft. ... In brief, if there were no receivers, there would still
be all sorts of thieves, and possibly more thieves of sorts we don't like than we
have now.
C. KLocArms, supra note 12, at 164-66 (citations omitted).
21. "It seems that fencing schemes provide the profit motive for the original
theft." Hearings on Fencing 2 (opening statement of Senator Alan Bible). See also
1516 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1511
ing the theft problem is to realize that law enforcement efforts
should be primarily directed at the fence.
A major obstacle to dealing effectively with theft is that, despite
the institutionalization of criminal redistribution systems, receiving
is a so-called invisible crime largely free from public scrutiny.
22
It is difficult to identify stolen property under any circumstances; the
task is made virtually impossible after a fence sells those goods to
unsuspecting customers, for evidence of the crime is then effectively
destroyed.23 In short, once stolen property is successfully fenced no
"smoking gun" remains. This invisibility has several undesirable
consequences. Police investigations of fencing activity usually are
unsuccessful because the crime is not readily detected by conven-
tional police surveillance techniques. 24  Moreover, the crime of re-
ceiving generally has not been subject to comprehensive academic
analysis25 because police enforcement problems are reflected in the
absence of accurate statistics exposing methods of redistribution and
id. at 41-43 (statement of Franklyn H. Snitow, Assistant District Attorney, New
York County).
22. Since the 1700s "[the fence has . . . been recognized as a very important
part of the theft problem and as a crucial figure in the support and maintenance of
the thief." Chappell & Walsh, Receiving Stolen Property 485. See Observations on
the Buyers or Receivers of Stolen Goods-A Letter to a Member of Parliament, 3
IAw PAMrPLETS No. 5 (1751).
23. "This is in sharp contrast to . • . 'conventional crimes' such as murder, as-
saultive offenses, and theft. These activities, even when successful for the perpetra-
tor . . . still leave substantial proof of their occurence." Chappell & Walsh, Receiv-
ing Stolen Property 494. Consequently, the only data that directly document fencing
activity are those that become available when a particular fencing operation has been
discovered by the police.
24. See notes 207-20 infra and accompanying text.
25. See Chappell & Walsh, Receiving Stolen Properly 486; C. KLOCKARs, supra
note 12, at 1-2; THE IMPACt OF CRIME ON SMALL BUSINESS-PART VI (CRIMINAL
REDISTRmBTnON (FENCING) SySTMs), S. REP. No. 93-1318, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
29-30 (1974) [hereinafter REPORT, TnE IMPACT OF CRIME].
Chappell and Walsh suggest that one reason for this situation is that the fence
has never been viewed as an appropriate subject for criminological research:
Criminology's search for crime causality, bolstered by inputs from the disciplines
of psychology and sociology, has greatly influenced the choice of research topics
for students of the field. . . . The quest to develop a psychological and so-
ciological competence in the study of crime causation meant . . . the rejection
of the simplicity which economics had introduced. It came also to mean, how-
ever, the virtual rejection of the discipline of economics with its rational ex-
planations, as irrelevant and inappropriate. . . . Lacking any obvious psy-
chological difficulties and remaining a well-integrated participant in the socio-
nomic structure, the fence could hold little interest for criminologists who were
searching for more deviant personalities to study. The same is true of the white-
collar criminal, those individuals associated with organized crime, and many pro-
fessional thieves. It seems clear that until economics is again accepted as a le-
gitimate input into the criminological research process, the rational criminal-
in particular the criminal receiver-will remain little studied and even less un-
derstood.
Chappell & Walsh, Receiving Stolen Property 487-88.
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measuring the amount of property actually redistributed. 26  Under-
standably, researchers have directed their attention to more visible
crimes such as theft itself or violent crimes against persons for which
statistics are available.2 7  Further, surprisingly carefree public atti-
tudes that insurance will cover theft losses 28 and that the purchase
of stolen goods is acceptable social conduct 9 reinforce the neglect
afforded fencing operations. Partly as a result of inadequate re-
search, society's theft-oriented approach has long remained free
from rigorous scrutiny, and the development of effective and creative
legal techniques for controlling the problem has been delayed.
The absence of accurate statistics directly measuring fencing ac-
tivity, however, has not foreclosed other, sometimes intuitive, means
of estimating its significance; this in turn allows appreciation of
theft's economic basis and makes it possible to devise reasoned solu-
tions. Crimes against property have increased 230.5 per cent since
1960,80 and by conservative estimates property crimes cost Ameri-
can businesses, and ultimately American consumers,," 20.3 billion
26. There is a "relative paucity of data" to support fencing research. Chappell
& Walsh, Receiving Stolen Property 492. "Most of the information that does exist
is of an anecdotal, historical, or 'police intelligence' nature." Id. at 493. Further,
police "[ilntelligence information is rarely made available for public scrutiny .... "
Id. For a comprehensive discussion of the difficulties involved in researching fencing
activity, see C. KocxAs, supra note 12, at 197-226.
27. See Chappell & Walsh, Receiving Stolen Property 494-95.
28. See REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRaM 25-26. This view is shortsighted be-
cause rising rates are now making insurance premiums for many businesses and indi-
viduals prohibitively expensive. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
29. Chappell & Walsh, Receiving Stolen Property 491; Chasan, supra note 1, at
17; notes 45-47, 511 and accompanying text infra. One discount store in Chicago
was so well known for bargains in stolen goods that the owner even removed labels
from legitimately acquired goods to make his customers think they were getting hot
articles. See U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, March 17, 1969, at 44. Similar prac-
tices have become commonplace in the underworld. See V. TEsA & T. RENNER,
My LIFE IN THE MAFIA 70 (1974) [hereinafter V. TEREsA]; C. KLocxARs, supra note
12, at 79. See generally Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 177, 189.
30. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR Tm UNITED STATES, 49 (1976) (data for 1960
through 1975).
31. There is little question that the consuming public must ultimately shoulder
the burden of paying for the increased costs that are engendered by theft and fencing
activity. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN.) &
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION, CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME: A DEsKBooK FOR
MANAGEMENT AND LAw ENFORCEMENT 8 (1972) [hereinafter CARGO THEFT AND
ORGANIZED CRIME]. It is not clear, however, that the consumer, who so quickly pays
for theft, would just as quickly reap the benefit of an anti-theft and fencing effort.
The immediate effect would be on insurance claims. This could affect rates and con-
sequently profits, prices, or both. How far down the line the benefits would actually
flow is not evident. But it seems obvious that, while the effect of an increasing theft
rate on the consumer tends to be immediate and adverse, the effect of a decreasing
theft rate would, in all likelihood, be gradual and only potentially positive.
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dollars annually.12  Of this amount ordinary crimes, including bur-
glary, robbery, vandalism, shoplifting, employee theft and passing
bad checks, account for approximately 16.1 billion dollars. 3 Presented
with similar statistics, a recent Senate investigation concluded that
since "[t]he magnitude of theft is so great . . . the only reasonable
outlet must be to legitimate consumers. '3 4  Obviously, stolen goods
must be channeled through criminal redistribution systems.85
One original study of property theft and recovery rates appears
in appendix A to this article. Research shows that, for every one
hundred persons, the value of property annually stolen, measured
in constant "1960" dollars to account for inflation, jumped from 502
dollars in 1960 to 1061 dollars in 1975, an increase of 111 per cent.8"
32. The 20.3 billion dollar figure for 1974 was broken down into the following
categories:
Estimates in This Study 1974 (Billions)
Retailing $ 5.8
Manufacturing 2.8
Wholesaling 2.1
Services 3.5
Transportation 1.9
Arson 0.3
Preventive 3.9
$20.3
U.S. DEPT. oF COMMERCE, ThE CosT OF CRIMES AGAINST BUSINESS 7 (1974) (up-
date of 1972 study). The ratio of losses to total capital expenditures is equal to
about 17 per cent of total corporate profits. Id. For the 1972 Study, see U.S. DEPT.
oF COMMERCE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CRIMES AGAINST BUSINESS, PRELIMINARY
STAFF REPORT 5 (1972) [hereinafter COMMERCE DEPT. REPOR.T]. "In almost every
case, the estimates are conservatively stated, inasmuch as they do not attempt to in-
clude unreported crimes, which are considered to be high." Id. at 4. Significantly,
"small business suffers an impact that is 3.2 times the average, and 35 times that
of businesses with receipts over $5 million." Id. at 9. See CARGo THEFT AND OR-
GANIZED CRJmn 5-6.
33. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, THE CoST OF CRIMES AGAINST BUSINESS 7
(1974).
34. STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS 3. See CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED
CRIME 28. See generally Roselius & Benton, Stolen Goods 174; Hearings on Stolen
Securities 210-213.
35. Los Angeles authorities have reported, for example, that 95 per cent of stolen
property is ultimately redistributed. Hearings on Fencing 3. Chappell and Walsh
state:
Reflected in each auto theft, in each burglary, and in many robberies and
muggings is evidence of fencing. No goods, whether created through the
productive process or acquired by theft, have value to the possessor unless they
are distributed and sold-and that is the fence's job. Fencing, then, represents
a major proportion of the nation's yearly crime figures ....
Chappell & Walsh, Receiving Stolen Property 495. Chappell and Walsh, however,
may overstate the case, at least in the auto theft area. Most auto thefts are appar-
ently made not for resale but for short term transportation. Young people (under
18) represent a major portion of those arrested for the offense (55 per cent in 1975).
Similarly, a high proportion (62 per cent in 1975) of stolen autos are recovered. Id.
at 178. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 37 (1975) [hereinafter
U.C.R. 1975].
36. See Table 2, Appendix A.
(Vol. 74:15111518
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Moreover, during the same period the percentage of stolen property
recovered declined from 52.4 per cent to 29.9 per cent." Rising
theft rates and declining recovery rates, especially of goods recently
manufactured for sale to consumers, are consistent with the theory
that theft is the by-product of sophisticated fencing schemes that quick-
ly redistribute stolen goods and frustrate police procedures currently
employed to control them.
These conclusions are supported by other observations reported
in appendix A. First, the increase in personal property thefts is pri-
marily accounted for by a rapid increase in thefts of "miscellaneous"
property,18 as classified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
its Uniform Crime Reports. "Miscellaneous" property includes of-
fice equipment, televisions, radios, stereophonic equipment, fire-
arms, household goods, consumable goods and livestock,89 goods
which are constantly in high demand by consumers. These goods
also are usually quite easy to conceal and transport, and can often
be "legitimized" simply by removing identifying labels since they are
rarely not marked with serial numbers; they are thus easy to fence.40
Second, the increase in the value of property recovered kept pace
with the increase in the value of property stolen until 1966 when
the recovery rate droped dramatically. This drop coincides with the
acceleration of thefts of miscellaneous property. 41 Finally, the sta-
tistics indicate that although the overall recovery rate declined, the
ability of law enforcement authorities to recover most types of stolen
property did in fact improve.42  Nevertheless, improved police pro-
cedures for recovering such items as automobiles, furs, and jewelry
have been more than offset in the overall recovery rate by the inade-
quacy of existing investigative techniques to recover miscellaneous
property.
This study supports other commentary that postulates a high cor-
relation between merchandise frequently stolen and that readily de-
manded by consumers.43 It also reinforces more intuitive observa-
tions that thieves do not hijack truck loads of razor blades, tires or
tuna fish for personal consumption. 44 Redistribution for profit is al-
ways the ultimate objective of these thefts, and the consumer mar-
37. See Table 4, Appendix A.
38. See section A, Appendix A.
39. See id.
40. See section B(6), Appendix A.
41. See section B(3), Appendix A.
42. See section B(4), Appendix A.
43. Roselius & Benton, Stolen Goods 182; see text at note 71 infra.
44. See V. TnmEsA, supra note 29, at 141-42 (theft of razor blades).
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ket is generally quite willing to absorb stolen goods.4" Although
consumers are often unaware they are purchasing stolen property,46
many bargain hunters have displayed a marked proclivity to buy such
merchandise when it is available.47 In this regard, reference already
has been made to the importance of apparently legitimate business-
men who seek a competitive edge by selling stolen merchandise48
and whose cash resources facilitate redistribution. Clearly, there-
fore, the survival of criminal redistribution systems depends upon the
continued propensity of consumers and businesses to buy illegal
goods. 9
The ultimate consequences of theft and fencing for both the na-
tional economy and American society is not completely reflected in
the estimated 20.3 billion dollar cost of property crimes.50 On one
level, rising theft rates for many legitimate businesses mean higher in-
45. "[M/any of these things are stolen for order and they are handled by or-
ganized crime. The markets are already established and the property is absorbed into
our economic system just like a huge dry sponge. It just sucks it all up and it disap-
pears. . . ." REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 3; see id. at 13-14, 23-24; Roselius
& Benton, Stolen Goods 174.
46. STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS 7.
47. See note 29 supra.
48. See C. KLoccARs, supra note 12, at 62, 111-12; REPORT, THE IMPACT OF
CRIME 3, 13-14, 23-24; notes 117-25 infra and accompanying text. Some establish-
ments may be reluctant "to buy from irregular, noninstitutionalized sources of supply,"
but will ultimately wind up obtaining stolen property because of their failure to check
the purchasing practices of their buyers, or because a fence has successfully estab-
lished a quasi-legitimate front. See Roselius & Benton, Stolen Goods 183; Emerson,
They Can Get It for You Cheaper Than Wholesale, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Nov. 22,
1971, at 37.
The greed of legitimate businessmen is a prime support of fencing activity. See
generally Hearings on Fencing 4. Thieves often feel "completely safe in making an
offer to an apparently legitimate store." Id. Pure greed may not be the only factor.
"Given current economic conditions, many small businessmen are only too glad to
get merchandise at low swag [stolen property] market prices." Emerson, supra, at
37. "[Ma poor areas of the inner city, where small businesses have an enormous rate
of failure, fencing may make the difference between survival and failure." Chasan,
supra note 1, at 17. Finally, in other situations, organized crime may be coercing
businessmen to trade in stolen goods. See note 119 infra and accompanying text.
49. By analogy, it has been said that "the American confederation of organized
crime thrives because a large minority of citizens demand illicit goods . . . that it
has for sale." Cressey, Methodological Problems in the Study of Organized Crime
as a Social Problem, 374 ANNALS OF THE Am. ACADEMY OF POL. & SOc. SCI. 101,
107 (1967). See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
isTATIoN OF JUSnCE, TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 2 (1967) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME]. For a discussion of the role of organized
crime in fencing activity, see notes 150-69 infra and accompanying text.
50. See CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 3 (actual dollar value of lost cargo
does not reflect other consequences of the theft); Hearings on S. 16, S. 33, S. 750,
S. 1946, S. 2087, S. 2426, S. 2748, S. 2856, S. 2994, and S. 2995 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 309, 356 (1972) [hereinafter Hearings on Criminal LUwsl.
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surance rateg51 and administrative costs,5" strained customer rela-
tions,5" and lost profits. 4 In many cases, the free flow of commerce
may be impeded. 5 On another level, although the sophistication of
fencing schemes varies considerably, the typical fence operates as a
businessman, often selling goods at discount and undercutting legiti-
mate competitors. Ultimately, therefore, widespread and sophisticated
theft and fencing threatens the free enterprise system 6 as tax reve-
nues decline57 and legitimate businesses are forced to lay off employ-
ees,58 to relocate, to use other methods of shipping goods, or, per-
haps, to declare bankruptcy.59
There is a clear and pressing need, therefore, to recognize the
undesirable consequences of fencing operations and to deal with
them forcefully. An important factor in our society's neglect of the
fence's role in the theft problem, however, has been his singular suc-
cess in avoiding prosecution and conviction."0 To a limited extent,
51. See SENAT SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON
SMALL BusINEs--PART III, S. REP. No. 91-1547, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1970)
[hereinafter SELECr COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS]; Hearings on Stolen Securities 66.
52. See SELEcT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS 3; CARGo TimFr AND ORGANIZED
CRIME 4.
53. See CARGo THEFT AND ORGANIzED CRIME 4.
54. See, e.g., id. at 4-5.
55. See id. at 5.
56. Ironically, since most stolen goods are eventually resold in the stream of con-
sumer commerce, they are often used in direct competition against the very business-
men who originally attempted to import them. See Hearings on Criminal Laws 356;
CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 8.
57. CARcoO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 8.
58. See generally note 31 supra.
59. See generally CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 5. When a particular
carrier or port of entry establishes a poor safety record with respect to the security
of its cargo facilities, a poor image may be acquired that would motivate shippers
to divert their cargo to alternative routes or modes of transportation. Id. at 7-8. A
poor image, once acquired, is difficult to lose. Id.
A recent report issued by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor re-
veals that airline theft may be valued at a figure as high as $16 million per year
at Kennedy, La Guardia and Newark airports (more than in the rest of the country
combined); it also casts doubt on previous evidence given to Congress that the theft
problem was being brought under control. WATERFRONT COMmN. OF N.Y. HARBOR,
REPORT ON THE TRUE EXTENT OF CARGO THEFT AT THE NEw YORK-NEw JERSEY AIR-
PORTS 2-3 (1975). The Commission concluded:
The thefts at our airports are really only symptomatic of the more basic
problem of criminal control of the air freight industry. Large-scale theft of
gold, silver, platinum, rare metals, furs, jewelry, diamonds, etc. are not thefts of
individual impulse, but rather require sophisticated planning in advance by or-
ganized groups as well as previously arranged distribution channels to get such
commodities into manufacturing and consumer markets.
Id. at 31.
60. Hearings on Criminal Laws 309-10. Compare REPORT, THE IMPACT OF
CRIME 10, with J. HALL, supra note 5, at 197-98. Nationally, the crime of receiving
stolen property has had a conviction rate (offense charged) of 38 per cent for a num-
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this success is a product of current law enforcement practices that
tolerate fencing as a quid pro quo for information concerning theft0'
and other crimes that police consider more important. While these
law enforcement priorities reveal a failure to recognize receiving as
a cause of other crime, they also reflect deficiencies both in tech-
niques used to detect fencing and in the substantive law that frus-
trates the prosecution of alleged fences.6 2  Thus, partial responsibil-
ity for the rising theft rate and the tremendous amount of property
successfully redistributed annually may be attributed to a failure of
the legal system to recognize the character and consequences of
modem theft and fencing operations.63  Section I of this article de-
scribes various theft and fencing operations. As will be evident from
that discussion, the most sophisticated fences are far removed from
those receivers who are owners of seedy pawnshops or who indis-
criminately select potential customers on the street, and thus they
pose peculiar problems for law enforcement. Section II then iden-
tifies inadequacies in existing investigative techniques and in the sub-
stantive laws of receiving in light of modem theft and fencing opera-
tions. It proposes changes in the law and suggests appropriate law
enforcement strategies to facilitate the detection and conviction of
alleged fences. Needed changes in the civil law are also discussed.
Throughout these sections of the article, reference will be made to
the provisions of a Model Theft and Fencing Act set forth in appen-
dixB.
ber of years. See, e.g., U.C.R. 1975, at 174. Historically, gaps in the substantive
law have made it difficult to convict fences. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 173.
There have also been other barriers to successful prosecution:
It has always been difficult to convict professional receivers. . . . mhey
have been shrewd enough to devise methods of operation which [escape] public
notice. They dress their illegal traffic in all the paraphernalia of lawful enter-
prise; they conduct their businesses secretly; they are equipped both mentally
and financially to take full advantage of the weaknesses in the administrative
machine, should prosecution be initiated.
J. HALL, supra note 5, at 195. At least some law enforcement officials today feel
that the substantive law related to fencing activity is satisfactory, believing that the
"difficulties arise in the practical application of the law especially in the evidentiary
and procedural area." Hearings on Fencing 46. Chappell and Walsh have stated
that "fencing should be considered and attacked as a problem of legal revision, of
updating the law to the contemporary situation." Chappell & Walsh, Receiving
Stolen Property 489.
61. See Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 166-67; C. KLoc.as, supra
note 12, at 27-28, 194-95. See generally J. HALL, supra note 5, at 201-02.
62. See notes 175-467 infra and accompanying text.
63. Chappell and Walsh attribute partial responsibility for the legal system's in-
adequacies to society's inaccurate perception of the fence: "mo deal effectively
with the fence, we must first alter our perceptions of him. . . . The law, after all,
can only proscribe and protect against that which we can describe and demonstrate
for it." Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 168 (emphasis original).
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I. THE REALITIES OF MODERN FENCING SYSTEMS
Although patterns of redistribution differ in sophistication, all
fences are essentially businessmen engaged in "[t]he performance
of business activities that direct the flow of goods. . . from prodlicer
[thief] to consumer or user."64  As middlemen, fences must locate
supplies of stolen goods, contact purchasers, provide transportation
and storage facilities,65 and finance the entire process.66 During re-
distribution, therefore, fences confront two major risks: the risk of
detection while performing the middleman functions and the risk of
financial loss if the particular stolen goods cannot be marketed prof-
itably.6 7 As this section of the article will show, the extent of both
these risks varies inversely with the sophistication of the fencing op-
eration. Risks are minimized for the most successful fences who
have leadership ability, business acumen, established contacts with
thieves, broad operation bases, tight organizational control, and legit-
imate facades.6s It is, of course, these sophisticated receiving opera-
tions that pose the greatest challenge to our society. A brief study
of the most common fencing techniques is, therefore, necessary to
understand the changes that are desirable both in the substantive law
of receiving and in its enforcement.
A. Marketing Theory and the Fence
Successful fences frequently minimize their risks by adopting the
64. COMMrIrEE ON DEFINITIONS, AM. MARKETrING AssN., MAREKMENG DEFINI-
TiONS 15 (1960). This is the conventional definition of the term marketing. See
Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 177-78. Some commentators argue, however,
that
a broader definition is often used to give more specific direction to the persons
charged with performing the marketing functions. Thus, "[m]arketing is a total
system of interacting business activities designed to plan, price, promote, and dis-
tribute want-satisfying products and services to present and potential users."
This definition assumes that much of the behavior related to the distribution of
stolen goods consists of rational, economically guided decisions. It also indi-
cates that such distribution requires conscious effort and decision making by the
thief and fence.
Id. at 179 (citations omitted). Other authorities have recognized the business nature
of a fencing operation: "The business of dealing in stolen goods requires a trained
personnel. It requires most of the qualifications necessary to carry on any business
and a number of additional ones." J. HALL, supra note 5, at 156-57.
65. See Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 187.
66. Financing the transfer process actually involved paying the producers for
their labor and taking care of both transportation and storage arrangements. Ro-
selius and Benton maintain that of these three functions, providing the thieves with
their payment is the most important marketing service performed by the fence. See
Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 186; STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESs 6-7.
67. See Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 187; STAFF REPORT ON SMALL
BusiNEss 7.
68. Arguably, "image-building" is no longer an important aspect of a fencing op-
eration. But see Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 165.
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same marketing techniques used by legitimate businessmen.10 For
example, fences frequently use elementary supply and demand prin-
ciples to determine which goods can be moved safely and quickly
through the redistribution chain.70 This information is then passed
to thieves who usually use it in determining the types of merchandise
to steal. 71  Although virtually any item can be fenced, 72 many fences
prefer high value, low volume goods that produce handsome profits
and can easily be hidden and transported.78 Most fences, however,
deal in high volume goods of lower value that are not easily identi-
fied by police 74 because of the large quantitites of physically indistin-
guishable products manufactured today. Thus, the list of commonly
fenced "safer" goods includes clothing, stereos, radios, home appli-
ances, cigarettes, liquor, pharmaceutical drugs, building supplies, office
equipment, and securities. 75  Shoplifters, 76 employees, 7' and bur-
69. See Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 178, 185-88; STAFF REPORT ON
SMALL BUSINESS 6; Hearings on Criminal Laws 309.
70. See Hearings on Criminal Laws 309; Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory
184. See generally J. HALL, supra note 5, at 160.
71. Hall has remarked that, "[o]f all these factors [influencing fencing activity],
fluctuations in the general market are the most important conditioning forces upon
the receiver's purchases and consequently upon professional theft." J. HALL, supra
note 5, at 160. See generally Truck Hijacking: Fastest Growing Racket, U.S. NEWS
AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 14, 1970, at 27; Hearings on Fencing 150-51; note 74 inira
and accompanying text.
72. "Almost anything seems to lure today's thieves: Hotpants are a hot item for
today's department store shoplifters. Typewriters, adding machines, electric clocks,
and xerox copiers-anything that isn't securely nailed down-are disappearing from
offices and warehouses." Dietsch, Theft: The Hidden Tax, Washington Star, July
12, 1971, pt. 1.
73. Antique pieces, expensive paintings, jewelry, and even certain kinds of con-
struction equipment (e.g., giant heavy equipment tires) are good examples of high
value, low volume goods. "Consumer goods such as guns, gems, autos, television sets,
and liquor ... " also fit into this category. Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory
196-97.
74. One of the prosecutor's chief obstacles in gaining convictions is the identifica-
tion of the goods as stolen. See notes 223-32 infra and accompanying text. Accord-
ingly, "identification of goods is the chief risk to be avoided" by any fence. J. HALL,
supra note 5, at 160.
75. See STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS 6; Hearings on Fencing 3-4, 22-23,
43, 149-53; Hearings on Stolen Securities 38, 547; Chasan, supra note 1.
76. "Total inventory losses which result almost entirely from shoplifting and em-
ployee theft are estimated as high as four to five per cent of sales at some stores.
This is virtually equal to the normal profit margins in retailing." COMMERCE DEPT.
REPORT 14. Over-alli shoplifting accounts for 28 per cent of retail loss due to prop-
erty crimes. Id. at 9. "Shoplifting in some metropolitan areas is highly organized,
with the stolen goods handled only by certain fences." Furstenberg, Violence and
Organized Crime, 13 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: A STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL
COMMN. ON THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE 911, 922 (1969). See generally Shoplift-
Ing: The Pinch That Hurts, BUSINESS WEEK, June 27, 1970, at 72; Shoplifting, Long
a Plague of Urban Stores, Is Now an Increasing Menace in the Suburbs, Wall Street
J., Dec. 23, 1971, at 22, col. 1.
77. In the cargo industry, employees are participants in 80 per cent of theft ac-
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glars,7 a who together account for most commercial theft,79 often steal
these high-demand products and sell them to fences for redistribu-
tion.80 Even though fences usually deal in high-demand products, the
use of standard marketing principles is, nevertheless, often imperfect
because the demand for and supply of stolen property are extremely
heterogeneous;81 the only fences consistently successful in matching
supply and demand are those with reliable and well-connected inform-
ants8 who can direct the fences to thieves able to supply particular
goods and customers willing to purchase them.
Once supply and demand have been estimated, a fence must
price his stolen merchandise. As in legitimate marketing operations,
pricing involves a consideration of current market prices, available
tivity. "Cartons [are] stolen by those who have easy access to shipments." CARGO
THEFT AND ORGANZED CRuME 19. It is estimated that "70 to 80 per cent of the
cargo stolen as the result of employee theft... is converted into cash through the
use of fences." Id. See Hearings on Fencing 39, 144-46. For excellent examples
of such theft activity, see C. KLocKARs, supra note 12, at 61-62, 75, 85-88, 107-08,
143-44. A detailed summary of employee theft techniques is provided in CARGO
THnvr TAND ORGAzED CRimE 37-38.
A similar situation prevails in the retail industry. Employee theft is estimated
to account for 13 per cent of the losses resulting from property crimes, but the Com-
merce Department and other sources feel that this percentage is greatly understated
because businesses are reluctant "to admit the magnitude of their employee theft
problem . . . ." COMMERCE DEPT. REPORT 9-11. There is little reason to believe
that these employees retain their stolen goods for personal consumption. See gener-
ally Hearings on Fencing 4; Gregory, Why Workers Steal, SATuRDAY EvENwG POST,
Nov. 10, 1962, at 68.
78. Burglaries account for 23 per cent of property crime losses incurred by retail
businesses. The over-all national burglary rate increased 256.6 per cent between 1960
and 1975. See U.C.R, 1975, at 49. This activity cost business and noncommercial
victims a loss of $1.4 billion in 1975. Id. at 28. The goods obtained by burglarizing
both residential and commercial establishments are commonly passed on to fences.
See Hearings on Fencing 161.
79. See generally U.C.R. 1975, at 25-31.
80. See notes 75-77, supra. "To make the original theft profitable, it seems evi-
dent that the huge amounts of goods stolen from carrier vehicles, stores, docks, termi-
nals, and warehouses must be passed along to unscrupulous buyers for eventual re-
sale." Hearings on Fencing 1.
81. Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 184.
82. Roselius & Benton state:
The dominant form of market information about stolen goods is word-of-mouth
communications between consumers, fences, information brokers such as bar-
tenders, and thieves. [Our] study [in Colorado] found no evidence of sophisti-
cated data gathering and analysis similar to the very effective techniques used by
legitimate businessmen. However, it is likely that syndicated crime [in other
areas] does use such techniques on large volume transactions.
Id. at 188. In addition, tips supplied by company employees are an important source
of marketing research information. See notes 140, 144-45 infra and accompanying
text. To the extent that a fence is able to buy goods on order for customers who
have already indicated a willingness to purchase designated stolen merchandise, his
marketing research difficulties with respect to the demand function are eliminated.
Buying on order is a frequent occurrence. See notes 111, 121 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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capital resources, promotional costs, personnel disbursements, and
storage and transportation expenses.88 The price of stolen property,
however, also includes the costs of precautionary measures taken to
avoid detection, such as removing identifying labels from the goods,
surreptitiously handling the merchandise and, frequently, paying
bribes.8 4 Ultimately, the price of stolen merchandise reflects both
the length of the redistribution chain and the costs of legitimizing
the product.85 If fences must charge prices approximating legit-
imate wholesale or retail prices, stolen goods will lose their competi-
tive appeal and demand will diminish.
One approach taken by certain cost-conscious fences is to trade
only in particular goods. By specializing in art, jewelry, or automo-
biles, for example, a fence can eliminate many costly and risky trans-
actions. Specialization, however, does not guarantee success,80 and
83. See Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 192.
84. See I. HALL, supra note 5, at 159-60; F. IANN, BLACK MAMA 131-32 (1974).
85. Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 191. When the purchaser is aware that
the goods have been stolen, the goods may be sold at a lower price. Id. Indeed,
the aware consumer actually expects to purchase stolen goods at bargain rates. In
contrast, when the consumer is unaware that
the goods are stolen, an effort must be made within the channel of distribu-
tion to legitimize the transaction by disguising the fact that the property is
stolen. Differences in channels will entail differences in the number and type
of middlemen involved.
The thief may sell directly to the consumer but must take steps to give the
transaction an aura of legality. If he cannot legitimize the transaction or per-form some middleman marketing function, he must utilize one or more inter-
mediaries in the channel of distribution, generally a fence. Legitimation is best
accomplished if the fence operates a cover or front institution of some kind.
Id.
86. C. KLocKAas, supra note 12 at 188:
mhe would-be successful dealer in stolen property may find that forces be-yond his control prohibit him from buying both profitably and regularly. Thisis particularly true if he has decided to become a specialist dealer. The would-
be successful dealer in fine art for example, may buy and sell profitably, but mayfind that not enough fine art is stolen to permit him to deal regularly. Similarly,
the would-be jewelry specialist may find that generalist fences . . . and "occa-
sional receiver" legitimate jewelers take up the small regular trade, leaving him
only with opportunities to buy large quantities of very expensive jewelry which
nonspecialists are not prepared to handle. The would-be specialist in men's
suits, on the other hand, may find that he can buy small quantities of suits regu-
larly but not profitably, because thieves manage to sell them to "lay receivers"
at prices which are close to or equal to what he would pay for them legitimately.Specialist dealers are generally under economic pressure to deal in large quanti-
ties of their particular item. They are also likely to plan each highly profitable
indi ,idual transaction days, weeks, or even months in advance.
In contrast,
[t]he generalist dealer may find himself subject to quite different pressures from
the economies of theft. These pressures may permit him to deal regularly but
may tax his ability to do so profitably. The advantage which the generalist
dealer offers to generalist thieves is a ready market for those things which are
commonly stolen. Like the department store or shopping center, his attraction
is convenience. He is willing and able to buy most things that are stolen, often
without special preparations. Two forces are likely to play upon him economic-
ally. On the one hand, there is a tendency for him to become more "conveni-
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the extent to which a fence can successfully specialize and reduce
his risks depends on the sophistication of his operation.
Thus, the use of established marketing principles to analyze fenc-
ing behavior, although somewhat imperfect, permits two rather intui-
tive observations. First, measures that increase a fence's difficulty
in matching supply and demand prolong redistribution and increase
his risks of detection. Second, as these risks increase so too do the
costs of minimizing them, and thus stolen goods begin to lose their
competitive advantage as their prices rise. Once the risks of finan-
cial loss and detection become sufficiently great, fencing activity may
be curtailed. Suppose, for example, that most manufacturers of
high-demand goods were to label their products with conspicuous se-
rial numbers and were accurately to record those numbers.s7 Such
measures might prolong redistribution and increase a receiver's risks
of detection and financial loss. They would have these effects by
deterring, to some extent, purchasers who knowingly buy stolen
property, since the goods of these manufacturers would be readily
identifiable; facilitating detection of fencing activity unless added
precautionary measures were taken; and increasing the cost of legit-
imizing stolen merchandise. Additionally, such measures might
prolong redistribution for similar goods not so labelled by preventing
fences from arranging their resale far in advance because they were
uncertain as to whether they could obtain unlabelled goods, and, sim-
ilarly, by making fences reluctant to refuse to purchase such scarce
goods even though they did not yet have buyers.
It is important always to keep in mind, however, that the extent
to which such measures would increase fencing risks would also de-
pend on other factors, such as the sophistication of the fence's opera-
tion. Although simple serial numbering of products may help in the
detection and conviction of relatively unsophisticated "neighbor-
hood" and "outlet" fences, more comprehensive measures may be
needed to help detect large, well-financed fences who can easily
shoulder the costs of legitimizing stolen goods and the added risk
ent," that is, to handle a wider and wider variety of items. Because specialist
items are likely to be working with specialist dealers, the unusual items that the
generalist dealer is pressed to handle may be small amounts of items taken by
chance by generalist thieves. Unless the generalist dealer has an unlimited num-
ber of buyers or develops other means of disposing of exotic merchandise, he
must find ways of limiting what he buys so as to match his capacities to sell.
The specialist dealer must also limit what he buys to what he is prepared to han-
dle readily, but the intermittent character of his trade may make it possible for
him to prepare to sell what he knows he is going to buy.
Id. at 188-89.
87. See text at notes 227-31 infra.
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of detection. a8 Attention, therefore, must focus briefly on the major
types of fencing systems.
B. Patterns of Redistribution
The extremely successful eighteenth century fencing operations
of Jonathan Wild 8 provide a preliminary framework for the analysis
of modem criminal redistribution systems. Sometimes called the
"Father of Professional Fencing,"9 Wild's "astonishing organiza-
tional sophistication '9 1 enabled him to develop a large-scale system
of redistribution that "[controlled] the London underworld for more
than a decade . ... 92
Although his redistribution system was constrained by economic
and demographic factors that made the resale of most stolen property
impractical, 93 Wild still managed to make a fortune by opening an
office for the "recovery of lost property, ' 94 a subterfuge through
which he established contacts with thieves and, in effect, fenced
stolen goods by selling them back to their original owners and col-
lecting rewards. The success of this system depended upon Wild's
ability simultaneously to gain the confidence of thieves with whom
he dealt and yet to maintain a clean public image,9" an understand-
ably delicate balancing process that he accomplished by applying ele-
mentary marketing principles and by taking advantage of the then
current English law. Wild built good relations with thieves by pay-
ing the best prices in London for stolen goods, 96 and he created and
88. See note 229 infra.
89. A vast literature is available which examines the life of Jonathan Wild in
great detail. See, e.g., D. DEFOE, THE KING OF PIRATFS (1901); H. FIELDING, THE
LIFE OF MR. JONATHAN WILD THE GREAT (1926); G. HowsoN, THE TmEF-TAKER
GENERAL: THE RISE AND FALL OF JONATHAN WILD (1970); P. PRINGLE, THE THIEF-
TAKERs (1958).
90. C. KLocKAIs, supra note 12, at 3.
91. Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 165.
92. C. KLOCKAaiS, supra note 12, at 3. At his peak jonathan Wild directed the
activities of approximately 7000 thieves. Id. at 13. He divided London into dis-
tricts, each administered by carefully selected assistants whom Wild controlled by the
threat of legal prosecution under the Transportation Act. Id. at 17. Wild ran his
operation in a business-like manner. Indeed, he referred to it as a "corporation."
Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 165. Thieves were often skillfully trained,
responsibilities were delegated, and even advertising was employed. See id. at 157,
159, 165-67; C. KLOCKA IS, supra note 12, at 13-19.
93. See Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 167; notes 2-7 supra and ac-
companying text. Items that could not be resold in England were frequently smug-
gled out of the country. See C. KLOcKARs, supra note 12, at 13; Chappell & Walsh,
"No Questions Asked" 167-68.
94. See C. KLoc ARs, supra note 12, at 14-15.
95. Id. at 16-17.
96. Id. at 11-12.
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maintained his untarnished public reputation by "thief-taking"-that
is, aiding in the capture of thieves or providing evidence to convict
themY7  Incidentally, the self-proclaimed "Thief-Taker General of
Great Britain and Ireland" 8 also accomplished a more subtle goal
by helping to convict thieves: Through such activity, he actually
tightened his control over the approximately 7,000 thieves in London
by giving him means to punish those thieves who would not deal
with him."
This brief description of Wild's operation is instructive for at least
two reasons... First, it demonstrates that Wild's success depended
upon his tight organizational control and, perhaps more importantly,
upon his ability to project two apparently contrasting images-an
ability that minimized his risks of detection. Thus, "'[b]efore a
thief, he was a fellow thief; before a gentleman, a gentleman.' "00
Second, it demonstrates in a rather simple fashion the extent to
which inadequacies in the law may promote fencing. In fact, Wild's
operation continued to expand until he succumbed to a law (the so-
called "Jonathan Wild's Act") specifically designed to defeat him.' 01
As will be evident in the following discussion, the most sophisticated
and the most dangerous modem fences also successfully project con-
trasting images and exploit inadequacies in the substantive law. 02
1. The "Neighborhood Connection"
[S]ome fences may deal directly with a thief and openly sell to a
buyer. This type of fence is usually found in every neighborhood,
and he deals primarily with small amounts of property. He is the
"neighborhood connection."'03
97. Id. at 9-10. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 73; Chappell & Walsh, "No Ques-
tions Asked" 159.
98. C. KLocKARs, supra note 12, at 16-17.
99. Id. at 17. It was alleged that "notwithstanding his [Wild's] pretended serv-
ices in detecting and prosecuting offenders, he procured such only to be hanged as
concealed their booty, or refused to share it with him." J. HALL, supra note 5, at
71-72. See Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 159. Although Wild generally
limited his thief-taking activities to those who did not recognize his authority, his
public reputation grew because the assistance he offered did, in fact, lead to the cap-
ture and destruction of many of London's most powerful criminal gangs. See C.
KLOCKARS, supra note 12, at 17-19.
100. C. KLoCKARs, supra note 12, at 12.
101. Id. at 25-26. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 73-76.
102. The typology of fences found in the text is only one of many possible. For
a typology based on sources of property dealt with, see STRATEGIS 14-23. It is im-
portant to emphasize, too, that one individual may play many different roles in many
different transactions; the types in the text, therefore, should not be viewed as mu-
tually exclusive.
103. Hearings on Fencing 44. Perhaps saying that the "neighborhood connec-
tion" exists in "every neighborhood" goes too far. But if the fence himself is not
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By definition, the neighborhood fence is a small-time operator.
He may, on occasion, actually steal merchandise for resale, but more
often he is supplied by local thieves, such as smal-time shoplifters
or dishonest cargo company employees.104 Although neighborhood
fences tend to specialize, they often buy whatever stolen property
is available if the price is reasonable and the item is in demand.10 1
Once the thief is paid, the goods are frequently stored in unimagina-
tive and insecure hiding places, for instance, in the trunk of a car
or the receiver's basement.'06
Although the neighborhood fence has no permanent place of
business, stolen goods are almost never hustled on the streets be-
cause of the risks involved.107  Instead, the goods are sold in living
rooms, local bars, or garages, or to local retail stores and pawnshops. 08
The neighborhood fence rapidly acquires a reputation as a dealer
in stolen property because little effort is made to legitimize the goods
and because his operation is essentially local. As he develops a reg-
ular clientele of thieves, 0 9 a neighborhood fence may occasionally
expand his operation by organizing thefts for customers,"10 by work-
ing closely with other fences,"' and by serving as one of many dis-
tributors for property stolen by organized crime syndicates. 112
There are several reasons why neighborhood fences represent
considerably less of a threat to our society than do large-scale fences.
in the neighborhood, there is usually someone in every neighborhood who knows
where such a fence can be found. For a good account of a neighborhood fencing
operation, see Emerson, supra note 48, at 311-17.
104. See Emerson, supra note 48, at 34-38. See generally Hearings on Fencing
44. For a good example of the working relationship between a neighborhood fence
and his boosters, see Emerson, supra note 48, at 313.
105. See Emerson, supra note 48, at 35-36. See generally Hearings on Fencing 6.
106. Hiding places for the temporary storage of stolen goods are known in the
street language of the "trade" as "drops." See note 146 inlra and accompanying
text.
107. In reality, street hustlers often peddle legitimate merchandise which has
been characterized as "'store-bought' swag." Emerson, supra note 48, at 37.
108. See id. at 35-38.
109. See id. at 35-38. For a neighborhood fence, the development of a local rep-
utation may be equated with Jonathan Wild's concern with "image-building." See
notes 95-100 supra and accompanying text. See also note 129 infra and accompany-
ing text.
110. See Emerson, supra note 48, at 36-37.
111. The neighborhood fence may work with a professional fence who specializes
in wholesaling. "[A] wholesale . . . dealer . . . sells only in large quantities to
other hustlers but does no hustling himself." Id. at 38. A wholesaler may be a mid-
dleman "in the chain of distribution for mob-controlled thefts . . . ." Id. For an
analysis of the professional fence, see notes 126-28 infra and accompanying text.
112. See Emerson, supra note 48, at 34. On the concept of "organized crime,"
see note 154 infra.
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First, they are more easily detected by conventional police investiga-
tive techniques because they often retain actual possession of the
goods until redistribution is complete,113 make little effort to disguise
the illegal nature of their goods, and are frequently well-known to
both thieves and police. Second, neighborhood fences rarely ex-
pand because they usually have limited financial resources and mar-
keting opportunities that prevent their establishing a broad operational
base or developing long-term relationships with a significant number
of thieves. Finally, although a small-scale fencing operation may
generate substantial personal income, neighborhood fences probably
only distribute a small percentage of the stolen property redistributed
annually.1 14
2. The Outlet Fence
Many businesses that primarily market legitimate merchandise
also serve, knowingly or unknowingly, as convenient outlets for large
quantities of low-cost stolen goods,' and gain obvious competitive
advantages from such marketing.""' These so-called outlet fences,
especially the large, prestigious establishments, usually do not deal
directly with thieves. 1 7  Instead, transfers of illicit merchandise to
these merchants are engineered by so-called professional or master
fences whose functions are similar to those of legitimate wholesalers.
Before delivery to outlet fences, these wholesalers of stolen goods
repackage the merchandise and remove all identifying features."18
113. Possession is strong circumstantial evidence of guilt in a prosecution for the
crime of receiving stolen property. Further, in most states, possession raises a pre-
sumption that the fence had knowledge that the goods were stolen. See notes 335-
42 infra and accompanying text. For this reason, other more sophisticated fences
generally attempt to avoid actual possession. See notes 143-47 infra and accompany-
ing text.
114. On the other hand, an anti-fencing strategy that was concerned with local
burglaries or thefts committed primarily by addicts and juveniles might well decide
to focus on the "neighbor fence." See STRATEGIES 14-16.
115. See CARGO THEFr AND ORGANIZED CRIME 22; notes 45-48 supra and accom-
panying text. "It seems paramount that these businesses must be named for what
they really are, a part of this country's criminal system and not what they think they
are, 'good' businessmen interested in making a 'good' profit." Hearings on Fencing
37.
116. For example, a retailer may purchase goods at relatively low prices and then
sell them at the standard retail level (or just a bit below). The result is a higher
mark-up and obviously a greater profit margin. See, e.g., V. TERESA, supra note 29,
at 141. In some cases, a retail outlet may be unaware that it is buying stolen goods,
and in those circumstances the bulk of the excess profit is reaped by third parties,
often the fence and a store's buyer.
117. See Roselius & Benton, Stolen Goods 183.
118. Note that this is in sharp contrast with the procedures utilized by a neigh-
borhood fence who generally makes no effort to disguise the swag identity of his
goods. See text at note 109 supra.
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The stolen merchandise then not only is ready for its reentry into
traditional streams of commerce, but also is difficult for police and
honest businessmen to identify.
In contrast to neighborhood fences, therefore, sophisticated out-
let fences pose more serious challenges to law enforcement efforts.
First, the merchandise these apparently legitimate businesses receive
is usually the product of sophisticated theft and redistribution oper-
ations, 119 and the prospect of high retail profits often provides suffi-
cient incentive for retailers to develop a long-term relationship with
supplying fences. 120  Thus, outlet fences have a greater adverse im-
pact on society than do neighborhood fences simply because they
market large quantities of stolen merchandise that otherwise could
not be readily redistributed. Indeed, once such retailers begin to
expand their dealings in stolen property they may become profes-
sional fences.' 2 '
Second, although any establishment handling stolen property is
technically a fence, criminal liability in most jurisdictions attaches only
if authorities can prove the establishment knowingly dealt in stolen
property, a mens rea difficult to prove if, as is often the case, either
the business had no direct contact with thieves or the merchandise
when delivered already had been legitimized. 22  One way to prove
an outlet fence actually had the requisite mens rea is to examine
the circumstances surrounding its transaction with the wholesaling
fence. For example, as discussed in section I, there is strong evi-
dence of the requisite knowledge if authorities can prove that the
wholesaling fence offered the goods at a price substantially lower
than the legitimate wholesale market price, had no evidence of own-
ership beyond mere possession, or demanded cash when the usual
practice is to accept a check and issue a receipt. 2 '
Finally, even if a knowledge standard is not unduly burdensome
for the prosecution in cases involving small retailers whose propri-
119. See notes 159-60 infra and accompanying text.
120. For this reason, and because of the sophisticated thefts involved, fencing op-
erations involving legitimate businesses probably stimulate considerable "buy-on-
order" theft activity. See Hearings on Fencing 42; REPORT, THE IMPACr OF CRIME
3.
121. "Most professional receivers seem, indeed, to be offshoots from legitimate
businesses." J. HALL, supra note 5, at 156. See Hearings on Fencing 161. The
characteristics of a professional fence are discussed in greater detail in notes 141-
54 infra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 274-409 infra and accompanying text.
123. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 224-25 n.72. Many sophisticated purchasers
of stolen goods, however, take precautionary measures to disguise the illegality of
their transactions. For example, phoney checks or fake receipts may be used for
these purposes. See notes 132-38 infra and accompanying text.
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etors control all aspects of the purchase and resale, it has serious
deficiencies when applied to large-scale retailers. For example,
upper-level management of a department store chain often has no
actual knowledge of illegal transactions because most purchasing de-
cisions are made at lower levels. By not participating in purchasing
decisions, upper-level management may knowingly promote the pur-
chase of stolen goods by the chain's buyers seeking a cost advantage
over their competitors and yet avoid criminal liability by intention-
ally remaining ignorant of relevant transactions. 124  As in the case
of smaller retailers, proof of purchases at unusually low prices is
strong evidence that store buyers knowingly acted illegally, although
frequently the illegal offer itself is even more overt.' 25
3. The Professional Fence
So-called professional fences frequently front as legitimate retail
businesses' 28 and may be either specialist or generalist fences, de-
pending, in large part, on the nature of their retail establishments. 127
Although professional fences thus appear to be similar to outlet
fences, they are different in two important respects.
First, unlike outlet fences who may only occasionally handle
stolen property,128 professional fences are primarily criminal distrib-
utors specializing in stolen merchandise, though they may also do
a substantial amount of legitimate business. Interestingly, since pro-
fessional fences require a steady flow of substantial amounts of stolen
124. See C. KIocmras, supra note 12, at 111-12; Hearings on Criminal Laws 310;
Chasan, supra note 1, at 15.
125. For example, direct bribes may serve as monetary incentives inducing a
buyer to purchase stolen goods. In addition, the buyer may also be rewarded by
management for purchasing his merchandise at a good price. See Hearings on Crimi-
nal Laws 310.
This discussion of the mens rea problem, more fully pursued in the text at notes
259-73 infra, should note that since a significant number of businesses dealing in
stolen property are pressured by organized crime to participate in redistribution
schemes, their participation is considerably less culpable than that of willing partici-
pants. See STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BusINEss &.- For a good example of organized
crime exerting pressure on legitimate businesses through the use of gambling and
loansharking techniques, see Hearings on Fencing 148-49. See generally CARGO
THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 28, 39; TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 4-5.
126. The seemingly legitimate business may be a retail discount center, bargain-
basement shop, pawnshop, junk dealership, or even a wholesaling enterprise. See
Emerson, supra note 48, at 37. Naturally, the more respectable the front, the more
security it affords.
127. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 156-57; notes 86-89 supra and accompanying
text. The relationship between the professional thief, the professional fence, and or-
ganized crime is carefully documented in PENN. CRIME COMMN. 1971-72 REPORT
107-37.
128. See notes 115-21 supra and accompanying text.
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merchandise and thus often need to deal directly with thieves, they
must simultaneously develop two contrasting images to a greater ex-
tent than outlet fences: they must appear sufficiently legitimate to
satisfy law enforcement agencies, or at least to frustrate investi-
gations, yet must actively promote their illegitimate operations to at-
tract both thieves wishing to sell and consumers wishing to purchase
stolen merchandise. 129  Thieves are naturally inclined to deal with
professional fences because they do not have ready access to outlet
fences, who are supplied by master fences, and because the ex-
tensive capital resources of professional fences make them more at-
tractive purchasers than neighborhood fences. A professional fence,
moreover, can frustrate police surveillance techniques and conviction
even though he retains actual physical possession or control over the
stolen merchandise.'1 0  In many cases, for example, the merchan-
dise can be resold within hours of its delivery.' 3" Otherwise, a pro-
fessional fence often can easily make his illegitimate conduct indis-
tinguishable from his legitimate activities.3 2 Thus, identifying char-
acteristics may be removed to the fullest extent possible' 83 by dispos-
ing of incriminating cartons, 84 removing labels, 18 and altering or
destroying serial numbers.' 86 Further, many brand name products
frequently can be successfully commingled with the fence's legit-
imate stock without any alteration. 37  In any case, false sales re-
ceipts are drafted and the fence's personal check for the purchase
price is cashed so that he has a receipt and a cancelled check,
129. See C. KocKAI~s, supra note 12, at 172, 190-91. Obviously, the modern
professional has many of the problems that faced Wild. See notes 95-101 supra and
accompanying text.
130. For an analysis of the legal problems posed by possession of stolen property,
see note 113 supra. These legal risks may be reduced by storing the goods in a ware-
house, but this is often not practical and this precaution does not necessarily elimi-
nate the possibility of a tracing process. "Secret locations under fictitious names are
simply not normal business procedures; if trouble developed, explaining a hidden stor-
age area might prove to pose more problems than the advantages such an area of-
fered." C. KLocxAs, supra note 12, at 93. Tracing can be avoided only if the fence
takes measures to ensure that the warehouse itself cannot be directly linked to him.
Even where a warehouse is available, the stolen goods must ultimately be transferred
to the retail establishment; consequently, actual possession cannot be avoided in-
terminably.
131. See C. KocnKAs, supra note 12, at 85-86; Hearings on Fencing 26-27. See
generally V. TERESA, supra note 29, at 143.
132. C. KLocKARs, supra note 12, at 89; 3. HALL, supra note 5, at 195.
133. See, e.g., C. ILocr.ARs, supra note 12, at 81, 87.
134. Id. Sometimes, instead of disposing of the carton, the fence simply removes
its original label and replaces it with his own. Id. at 88.
135. See id. at 81. See note 138 infra.
136. See id. at 83 n.6.
137. See id. at 81; J. HALL, supra note 5, at 192-93.
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thereby making his conviction extremely difficult even if the goods
are identified. 138
A second distinction is that as the operation of the professional
fence grows in sophistication, he may supply vital information to
thieves planning a theft'3 9 or may himself organize thefts for cus-
tomers. 140 Arranging successful thefts requires both an extensive
system of informants who provide inside information detailing the
location of particular property and security measures taken to protect
it, and a pool of potential thieves. A professional fence frequently
may satisfy both needs by using the shoplifters, dishonest employees,
and burglars with whom he regularly deals. Alternatively, the pro-
fessional fence may satisfy his customers' needs by contacting a so-
called master fence who wholesales stolen goods.
4. The Master Fence
The master fence directs a big-time operation and either organ-
izes large-scale thefts or serves as a middleman for other organ-
izers. ' 1  While other fences may perform similar services, the mas-
ter fence is distinguished by his ability to insulate himself from the
actual theft and subsequent redistribution process. 142 The master
fence operates as a broker, buying and selling stolen goods valued
138. See id. at 82, 90-91; J. HALL, supra note 5, at 189-91; Hearings on Fencing
4. All of this must, of course, be evaluated in the context of the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" rule in a criminal case. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
If the prosecution fails to convince any member of the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt a conviction is not possible. There is some evidence that as a result of recent
reform legislation the quality of juries, at least in federal cases, is not as high as it
might be. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970) (uniform jury selection). In addition
the expertise of the government in prosecuting complicated cases has diminished.
See Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 4, at 3709-11 (1972). These two factors may combine to make convictions
even less likely.
139. Professional fences frequently provide thieves with detailed information con-
cerning the location of items for theft. See, e.g., Hearings on Fencing 162. Even
so, although many professional fences undoubtedly have teams of thieves, most do
not personally arrange large-scale heists. Id. at 135-37.
140. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 162.
141. See Hearings on Fencing 135-38; note 153 infra.
142. Hence, "fences may. . . purchase the property from another fence, sight un-
seen, and never go near the 'drop' where the merchandise is kept. Their transactions
are all consummated over the telephone. This type of fence is known as the 'master
fence."' Hearings on Fencing 44. Cf. Chasan, supra note 1, at 15. For a good de-
scription of a master fencing operation, see CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME
40-42. Most professional fences do not qualify as master fences since they inevitably
come into contact with the stolen goods. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
Even so, a professional fence may, on occasion, do some master fencing by arranging
a transaction in which he is completely insulated.
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in the hundreds of thousands of dollars that are always the product
of large-scale theft, yet rarely, if ever, seeing or touching any of it. 48
To be successful, therefore, a master fence must have an exten-
sive system of contacts including both informants and potential large-
scale purchasers. For example, as an organizer of thefts, a master
fence relies upon his paid connections, such as a dock employee of
a manufacturing company or a dispatcher of a trucking outfit, to pro-
vide detailed information on shipments of valuable merchandise. 144
The master fence then contacts potential buyers,14' but does not ac-
tually arrange the theft until he has a firm agreement for resale.
Once such an agreement is concluded, he plans in great detail the
theft itself and arrangements for storing, legitimizing, and delivering
the stolen goods."'
Although these activities are more daring than those of most out-
let and professional fences, who do not regularly arrange thefts and
often receive stolen property already legitimized, master fences
avoid detection and conviction in two ways. First, they move stolen
merchandise rapidly through their redistribution chains because they
never steal unless a resale has been arranged. Second, and perhaps
more significantly, master fences rarely have actual physical contact
with either the stolen goods or their purchasers. They deal with
thieves and purchasers indirectly, usually through agents or by tele-
phone. These practices present obvious problems for law enforce-
ment authorities who must gather evidence. As a result, to convict
master fences, authorities must use sophisticated surveillance tech-
niques and must offer immunity from prosecution to other members
of the redistribution chain.147  Intensive surveillance, however, is
costly and subject to significant legal restraints; further, even immu-
nity grants may not be sufficient to pierce the master fence's legal
143. See Cargo Theft and Organized Crime 21; note 145 inIra and accompanying
text.
144. Law enforcement officials believe that the truck hijackers all too often
"know exactly what type of property is to be in that truck." Hearings on Fencing
136-37. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 158.
145. Hearings on Criminal Laws 310.
146. A good description of the detail in modem hijacking operations may be
found in Hearings on Fencing 136-38, 146-54 and CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED
CRIME 38-39.
147. See notes 277-94, 310-25 infra and accompanying text. "Most offenses
come to the attention of the police by reports from citizens." LAw ENFORCEMENT
iN THE METROPOLIS 3 (D. McIntyre ed. 1967). Since citizens will not usually come
into contact with a fence's activities except as purchasers, there are no complaining
witnesses. A "complaint only" policy in fencing will result in few fencing prosecu-
tions. Consequently, there is a need to institute carefully thought out police pro-
grams. Alternative police strategies, primarily from the perspective of a local police
agency, are discussed in STRArErIEs 74-112.
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shield since thieves are reluctant to testify against their fences, 148
and, in any event, their testimony alone may be insufficient for con-
viction in those jurisdictions that have adopted the "accomplice rule,"
which requires independent corroboration of such testimony. 149
Successful master fences usually require access to the extensive
capital resources, personnel and connections of organized crime
syndicates. 1 0 The degree of assistance a master fence receives, of
course, depends on the nature of his relationship with the syndicate.
While some master fences may actually be syndicate members, 151
and consequently may receive considerable additional assistance in the
form of information, personnel, equipment, and storage space, most
are content to function outside the syndicate and simply to participate
in the redistribution process, reaping a share of the profits.1
52
Because they deal in large quantities of stolen goods, the activi-
ties of master fences have a sharp impact on the national economy.lss
148. Successful fences often enjoy very good relationships with their thieves. See
C. KLOcKARS, supra note 12, at 152-55; J. HALL, supra note 5, at 157, 196. Fences
have been known to provide thieves with bail money and legal assistance. See C.
KLOCKARS, supra note 12, at 153; STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS 4. These fac-
tors combine with the thiefs natural economic dependence upon his fence to produce
a general reluctance to testify against fences. Cf. Hearings on Fencing 34. This
disinclination is reinforced when the fence is a member of an organized crime syndi-
cate or in some way associated with one. In such cases, potential witnesses may be
intimidated by the threat of physical harm. See TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED
CRIME 14; V. TERESA, supra note 23, at 326-42; Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence
Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A Preliminary Analysis, in TASK
FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 80, 83; Furstenberg, Violence and Organized
Crime, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: A STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMN. ON
THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE 918-19. Finally, in many cases the thief may not know
the actual identity of his master fence.
149. See notes 216-308 infra and accompanying text.
150. Even where he has not organized the theft, the master fence must have
enough cash to meet his personnel, storage, and transportation costs. Naturally,
where the fence has actually organized the theft, his initial cash outlay is even
higher. The costs of large-scale theft run high; for hijacking a shipment worth
$100,000, $20,000 or more may be needed for payoffs to informants, drivers, thieves
and other participants. See Hearings on Fencing 152-53; CARGO THEFT AND OR-
GANIZED CRIME 26-27. See generally STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS 5; Emerson,
supra note 48, at 37-39. Significantly, testimony has recently been given that in
New York City alone "[flour big fences . . . can come up with $100,000 in cash,
no sweat." Hearings on Fencing 153.
151. See CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 28; Hearings on Fencing 135.
These fences receive the benefit of access to capital and manpower resources. See
CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 27; Hearings on Fencing 134-35.
152. "Fences, especially 'master' fences, are usually not members of 'organized
crime' per se. However, organized crime figures will often 'stake' a fence with a
large amount of money if he will use his connections to move stolen property for
them. This is usually the relationship that exists, since a fence especially a 'master'
fence, of necessity has the required legitimate contacts and travels in the highest busi-
ness circles." REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 27. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 164.
153. See CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 25-28, 38-42; Hearings on Fencing
43-45, 151-54.
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More significantly, however, since master fences must rely upon out-
side sources for support because of their high overhead costs, their
growth and success is a good indicator of the extent to which organ-
ized crime syndicates control theft and fencing activity.
5. The Role of Organized Crime
Organized crime is a society that seeks to operate outside the control
of the American people and their governments. It involves thou-
sands of criminals, working within structures as complex as those of
any large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than
those of legitimate governments. Its actions are not impulsive but
rather the result of intricate conspiracies, carried on over many years
and aimed at gathering control over whole fields of activity in order
to amass huge profits.154
154. TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CPIME 1.
The concept of "organized crime" is much like the fictional crime portrayed in
Akira Kurasawa's 1951 film, Rashomon, in which a ninth century nobleman's bride
is raped by a bandit and the nobleman is killed. This double crime is then acted
out in the film in four versions, as seen by the three participants and a witness. Each
version is not quite like the others.
The vision of those who have looked at "organized crime" has been much like that
of the witnesses whose stories were told in Rashomon. Some have seen nothing and
hence have decided that nothing is there. See, e.g., Hawkins, God and the Mafia,
14 THE PuB. INTEREsT 24-51 (Winter 1969). Compare the summaries of wiretaps
reprinted in H. ZEiGER, THm JERSEY MOB (1975). Others have looked only at press
accounts and have seen little more than a public relations gimmick. See D. SMrrn,
THE MAFIA MYSTIQUE (1975). Others have looked at it through the eyes of an or-
ganizational theorist, and have seen the special character of organized crime to be
its functional division of labor. See D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF A NATION (1969). Some
have examined the phenomenon from the perspective of an anthropologist and have
seen not a "conspiracy" but a "social system." See, e.g., F. IANNI, A FAMILY Busi-
NESS (1972). Others have examined it as a lawyer would, and have seen it as "con-
spiracy." See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 148 at 80, 81-83. The President's Crime
Commission, too, adopted this view (La Cosa Nostra was recognized only as the
"core" of organized crime. Id. at 6); the Crime Commission termed conspiratorial
crime "organized crime" when its sophistication reached the point where its division
of labor included positions for an "enforcer" of violence and a "corrupter" of the le-
gitimate processes of our society. Id. at 8.
A good summary of this view of "organized crime" was composed by the Depart-
ments of Justice and Transportation in a study of cargo theft:
[T]he predominant group and inner core of organized crime is . . . a Na-
tionwide group divided into 24 to 26 operating units or "families" whose mem-
bership is exclusively men of one ethnic group and who number 5,000 or more.
The Task Force [on Organized Crime of the President's Crime Commission]
quoted the FBI's director, who evaluated this core group as "the largest organiza-
tion of the criminal underworld in this country, very closely organized and disci-
plined . . . it has been found to control major racket activities in many of our
larger metropolitan areas, often working in concert with criminals representing
other ethnic backgrounds."
Heading each operating unit, or family, is the boss, whose authority is subject
only to the rulings of a national advisory commission, which has the final word
on organizational and jurisdictional disputes and is comprised of the more pow-
erful bosses. Beneath each boss, in chain-of-command fashion, is an underboss,
several captains (caporegime), who supervise lower-echelon soldiers, who in turn
oversee large numbers of nonmember street personnel. One such family is said
to number 1,000-half members, half nonmember street-level workers-with 27
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In recent years, organized crime syndicates have expanded their
fencing operations to exploit the growing demand of consumers and
businesses for stolen goods.155 This expansion has been made pos-
sible by the ability of organized crime to marshall its tremendous
resources to solve the complex financial and logistical problems that
captains and stretches from Connecticut to Philadelphia. Bosses have access to
a variety of "staff men," including attorneys, accountants, business experts, en-
forcers, and corrupters. Many individuals, while not family members in a for-
mal sense, work closely with these inner-core groups and may be called associ-
ates (to distinguish them from mere street workers) and, as is the case with
street personnel, should be considered an integral part of organized crime. Some
associates are highly respected by family members and are very powerful in their
own right.
Through interceptions of phone conversations and other oral communications
at different times and places between members and associates of this large crimi-
nal nucleus of the organized underworld, its existence, structure, activities, per-
sonnel, and such terminology as "boss," "captain," "family," "soldier," "commis-
sion" have been confirmed and reconfirmed beyond rational dispute.
Loosely allied with this large criminal nucleus are several other organized
crime syndicates or groups, those members can also be distinguished among eth-
nic lines-just as most neighborhoods can, and probably for much the same so-
ciological reasons. The various organized crime groups call upon the services
and special skills of one another frequently enough for them to be characterized
as a loose confederation, a designation reflecting the absence of a boss of bosses
at the top. Sometimes these groups are referred to individually or collectively
as the "outfit," "mob," or "syndicate."
Taking into account the political organizations, unions, businesses, and other
groups directly or indirectly under the thumb of organized crime, the manpower
available to the confederation could conceik ably run into the hundreds of thou-
sands. Because they are relatively well organized and disciplined and because
they possess the demonstrated superior ability to protect themselves from prose-
cution through corruption and other means, organized crime groups have a
strength and permanency beyond the reach of conventional partners in crime.
The difference to management between cargo theft committed under the di-
rection of organized crime and cargo theft executed under the direction of non-
member employees is analogous to the difference between a company's market
share being challenged by a multibillion conglomerate and being challenged by
a three- or four-man partnership. Both the conglomerate and partnership are
engaged in business, just as organized crime groups and other nonmember crimi-
nal elements are both engaged in organized criminal activity. But there is a
world of difference between a conglomerate and a partnership, just as there is
between organized crime and less organized and disciplined individuals who may
cooperate in crime.
CARGo THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 23-24. The phrase "organized crime" is used
throughout this article to refer to this type of conspiratorial criminal behavior. For
an analysis of the concept of "organized crime" that further breaks it into "enter-
prises," "syndicates," and "ventures," see ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMN. FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING
TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 189-92 (1976) [hereinafter WR-
TAP REPORT] (concurrence of Commissioner Blakey). See generally D. CRtassEY,
THEFT OF THE NATION (1969); R. SALERNO & J. ToMPxIs, THE CRIME CONFEDERA-
TION (1969); G. TYLER, ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA (1962); M. MALTz, Defining
"Organized Crime," 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 338 (1976).
155. See V. TEREsA, supra note 29, at 143-45; notes 150-52 supra and accom-
panying text. Organized crime offers "goods and services that millions of Americans
desire even though declared illegal by their legislatures." TAsK FORCE REPORT, OR-
GAN=Z CRIME 2. In addition to theft and fencing, those illegal goods and services
include gambling, loansharking, narcotics, labor peace, and illegal alcohol. Id. at 2-
4. See Pileggi, The Mafia Is Good for You, SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Nov. 30, 1968,
at 18.
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are inherent in large-scale theft and fencing activity.156
The participation of organized crime in many truck hijackings
and the evolution of sophisticated hijacking techniques are evidence
of its increasing role in large-scale fencing. 15 7  Illustratively, syndi-
cate members engineer as many as seventy-five per cent of all truck
hijackings in some areas of heavy organized crime activity.'58 In
fact, the prototype "stick-up" hijacking is essentially a relic of the
past,15 9 for most hijackings today are more appropriately character-
ized as "give-ups" in which drivers, in accordance with prior ar-
rangements, deliver the merchandise to thieves and then claim they
were hijacked. 60 Sometimes the drivers and other insiders are re-
warded for their duplicity,' 6' but in most cases syndicate members
coerce their participation by threatening to foreclose their gambling
and loan sharking debts.' 62 Members of the syndicate usually re-
156. See notes 150-52 supra and accompanying text.
157. Most (top ten) truck hijackings occur in the following areas: New Jersey,
New York City, Massachusetts, New York State, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Tennessee and California. SoURcE BooK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS 320
(LE.A.A. 1974). These are areas of high organized crime activity. TASK FORCE
REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME, 7. For a detailed analysis of cargo theft in the motor
and air industry, see A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE NATIONAL CARGO SECU-
RrrY PROGRAM 36-43 (1976).
158. A prime example is New York City. See CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED
CRIME 26; Hearings on Fencing 191. The syndicate's role, however, is not obvious
to everyone:
Whether because of such indirect involvement by organized crime in cargo theft
or because of public-image reasons-or both-there is the temptation to down-
grade or deny the presence of organized crime at facilities where cargo is trans-
ported or otherwise handled. For example, at a southern location, a shipping
executive did not believe organized crime was connected to pier thefts. How-
ever, other sources in the area revealed the following information: (1) the local
crime family boss has held meetings with warehousemen, grocers, truckers, etc.;
(2) this boss offered his assistance in establishing another local of a waterfront
union; (3) a shylock has solicited loans, at 5 for 4 (25 percent weekly interest),
from longshoremen and has been in collusion with a local waterfront union,
which permitted the presence of the loan shark on payday and held back the
wages of those indebted to him; (4) a syndicate-connected gambler is quoted as
saying he expects to get "a lot of action off longshoremen"; (5) the president
of a local dock workers union wrote a Federal judge about the fine character
of the area's mob boss, who was about to receive a sentence from the jurist;(6) the same union president at one time utilized the services of a syndicate-
connected bodyguard.
CARGO THEFr AND ORGANIZED CRIME 27. Americans, in general, have not been
aware of the nature and extent of organized crime activity. See TASK FORCE
REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 1-2.
159. See Hearings on Fencing 136, 145, 151; V. TERESA, supra note 29, at 144.
160. See Hearings on Fencing 136-37, 151-54; V. TERESA, supra note 29, at 144.
161. See Hearings on Fencing 151-53.
162. See id. at 42; CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 27; Hearings on Stolen
Securities 64, 73.
Organized crime members have been able to obtain inside information and place
selected employees in sensitive positions by successfully infiltrating many labor
unions. Emerson, supra note 48, at 312. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, OR-
1540 [Vol. 74:1511
August 1976) Criminal Distribution of Stolen Property 1541
main completely insulated from the hijacking 68 because nonmem-
bers, 64 often persons aspiring to join the syndicate0 5 or persons in-
debted to it,' 66 carry out the crime.
Once the theft is finished, the syndicate efficiently and effec-
tively legitimizes and redistributes the goods.167 The syndicate's
connections with master and professional fences, 68 and the influ-
ence it exerts over many legitimate businesses,' 69 have enabled it to
develop a redistribution system capable of funneling stolen goods
through interstate commerce with great ease. 170  Goods hijacked at
4:30 p.m. may be on retail shelves by 5:15 p.m. that same day.
11
The growth of such a redistribution network inevitably stimulates
large-scale theft.
Although organized crime groups have not, of course, monop-
olized theft activity, 172 the considerable profits derived from redis-
tributing large quantities of stolen goods assures their continued par-
ticipation in large-scale thefts 73  Moreover, syndicate activity in
GANIZED CRIME 5; The Mob: It Racks Up Overtime on Government Payroll, LIFE,
Feb. 14, 1969, at 52.
163. A crime syndicate leader, particularly, tries never to come in contact with
the stolen goods. See, e.g., V. TERESA, supra note 29, at 144-45; Hearings on Fenc-
ing 152. The sophisticated structure of an organized crime syndicate, its relatively
tight internal controls, and its usually enforced code of omerta-the code of conduct
which mandates silence and loyalty-all serve to reinforce this insulation. See, e.g.,
TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANITED CRIME 7-9; Cressey, The Functions and Structure of
Criminal Syndicates in TASK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 41.
164. See CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 26; V. TERESA, supra note 29, at
144-45; REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 4, 26. Hearings on Fencing 42, 364; Hear-
ings on Criminal Laws 310.
165. See Hearings on Fencing 42; V. TERESA, supra note 29, at 144-45.
166. See V. TERESA, supra note 29, at 144-45.
167. This service is essential because, in its absence, large-scale thieves would not
be able to find a market for their goods. With financing supplied by syndicate
sources, a sophisticated theft and fencing operation is made possible.
168. See note 152 supra.
169. Organized crime members have utilized their loansharking and gambling ac-
tivities as a means of compelling indebted businessmen to handle stolen goods. In
other situations, businesses directly controlled by organized crime handle the goods.
See CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 28-29 (25 per cent of stolen goods esti-
mated to be handled in syndicate outlets).
170. "Organized Crime. . . also controls the underworld disposal systems where
bootlegged goods are rapidly fenced and distributed in the city and across the coun-
try." Emerson, supra note 48, at 315-16. See CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME
39-40; Hearings on Fencing 7. Speed of distribution is made possible by finding buy-
ers before the theft is carried out. See id. at 42; note 140 supra.
171. CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 38-39.
172. "Organized crime is both stealing and [controlling] the disposition. But
they don't have the sole market in stealing. The amateurs and organized crime are
stealing. Everybody is stealing. Organized crime is handling the disposition." Id.
at 28. See Hearings on Stolen Securities 73.
173. Organized crime does appear to have more than its share of the disposition
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narcotics, gambling and loansharking is indirectly responsible for a
large number of smaller property crimes committed by burglars,
shoplifters and employees, 17 4 and it gives syndicate members a
means to acquire information useful for planning major thefts. Thus,
organized crime is a pervasive influence in theft and fencing activi-
ties.
I. SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW
A. Criminal Sanctions
Despite the growth of large-scale criminal redistribution systems
with their widespread adverse economic consequences, our society
has been unable to develop correspondingly sophisticated legal
measures to control the problem. As the following brief historical
account will demonstrate, although fencing has been illegal since the
era of Jonathan Wild, conceptualization of the crime has failed to
keep pace with changes in the nature of the criminal activity.
1. The Development of the Law
Receiving property knowing it to be stolen is an offense whose
"origin can be traced to medieval England['s prohibition]...
against 'harboring stolen cattle,' "I" but fencing activity at that time
was seen merely as an aspect of theft itself, not as a crime deserving
of any independent recognition. In fact, early English law did not
even impose criminal sanctions upon receivers as accessories after
the fact unless they were guilty of sheltering the thieves.' Because
economic conditions effectively precluded the possibility of large-
scale theft for resale, receiving was not considered a major incentive
to theft requiring separate criminal punishment.177 But with ensu-
ing economic developments"7a that spurred the growth of fencing ac-
process:
The bulk, quantity, specialized nature, or other characteristics of much stolen
cargo presents incontrovertible evidence-circumstantial as it is-of facilities,
contacts, and know-how of a coordinated underworld. Referring to a series of
sizeable cargo thefts, the head of a State investigation unit asserts that "the
merchandise involved must be disposed of by the thieves and it is equally obvious
that it can only be disposed of through organized crime channels."
CARGo THEFT AND ORGANIZED CImE 27. See notes 24, 150, supra and accompany-
ing text; Hearings on Stolen Securities 2. See generally V. TERESA, supra note 29,
at 259-89.
174. See notes 162-63 supra and accompanying text.
175. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 52.
176. Id. at 53. See W. LAFAV E & A. Scorr, supra note 14, at 682.
177. See notes 4, 93 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
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tivity, legislation was enacted in 1692 to criminalize the mere receipt
of stolen property.179  Even then, however, a receiver was only sub-
ject to prosecution as an accessory after the fact to the larceny. Con-
sequently, under established English procedure, he could not be
brought to trial before the principal was convicted of theft. 8 0  This
measure, which ironically gave receivers an additional incentive to
assist their thieves in evading detection, was subsequently amended
in part,' 8" but the distinctions drawn between theft and fencing had
been firmly ingrained in English law: "The tradition remained
throughout the eighteenth century and early nineteenth that the re-
ceiver was an accessory to the crime rather than a principal."'' 8 De-
spite the success of Jonathan Wild, which clearly demonstrated the
errors of this approach,8 8 receiving stolen property remained an "ap-
pendage of theft" until 1827, when it was finally treated as a sep-
arate substantive offense.' 84
The 1827 English receiving statute served as a prototype for sub-
sequent American legislation, 85 and although traces of the ap-
179. 3 & 4W. & M., c.13, § 3 (1692).
180. This reflected prevailing English attitudes which viewed theft as d major
crime and receiving as simply a secondary activity. Since the receiver was only con-
sidered to be an accessory, English law would not punish him more severely than
his principal and not at all if the thief escaped conviction. Since "the thief might
avoid a conviction for larceny by dying, or by not getting caught, or by winning an
erroneous acquittal," the statute was not an effective enforcement device. W. LAFAvE
& A. Scotr, supra note 14, at 682. See J. HALT, supra note 5, at 54-55.
181. 2 Anne, c.9, § 2 (1701). See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 55.
182. Chappell & Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 160.
183. See id.
184. See 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c.29, § 54 (1827); W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note
14, at 682; J. HALL, supra note 5, at 55-56.
185. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 58. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 14,
at 682. Title 18 of the United States Code contains at least twelve provisions which
could be used to prosecute the receipt of stolen goods. 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970) (re-
ceipt of property stolen from an interstate or foreign carrier or depot); 18 U.S.C.
§ 662 (1970) (receipt of stolen property within the special maritime or territorial
jurisdiction of the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 842(h) (1970) (receipt of stolen ex-
plosives); 18 'U.S.C. § 1660 (1970) (receipt of property taken by an act of piracy
or robbery); 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1970) (receipt of property stolen from the U.
S. mails); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970) (receipt of property stolen from a bank that
is federally chartered or a member of the Federal Reserve System or stolen from a
federally insured credit union or savings and loan association); 18 U.S.C. § 2313
(1970) (receipt of a stolen vehicle moving in interstate or foreign commerce); 18
U.S.C. § 2314 (1970) (transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys or fraudu-
lent state tax stamps); 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1970) (receipt of stolen goods, securities,
moneys or fraudulent state tax stamps); 18 U.S.C. § 2317 (1970) (receipt of stolen
cattle moving through interstate commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) (outlaws any
conspiracy to violate any of these provisions, and accordingly may be classified as
an anti-fencing statute). Receiving stolen property is also outlawed in every state.
State legislation is comprehensively analyzed in THE NATL. ASsN. OF ATToRNEYs
GENERAL, CMMN. ON THE OFFICE OF AroRNEY GENERAL, LEGIsLATIVE RESPONSES
TO DEALING IN STOLEN GOODs 33-37 (Dec. 1975).
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pendage theory still survive, 86 most jurisdictions today conceptualize
receiving stolen property as an independent statutory crime.'17  But
while the conceptual difficulties that plagued eighteenth-century
England have largely been solved, they have been replaced by new
failures to recognize the need to draw even more sophisticated dis-
tinctions. Whereas eighteenth-century English society had to learn
to make legal distinctions between thief and receiver, our society
must be prepared to distinguish among different classes of receivers
and diverse patterns of fencing activity.'88 Law enforcement strat-
egy and tactics must be designed to reflect modem differences in
modus operandi and to accord special emphasis to the important role
of organized crime syndicates.
Although there is evidence that our legal system has begun to
recognize differences in fencing schemes,8 9 recent proposals that
treat fencing as a subordinate part of the theft problem simply
continue outdated formulations.190 A more advanced intellectual
186. For example, several of the federal provisions deal with receiving activity
simply by listing the prohibition as part of a larger section outlawing a particular
type of theft. -See 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 659, 1709, 2113 (1970). Several of the states,
too, have recently consolidated receipt of stolen property as part of a general anti-
theft classification reform. See note 190 infra. Examples of state statutes are:
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-119(8) (Supp. 1975); ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-
l(d) (Supp. 1975); KA. STAT. ANN. § 21-3701(d) (1972). Unless sophisticated
grading schemes are also adopted that distinguish different types of receipt, such re-
form is unwise. See, e.g., N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. 637:11 (1971).
187. See ThE NATL. ASSN. OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 185, at 33-37;
ATTORNEY GENERAL, LEGISLATIVE -RESPONSES TO DEALING IN STOLEN GOODS 33-37
(Dec. 1975).
188. See notes 103-74 supra and accompanying text. The need to distinguish
among different kinds of receivers was first proposed in Hall's classic work. See J.
HALL, supra note 5, at 155-64; 189-99; 211-25. Since Professor Hall's initial study,
patterns of redistribution have become even more sophisticated, and the role of or-
ganized crime has become more pronounced. Accordingly, the need for reform today
is more apparent than ever, especially in light of the failure to implement Professor
Hall's original proposals.
189. The judiciary has been primarily responsible for most of the legal develop-
ments that have facilitated the conviction of fences. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at
173-89.
190. For example, both the Model Penal Code and the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws have advocated the consolidation of receiving into
a general offense category which broadly outlaws theft activity. By characterizing
receiving as merely a subordinate part of theft, the proposed legislation inadvertently
de-emphasizes the significance of fencing activity. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 223.1
(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUnCOMM.
ON CRIMINAL LAWS AND PROCrDURS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CoMM. ON REFORM
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, § 1732(c), at 359 (1971)
[hereinafter REFORM COMMN.J. Consolidation may be an appropriate way to deal with
the receiver who obtains stojen property merely for personal consumption, but it is
an awkward way to attack the multifaceted fencing activity that is carried on through-
out the nation today. Both the Model Penal Code and the Reform Commission have,
however, made some attempt to distinguish among different types of receivers for the
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framework that fundamentally changes evidentiary rules, state of
mind requirements, and criminal sanctions, is at least one prerequi-
site to a modernization of investigative techniques. Until this has
been accomplished, our laws will remain unable to help control ef-
fectively criminal redistribution systems.
2. Receiving Stolen Property: A Modern Perspective
Legislation criminalizing fencing activity has traditionally been
drafted to outlaw the knowing receipt of stolen property.19' To con-
vict a receiver undet such a statute, the prosecution must establish:
(1) receipt of the goods by the fence; (2) the merchandise was
stolen property at the time of the receipt; and (3) the fence knew
the property was stolen. 192 When defined strictly in these terms,
each element of the crime poses major obstacles to successful prose-
cution. Once these elements are considered from a twentieth-cen-
tury perspective that recognizes the increasing sophistication of re-
distribution systems- however, appropriate modifications can be
made to remove those obstacles.
a. The "receipt" of property. As in the first English fencing
statute passed in the seventeenth century, the actus reus prohibited
by most of the early federal and state statutes drafted in this coun-
try was the buying or receiving of stolen property. 98 Since this de-
purpose of grading. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.1(2) (a), 223.6(2) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962); REFORm Co.MN. § 1735(2)(f) at 362. Nevertheless, the po-
tential impact of § 223.1(2) (a) of the Model Penal Code and § 1735(2) (f) of the
Reform Commission is limited, and unless their significance is carefully noted, reform
based on these recommendations can err. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 637.1-1
(1971) (grading distinction not adopted).
191. The offense is commonly referred to as "receiving stolen property." See
note 185 supra.
192. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 14, at 683. In addition, some statutes
explicitly require the prosecution to establish that the defendant intended to deprive
the owner of his interest in his property. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-401
(Supp. 1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(d) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
165.45, 165.60 (McKinney 1975). This requirement is designed to eliminate the po-
tential liability of one, such as a policeman or innocent finder, who knowingly pos-
sesses the stolen property, but intends to return it immediately. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 223.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). In any event, this element is not con-
sidered a major impediment, since it is readily established by direct or circumstantial
evidence. Generally, in the absence of specific language setting forth this require-
ment, its establishment is not a prerequisite to conviction. See STAFF REPORT ON
SMALL BusiNEss 17.
193. See 3 & 4 W. & M., c.9, .§ 4 (1692). Approximately 20 jurisdictions still
retain this emphasis on the buying or receiving of stolen goods. Hearings on Fencing
164-71. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 466 (1957); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:139-
1 (Supp. 1974). See generally MODEL PmAL CODE § 206.8, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1954).
194. See notes 142-43, 145, 152 supra and accompanying text.
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scription of the proscribed conduct proved ineffective in controlling
fences who avoid physical contact with stolen goods and never make
purchases for their own use,1 4 many states have expanded the scope
of the prohibited conduct to include withholding, concealing or aid-
ing in the concealment of stolen property.10 5 Likewise, Congress
has adopted measures to correct similar deficiencies in federal re-
ceiving statutes, but no uniform formula has yet been developed at
the federal level. Thus, current state and federal legislation, reflect-
ing the inability of law enforcement authorities to formulate an effec-
tive and consistent approach to fencing, broadly proscribe conduct
ranging from the traditional purchase or receipt to the sale, barter,
concealment, retention, transportation, disposal, storage, or posses-
sion of stolen goods.' 96
It is doubtful that the inclusion of many of these terms actually
promotes more efficient law enforcement. Language such as "dis-
posal" or "sale" may help reach the fencing techniques of modem
receivers, but, in the absence of appropriate gradation distinctions,
the remaining language merely creates additional confusion in the
substantive law. In contrast, the clear description of the proscribed
conduct in the Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S.1, the most
recent Congressional proposal for reforming the federal criminal
code, makes possible a realistic effort to deal with modem fencing
activity.'1 7  According to the fencing provisions of that proposed
Act, "[a] person is guilty of [receiving stolen property] . . . if he
buys, receives, possesses, or obtains control of property of another
that has been stolen."'9 8 By focusing on the control of stolen prop-
195. Hearings on Fencing 164-71. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West
Supp. 1975). These additions, however, are only an indirect way of dealing with
the problem, and considerable judicial effort has been required to apply the modified
versions to fences who have avoided physical contact with the goods. See note 202
infra and accompanying text. Significantly, the terms "conceal" or "withhold" were
probably adopted merely to reach the situation where the defendant, upon initial re-
ceipt, had no knowledge of the goods' stolen character but subsequently acquired the
requisite knowledge and decided to keep the goods. As the statutes were initially
drafted, such a defendant had technically committed no crime since he did not know-
ingly receive the goods. See W. LAFAvE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 14, at 688-89. Sub-
sequently, however, the terms "withhold" and "conceal" received appropriately
broader application. Id. at 684.
196. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 662, 659, 842(h), 2113(c), 2313, 2315 (1970).
These statutes are discussed briefly in note 185 supra. Specific state legislation deal-
ing with specialized aspects of fencing is outside the scope of these materials. Exam-
ples of provisions that are common throughout the United States, but are too par-
ticularized to merit examination here, are ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1621 to
1627 (1967) (pawn brokers); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-102 (1973) (stolen
auto parts).
197. The Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) [hereinafter S. 1J.
198. S. 1, § 1733a (emphasis added),
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erty, the statute concisely covers a broad range of modem fencing
activities that do not require physical possession. 19 9 The proposed
federal legislation, however, does not contain a definition of con-
trol.200 In any event, it is, of course, not yet law, and only a few
states have adopted a simple control-oriented definition of the actus
reus by defining receiving to be the equivalent of acquiring posses-
sion or control of stolen goods.201
Despite failures at the legislative level, modernization of fenc-
ing statutes has in effect been accomplished in many jurisdictions
by judicial statutory construction. By viewing the offense in broad
terms, a number of courts have construed statutes to include any con-
duct that might be considered to be constructive possession, effective
control, or an exercise of dominion over the stolen property.202 Still,
many courts steadfastly refuse to make this broad interpretation.
Moreover, in those jurisdictions that are willing, case-by-case deter-
minations, requiring close judicial scrutiny of the relationship be-
tween the defendant and the stolen goods, suffer from a lack of pre-
dictability as to whether proof of constructive possession or control
is sufficient to convict alleged fences and, if it is, as to what conduct
amounts to sufficient control.203 This lack of uniformity and pre-
dictability can only be alleviated by carefully tailored legislative re-
form.
This article, therefore, recommends that legislatures enact stat-
utes similar to the Model Theft and Fencing Act (Model Act) set
199. See generally notes 142-50 supra and accompanying text. The Model Penal
Code also reflects the view that control of stolen property is the essence of modern
fencing activity. See MODEL PNA. CODE § 206.8, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1954).
200. S.1, § 1733(a) simply mentions the word control without explicating the fac-
tual basis that would support such a finding. In all likelihood, the courts would fol-
low previous decisions. For a discussion of prior decisions, see United States v. Cas-
alinuovo, 350 F.2d 207, 209-10 (2d Cir. 1965).
201. See Hearings on Fencing 164-71. An example of such legislation is COLO.
REV. STAT. § 184-401 (1973). This approach has been advocated by the Model
Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
202. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 14, at 683. Both state and federal
cases stress that control or dominion is the essential element to be established. See,
e.g., United States v. Casalinuovo, 350 F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1965) ("such a nexus
or relationship between the defendant and the goods that it is reasonable to treat the
extent of the defendant's dominion and control as if it were actual possession");
Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 15, 280 A.2d 119, 121 (1971) ("in possession
of stolen goods only when it is proved that he exercised conscious control or domin-
ion over those goods").
203. See People v. Fein, 292 N.Y. 10, 53 N.E.2d 373, 39 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1944);
People v. Colon, 28 N.Y.2d 1, 267 N.F.2d 577, 318 N.Y.S.2d 929, cert. denied, 402
U.S. 905 (1971). The Fein decision was rejected by the legislature in 1967. N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 10.00, Practice Commentary (McKinney 1975).
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forth in appendix B, which modifies the basic approach employed
by the drafters of S.1. According to the Model Act, the defendant
has exhibited the proscribed conduct if he "obtains or uses" stolen
property. 20 4 The proposal defines "obtains or uses" as "any manner
of . . .taking or exercising control . . .making an unauthorized
use, disposition, or transfer of property . . . or obtaining property
by fraud ... "20
Even if suggested substantive reforms are initiated, however, be-
cause of critical inadequacies in existing techniques for gathering ev-
idence, control or constructive possession may be difficult to establish
if the fence is not apprehended in physical possession of the goods.
Conviction simply is not possible unless the stolen merchandise can
in some way be linked to the fence. An investigation may be facili-
tated by informants2 " or by testimony from accomplices who have
received immunity.2 7  To tap these sources of information, the
Model Act provides that accomplice testimony alone is sufficient to
establish receipt if it is believed beyond a reasonable doubt.2 08
The rule in many jurisdictions, however, is that, unless it is inde-
pendently corroborated, an accomplice's testimony is insufficient for
conviction. 2 9  As a tactical matter, then, the prosecution's task in
204. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACr § 2(a), Appendix B.
205. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT § 7(b)(1), (2), (3), Appendix B.
206. In 1972, for example, FBI informants provided information which led to the
recovery by the FBI of $35 million in stolen property and contraband. Hearings on
the Depts. of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations for 1974 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 879 (1973). This information was disseminated to
other federal, state, and local agencies, resulting in the recovery of an additional $95
million. Id.
207. The use of immunity grants is discussed in notes 277-94 infra and accom-
panying text.
208. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT § 5(b), Appendix B.
209. See notes 296-303 infra and accompanying text.
Different problems are involved when the informant is not a thief. First, the po-
lice may be reluctant to reveal his identity, since such a disclosure would destroy his
future effectiveness and jeopardize his physical safety. Second, an informant by
his very nature may not make a credible witness. Finally, in some cases, the use
of an informant may result in allegations of entrapment. See, e.g., C. KLOCKMAS,
supra note 12, at 98-100. On the federal level, the traditional notion of entrapment
focuses on the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime. See Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1973), where the defendant was offered an essential ingredient for the illicit manu-
facture of drugs, the Court's language in formulating the defense suggests that a "sell
and bust" program in the fencing area might not run afoul of entrapment if targets
were carefully selected. What might have been only inferred from Russell seems to
be beyond question in Hampton v. United States, 19 CiuM. L. RPTR. 3039 (4-27-76)
(sell to and buy back heroin if predisposed not entrapment). "Attempted receipt,"
not "receipt," of course, would be the charge. Ser note 237 infra. Such a program
might, however, run into judicial opposition at the state level. See Young v. Superior
Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 838, 61 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1967).
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those jurisdictions is appreciably lightened only when it has appre-
hended the defendant in actual possession of the goods, which sel-
dom occurs at the more sophisticated levels of fencing activity, or
has otherwise obtained independent corroboration of the facts es-
tablishing control or constructive possession.210
The use of a search warrant is all too often an inadequate inves-
tigative tool for fencing crimes since the warrant may be issued only
after probable cause has been established, a process that tends to
be both cumbersome and time-consuming. 11 For example, al-
though the personal observations of a police officer would establish
probable cause, in situations where an informant has provided the
critical information-the typical case in fencing investigations-po-
lice must demonstrate to a judge their basis for considering the infor-
mation reliable and reveal the informant's source of information. 212
There is sufficient corroboration if the informant, shown to be reli-
able, states he has personal knowledge of the information he has pro-
vided.213 If the informant does not have such personal knowledge,
police must independently corroborate his testimony.21 4 Sophisti-
cated fences are too often able to dispose of their stolen goods be-
fore police can acquire probable cause and obtain and execute a war-
210. Even in those states where there is no rule requiring the corroboration of
an accomplice's testimony, an accomplice's account of the crime often lacks the credi-
bility necessary to persuade a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This is particularly
so when the defense effectively emphasizes to the jury that the witness is testifying
under a grant of immunity or promise of leniency. See C. KLOCKARs, supra note
12, at 99-100.
211. The warrant must set forth sufficient detail of underlying circumstances to
enable the federal magistrate or a judge of the state within which the search is to
take place to evaluate independently whether probable cause exists. See United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 578-83 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 415-16 (1969).
212. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 416-17; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 110-15 (1964).
213. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 416.
214. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 416-18. Spinelli's demand for cor-
roboration has been weakened by the holding of United States v. Harris, 403 U.S.
573 (1971). Two concurring justices went as far as to call for the overruling of
Spinelli. 403 U.S. at 585-86 (Black & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). It may be only
a short time before it is overruled. As it stands, it is a significant road block in
fencing investigations.
Note that prior to Spinelli, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), upheld
the validity of a warrantless arrest under circumstances where the corroboration con-
sisted simply of police observations of activity which, while not itself illegal, served
to confirm so many of the details supplied by the informant that it would have been
reasonable for a magistrate to conclude that the information supplied was accurate.
The validity of this approach to probable cause, however, underwent a significant de-
velopment in Spinelli, which found that the Draper information was based on per-
sonal knowledge, so that corroboration of the criminality was not required.
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rant.215 Alternatively, the use of the "buy-bust" technique,216 which
deploys undercover agents who pose as dealers of illegal goods,
may offer a more viable solution, at least in gathering evidence
against neighborhood, outlet, or professional fences. It obviously
offers little hope of success against well-insulated master fences.
In any case, investigations are often also complicated by the gen-
eral absence of conduct that clearly bespeaks its own illegality: A
sophisticated fence utilizes the legitimate aspects of his business to
disguise any underlying criminal conduct.217 Even so, this veil of
legitimacy may in some cases be pierced by intensive physical and
electronic surveillance, which allows police to show the probable
cause they are not otherwise able to establish by conventional meth-
ods of enforcement. Police might not then be required to obtain
a warrant for an immediate arrest218 and search 219 where the fence
is known to be in criminal possession, thus greatly reducing the risk
the fence will transfer the stolen merchandise, thereby disposing of
the evidence of his crime. Although admittedly time-consuming,
expensive, and an obvious drain on manpower,220 once the authori-
ties have learned (from an informant, captured thief, or electronic
surveillance) of the operations of a particular fence, intensive sur-
215. See, e.g., Hearings on Fencing 27; note 131 supra.
216. The "buy-bust" or "sell-bust" technique may be utilized against both thieves
and fences. When thieves are the target of the technique, the undercover officer as-
sumes the identity of a fence who is willing to buy stolen goods. At an appropriate
time, arrests can then be made. See generally, 122 CONG. REC. S12222-25 (daily ed.
July 22, 1976) (LEAA support for anti-theft programs). For a fence, the process
would involve an attempt by an undercover officer to sell goods to, or purchase them
from, a suspected fence. If the fence is responsive, an arrest would be made. See
STRaAToius 74-113.
217. See notes 132-38 supra and accompanying text.
218. The right to arrest without a warrant was recognized prior to the develop-
ment of the warrant procedures and was never supplanted by them. See Wilgus, Ar-
rest Without a Warrant (pts. 1-2), 22 MIcH. L. REv. 541, 548-50, 673, 685-89(1924). Historically, arrest warrant procedures arose solely out of a desire to protect
the arresting officer from tort liability. 1 STEPxEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAw OF ENGLAND 190-93 (1883). The right to search without a warrant, however,
received no such independent favorable development. See generally LAssoN, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FouRTH AMENDMENT 23-50 (1937). The cur-
rent teaching of the Supreme Court on arrests without warrants is contained in
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (not necessary in public area).
219. Once an arrest has been made, the police can conduct a limited search of
the area to ensure that the goods are not subsequently moved. The Supreme Court
has limited the scope of this potential search, however, to the suspect's body and
areas within his immediate reach. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Even
so, if the goods are not initially obtained in that way, the police could protect against
the loss of evidence by posting a guard and returning later with a search warrant.
See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818
(1969).
220. See Hearings on Fencing 4.
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veillance as part of an aggressive enforcement program offers the
only realistic hope of acquiring sufficient evidence of the proscribed
conduct to justify an arrest. Whether a conviction is subsequently
obtained depends upon the prosecution's ability to establish the re-
maining elements of the offense.
b. The goods must be stolen. Since receiving statutes are de-
signed to criminalize only conduct that is socially unacceptable, a
basic element of the offense is the requirement that the goods have
been stolen and have retained their stolen character throughout the
redistribution process. 221 This element initially posed definitional
problems for prosecutors since courts were inclined, at least at one
time, to describe as "stolen" property only those items that were ob-
tained by common law larceny.222 They thus excluded the receipt
of property obtained by embezzlement or false pretenses from the
scope of fencing statutes. In recent years, however, the potential
for a technical defense based on the narrow common law definition
of the term "stolen" has been eliminated by judicial 228 and legisla-
tive 224 action that has expanded the scope of the prohibition to in-
clude property obtained by any type of felonious taking.22 5
Although this development has successfully eliminated a trouble-
some technical defense to fencing crimes, conviction is often impos-
sible anyway either because prosecutors are unable to prove that the
goods are stolen226 or because the goods are no longer technically
"stolen property" when obtained by the fence. Typically, stolen
merchandise lacks any distinctive identifying indicia, and whatever
identifying marks are provided can easily be removed by fences.227
221. W. LAFAvE & A. Scor, supra note 14, at 684-85.
222. Id. at 684 & nn. 23 & 24.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957).
224. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 659 (1970); CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West
Supp. 1975).
225. The Model Act eliminates any similar confusion by specifically providing
that goods obtained by a variety of means are considered "stolen property." See
MODEL T FT ND FENCING AcT § 7(b), Appendix B. S. 1, § 111 proposes a very
broad definition of "stolen": "sItolen property means property that has been the
subject of any criminal taking, including theft, executing a fraudulent scheme, rob-
bery, extortion, blackmail, and burglary. . ....
226. This is due in large part to the prosecution's need to identify stolen property
with "some precision." STAF REPORT ON SMALL BusiNEss 15. The true owner is
generally required to identify his goods. An analysis of the cases holding that iden-
tification is not necessary suggests only that the owner's identification is not always
necessary for indictment purposes. See Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 382 (1965). Because
the owner's identification is required for trial, however, most prosecutors are reluctant
to initiate indictment proceedings if a precise identification cannot be made. See
notes 228, 231, 259 infra.
227. Members of the New York City Police Department have regularly con-
ferred with various manufacturers of clothing and small appliances in an attempt
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Manufacturers could deter theft and fencing somewhat by serially
numbering their products and recording those numbers.22 8  Such a
procedure would presumably impede illicit resale efforts by facilitat-
ing both the recovery of stolen property and the prosecution of guilty
parties.229 Unfortunately, few manufacturers are willing to incur the
production and record-keeping expenses that this process unavoid-
ably entails.28 0 In the absence of a reliable identification system,
therefore, fungible stolen goods can be easily commingled with legit-
imate merchandise2 31 to preclude precise identification by police.232
Conviction of fences is further hampered in many jurisdictions
by the requirement that the goods retain their stolen character
throughout the redistribution process. Quite often, police catch the
thieves with the stolen property or otherwise recover the merchan-
dise before it comes into the possession of a fence, and, frequently
with the cooperation of the apprehended criminals, they then pro-
ceed to complete delivery to the property's purchasers. By utilizing
this approach, police can minimize identification problems and di-
rectly trace the goods to a professional fence or other seemingly le-
gitimate business.2 3 3  In contrast to analogous investigatory "set-
ups" used to break up distribution networks for narcotics, however,
once authorities recover stolen property, the goods immediately lose
their stolen character, and subsequent receivers cannot be prose-
cuted for receiving stolen property.2 4  Although this result may be
to have all products serialized for identification purposes. However, the position
of many manufacturers is that identification would be extremely costly in terms
of labor and record keeping and might conceivably price their products out of
the market. In most cases, identification can be made by markings on outer car-
tons where consignee names and order numbers are stenciled. Unfortunately,
the thieves also have this knowledge and their first act after coming into posses-
sion of "swag" is to "'strip the cartons" or remove the information from the car-
tons.
REPORT, Tim ImPAcT OF CiumF 18. See notes 133-35, 146 supra and accompanying
text.
228. Without a reliable recording system, serialization would be a wasted effort.
Many large corporations do not maintain reliable recording systems for their inven-
tories. See REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CIME 18,
229. See Roselius & Benton, Marketing Theory 203.
230. This is a purely economic decision based on a simple cost-benefit analysis.
See note 227 supra.
231. See REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 17-1; Hearings on Fencing 49-50, 54;
note 137 supra and accompanying text and note 228 supra.
232. See notes 228, 231 supra and accompanying text.
233. After the goods are traced to a warehouse, a professional fence, or a "legiti.
mate" business outlet, investigation could work upstream in an effort to apprehend
(or at least identify) the organizer or master fence. This process could be achieved,
inter alia, through the careful use of immunity grants. See note 277-94 infra and
accompanying text.
234. The authorities uniformly agree on this point. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A.
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legally sound, a valuable investigative technique is largely emascu-
lated if authorities are also unable to prosecute receivers for at-
tempted receipt of stolen property.
In the federal system, the question of whether fences may be
prosecuted for attempted receipt of stolen property in these situa-
tions is not reached because there is no attempt provision of general
application in the federal criminal code.235 At the state level, a
number of jurisdictions with criminal attempt provisions have not yet
decided whether an attempt conviction is appropriate in this instance.
When the issue was squarely presented in the leading case of People
v. Jaffe,236 however, the New York Court of Appeals held that an
attempt conviction in the fencing context presented a question of
legal impossibility, and accordingly reversed a conviction for at-
tempted receipt of stolen property.281 New York followed this ap-
ScoTr, supra note 14, at 685; United States v. Cawley, 255 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir.
1958); People v. Rojas, 55 Cal. 2d 252, 358 P.2d 921, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1961).
235. See REFORM COMmN. 220-21; Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434 (1899)
(no atempt to smuggle); 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 (1970) (embezzlement and receipt of
public money, property or records, but no attempt); 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970) (theft
and receipt of interstate shipment, but no attempt).
236. 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
237. The Court of Appeals reasoned that "if the accused had completed the act
which he attempted to do, he would not be guilty of a criminal offense," and on this
basis concluded that he could not be guilty-of attempt. 185 N.Y. at 502, 78 N.E.
at 170. In reality, however, Jaffe's conviction should have been upheld since the case
actually involved a question of factual, not legal, impossibility. Jaffe had made a
mistake with respect to a factual attendant circumstance; he had thought that prop-
erty that was not stolen was, in fact, stolen. Although under the circumstances of
the case, the property had legally lost its stolen character, this transition should only
have served to preclude a conviction for the substantive offense but not for a convic-
tion for attempt. The authorities are in general agreement that factual impossibility
is not a defense to attempt. W. LAFAv & A. ScowT, supra note 14, at 438-42. As
evidenced by Jaffe, the distinction between legal and factual impossibility is unclear.
The appropriate distinction is outlined by LaFave and Scott: '51f the case is one of
legal impossibility, in the sense that what the defendant set out to do is not criminal,
then the defendant is not guilty of attempt. On the other hand, factual impossibility,
where the intended crime is impossible of accomplishment merely because of some
physical impossibility unknown to the defendant, is not a defense." Id. at 439 (em-
phasis added). When analyzed in this context the distinction is apparent, but confu-
sion has developed because of a tendency by some courts to classify certain cases as
legal impossibility simply because an attendant circumstance simultaneously involved
what appears to be a question of law. For example, in Jaffe there had been a prior
interception, which made the question whether the property was stolen one of law.
But as to the defendant, the question was really one of fact, and the mistaken belief
did not make his conduct any less blameworthy. Analyzing the issue in precisely
this manner, the Supreme Court of California rightly rejected the Jaffe decision:
"Even though we say that, technically, the [goods] ...were not 'stolen' nevertheless
the defendant did attempt to receive stolen property." People v. Rojas, 55 Cal. 2d
252, 258, 358 P.2d 921; 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1961). Accordingly, mistake
as to attendant circumstances should never be a defense to attempt. This is the view
taken by the Model Penal Code and sophisticated legislatures and jurists. See notes
239-41 infra. Other decisions that have incorrectly applied the impossibility theory
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proach for many years,238 but other states adopted a more pragmatic
approach in similar situations and, either by judicial interpretation 2 0
or statutory enactment, 240 authorized convictions for attempting to
receive stolen property. Although the primary rationale for the
more pragmatic approach is the blameworthy character of the fence's
conduct and his state of mind,241 such an approach also facilitates
law enforcement efforts. Rather than requiring police to resort to
impracticable techniques thaf would necessitate their tracking stolen
goods from a distance as they pass through a complex redistribution
chain, 242 recognition of the propriety of attempt convictions in these
circumstances allows authorities to intervene immediately and to
maintain direct control as the property passes through the chain.
By legislation, New York has abandoned the impossibility de-
include State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1953) (shooting a stuffed deer
believing it to be alive); State v. Porter, 125 Mont. 503, 242 P.2d 984 (1952) (at-
tempting to bribe a person mistakenly believed to be a juror).
The apparent confusion surrounding the impossibility defense and the crime of
attempt has attracted the attention of numerous scholars. See, e.g., J. HALL, GEN-
ERAL P RNCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 586-99 (2d ed. 1960); Elkind, Impossibility in
Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA. L. REV. 20 (1968); Enker,
Impossibility in Criminal Attempts-Legality and the Legal Process, 53 MINN. L.
REV. 665 (1969); Hughes, One Further Footnote on Attempting the Impossible, 42
N.Y:U. L. REv. 1005 (1967); Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARv. L. Rvv. 821, 848-
55 (1928).
The impossibility doctrine still continues to trouble the courts. For two recent
cases decided on questionable grounds see United States v. Hair, 356 F. Supp. 339
(D.D.C. 1973) (defendant told that television set was stolen property) and United
States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973) (refusal to allow conviction of "at-
tempt to smuggle mail in or out of prison without warden's knowledge or consent"
when warden knew of smuggling). See also United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881
(5th Cir. 1976) (sale of substance not heroin not attempt).
238. See People v. Jelke, 1 N.Y.2d 321, 329, 135 NE.2d 213, 218, 152 N.Y.S.2d
479, 484-86 (1956); People v. Rollino, 37 Misc. 2d 14, 21-22, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580, 587-
88 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
239. People v. Rojas, 55 Cal. 2d 252, 257-58, 358 P.2d 921, 923-24, 10 Cal. Rptr.
465, 468-69 (1961); Faustina v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. App. 2d 830, 833-34, 345
P.2d 543, 545-46 (1959). But see Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 868-72 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1965); Young v. Superior Ct., 253 Cal. App. 2d 848, 853-54, 61 Cal. Rptr, 355,
359-60 (1967).
240. These statutes have not focused specifically on the crime of receiving stolen
property but instead have paralleled the approach of the Model Penal Code by au-
thorizing attempt convictions whenever an actor "purposely engages in conduct which
would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them
to be." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See,
e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-49 (1971).
241. "In all of these cases (1) criminal purpose has been clearly demonstrated,
(2) the actor has gone as far as he could in implementing that purpose, and (3) as
a result, the actor's 'dangerousness' is plainly manifested." MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.01(a), Comment, at 31 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
242. See, e.g., Copertino v. United States, 256 F. 519 (3d Cir. 1919) (property
merely watched by police retains stolen character).
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fense,243 but the law of other states in this area generally remains
unsettled.244 Since an approach authorizing attempt convictions in
receiving cases reflects an appropriate standard of blameworthiness
and supports a necessary investigative technique, it is to be hoped
that legislation eliminating the impossibility defense in fencing situa-
tions will be quickly enacted without the delay associated with gen-
eral penal reform. The Model Act, illustratively, expressly author-
izes attempt convictions in the receiving context.245 Further, since
similar investigative techniques would facilitate control by federal
authorities of large-scale, interstate fencing activity, 248 there is a
need for congressional enactment of an appropriate special attempt
provision that would obviate the possibility of a technical defense
based on legal impossibility.2 47
Additional legislation could also be drafted to facilitate investiga-
tions and help reduce the difficulties prosecutors confront in proving
the goods are "stolen. ' 248  Since legitimate wholesale and retail
243. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.10 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
244. Because very few jurisdictions have specifically dealt with the question of
legal impossibility in the receipt of stolen property context, the issue has not been
satisfactorily resolved. Accordingly, there is the danger that other jurisdictions will
consider Jaffe well reasoned. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 375 (1971); note 237 supra.
245. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCiNG AcT §§ 2, 4(a) (1), 4(a) (2), Appendix B.
246. See note 170 supra.
247. S. 1, § 1001 proposes the creation of a general attempt offense and the elimi-
nation of the defense of legal or factual impossibility whenever the crime would
"have been committed had the circumstances been as the actor believed them to be."
248. The need for federal legislation goes beyond reform in the area of attempt.
Presently, federal theft legislation is usually tied to some aspect of interstate com-
merce; the defendant must be shown to have so transported, or at least so caused
the transportation of, the stolen goods. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970); United
States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds,.394 U.S.
310 (1969). This causes additional proof problems at trial. It also causes virtually
insurmountable probable cause problems during the process of investigation, particu-
larly investigation of fences. Informants will supply intelligence of fencing activity,
but they are not often attuned to the proof requirements of federal law. Under pres-
ent practices and legal limitations, it is difficult to convict a fence on federal grounds,
even with the aid of such extraordinary tools as electronic surveillance. See gener-
ally Testimony of Special Agent Robert G. Sweeney, Hearings of the National
Comm. for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Elec-
tronic Surveillance, Vol. 2, at 860-61 (May 20, 1975). The need here is for compre-
hensive federal fencing legislation patterned after either 18 U.S.C. § 892 (1970)
(loansharking) or 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) (syndicated gambling), neither of which
makes commerce an integral part of the offense. See Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that § 892 is constitutional); United States v. Sacco, 491
F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1974) (§ 1955 held constitutional). The need for independent
federal legislation is underscored by the interplay of other aspects of the problem.
Often the states that have comprehensive theft and fencing legislation do not have
the necessary investigative tools (e.g., wiretapping); in addition, because of restrictive
court decisions, federal-state cooperation is seriously inhibited. See, e.g., People v.
Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 804 (1973)
(lawful federal wiretap inadmissible in state proceedings).
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dealers apparently play an important role in theft and fencing,24 9 it
would be helpful to impose on them a duty of inquiry as to the source
of the goods they purchase and to criminalize, under appropriate
standards, the possession of merchandise with altered identification
marks. An appropiate duty of inquiry would permit undercover
police to offer for sale allegedly stolen goods25 0 and at least to arrest
dealers who purchased without making a proper inquiry. Assuming
sufficient corroborative evidence is available, noncomplying mer-
chants might be convicted of both an attempt to purchase stolen
property and a failure to inquire, regardless of the innocent character
of the property in question. 251  Of course, the failure to inquire
might be appropriately graded as a lesser offense than attempted re-
ceipt of stolen property.2 52
249. See notes 45-49, 115-39, 145, 169-71 supra and accompanying text.
250. The investigation would have to be carried out with great care, since entrap-
ment is an obvious potential difficulty. See note 209 supra. A suggested method
would include the use of agents or cooperative informants who would be wired with
appropriate electronic surveillance devices. Since the "wired" individual consents to
the use of such a device, no fourth amendment problem is posed. See Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437-40 (1963) (wire recorder); On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 753-54 (1952) (transmitter); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971). Cf. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (telephone). For an
illustration of the creative use of a wired informant in a fencing investigation where
the informant died before trial, but the tapes were still used, see United States v.
Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 415 U.S. 989
(1974). A merchant who fails to adhere to the duty could also be caught through
the use of legislatively authorized electronic surveillance measures issued pursuant to
a court order. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-2519 (1970). See notes 310-28 infra and accom-
panying text. Under such circumstances a "wired" agent could establish the initial
probable cause for the court order.
251. Since the purpose of such an enactment would be to facilitate investigative
efforts, the mere failure to make inquiry would constitute a separate offense, and the
character of the goods would be immaterial. Consequently, a merchant who fails to
make appropriate inquiry with respect to the source of goods would act at his peril.
Hall points out that New York initially utilized a similar approach by enacting
legislation that required diligent inquiry into the character of the goods and later cre-
ated a rebuttable presumption of knowledge of the goods' stolen character whenever
there had been failure to make diligent inquiry. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 211-12.
New York's statute did not, however, make the mere failure to inquire a separate sub-
stantive offense. Id. at 212-13. See People v. Rosenthal, 197 N.Y. 394 (1910),
ajfd., 226 U.S. 260 (1912) (failure to inquire in receipt of stolen property by junk
dealer not violation of liberty of contract or equal protection). Apparently, Hall did
not recognize the investigative significance that such a statute might have, for al-
though he proposed to make the failure to inquire a separate offense applicable to
designated retail and wholesale dealers, he apparently would not have allowed a con-
viction if the items were not, in fact, stolen. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 224.
252. As an alternative to making failure to inquire an offense, a statutory pre-
sumption could be enacted which would give rise to a presumption of knowledge of
the goods' stolen character upon proof of a dealer's failure to make inquiry with re-
spect to source. See notes 344 infra and accompanying text. There are, however,
constitutional limitations surrounding presumptions of this type. See notes 351-54,
360-88 infra and accompanying text.
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A law proscribing the possession of altered merchandise would
function in a somewhat different manner. As provided by section
3 of the Model Act,2 53 possession of altered property itself would
be considered a separate crime; in addition, it could be treated as
a strict liability offense. 254 The Model Act also provides appropriate
gradation distinctions since possession of altered goods may be less
blameworthy than possession of stolen property.2 55
Obviously, such a proposal is useful only if sufficient numbers
of products are manufactured with distinctive identification marks.
For this reason, legislatures should seriously consider requiring se-
rialization of products where technologically feasible.25 6 In the past,
state legislatures have not refrained from imposing similar require-
ments upon businessmen to protect state revenues. For example,
the stamping of cigarette packages is routinely required in most
states.25 7  State revenues are similarly threatened by theft and fenc-
ing, since fences frequently sell stolen goods without collecting or
reporting a sales tax and victimized merchants inevitably report
lower profits for income tax purposes.258 If mandatory serialization
is too far-reaching, legislatures might consider offering businesses
tax credits in return for voluntary serialization.
In any case, both prosecutors and police are in desperate need
of a modernized approach to help them prove receipt of "stolen"
property. Serialization accompanied by accurate recording proce-
dures would help in the identification of stolen property, and espe-
cially in jurisdictions that do not recognize a crime of attempted re-
ceipt of stolen property, would also help police trace property
253. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT § 3, Appendix B. Note that the
Model Act would not make possession of altered property a strict liability offense.
See note 2, Appendix B.
254. Strict liability has traditionally received constitutional approval in the regu-
latory offense area. For a detailed discussion of the constitutional limitations on
strict liability offenses in general, see notes 412-25 infra and accompanying text.
Note that the proposed legislation should provide an exemption for cases when the
dealer has received the manufacturer's express permission to make alterations or
when such activity is considered impliedly approved by prevailing commercial stand-
ards.
Similar legislation, but of a more limited character, has been enacted in California
and Illinois. California's statute does not provide for strict liability, and Illinois' is
directed at a very limited range of activity. See CAL. PENAL LAW § 537e (West Supp.
1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 50-31 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
255. Compare MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT § 3(b), with §§ 2(b), 4(b), Ap-
pendix B.
256. Legislation could be designed that would create a hearing board structure to
review questions of technological and economic feasibility.
257. See, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAX CoDn §§ 30161, 30162 (West 1970).
258. See CARGO THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 8.
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through complex redistribution systems without actually intervening,
and thus without depriving the goods of their "stolen merchandise"
status. In addition, since sophisticated receivers can remove serial
numbers, the passage of statutes criminalizing either the possession
of altered merchandise or the failure to inquire is necessary.
c. The state of mind requirement. In addition to establishing
that the property was received and stolen, the prosecution must also
establish that the fence knew the goods were stolen.25 9 In the fed-
eral courts the prosecution need not prove that the defendant knew
the stolen goods were part of interstate commerce,28 0 since this ele-
ment has uniformly been regarded as a purely jurisdictional require-
ment.2 " Although for many years the circuits were split over
whether knowledge of the jurisdictional element must be established
in conspiracy cases, 26 2 the Supreme Court recently facilitated con-
259. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 14, at 685-88.
260. The interstate character of the transaction must be established under several
of the federal theft statutes. There is, however, a difference between the character
of the interstate element in several of the statutes. In 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970), for
example, the goods must be taken from interstate commerce, while in 18 U.S.C. §
2313 and § 2315 (1970) the goods must have moved in interstate commerce after
having been stolen.
261. See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 471 F.2d 1310, 1312 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 935 (1973); United States v. Tannuzzo, 174 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 815 (1949).
262. The underlying argument of those decisions that have required proof of the
defendant's knowledge of the jurisdictional elements in conspiracy cases was originally
stated by Judge Learned Hand: "While one may, for instance, be guilty of running
past a traffic light of whose existence one is ignorant, one cannot be guilty of con-
spiring to run past such a light, for one cannot agree to run past a light unless one
supposes that there is a light to run past." United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271,
273 (2d Cir. 1941). Accordingly, "[tihe distinction between the scienter component
of the conspiracy and substantive charges arises from the notion that although an
individual may commit some crimes unwittingly he cannot conspire to commit a spe-
cific crime unless he is aware of all the elements of the crime." United States v.
DeMarco, 488 F.2d 828, 832 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Hand approach, however, was widely criticized by both the courts and the
commentators. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, Comment at 110-13 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1960); Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv.
920, 937-39 (1959); 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATiONAL COMMN. ON REFORM OF
Ta FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws 388-89 (1970) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]; RE-
FORM COMmN., 1§§ 203, 204, 1004; United States v. Polesti, 489 F.2d 822, 824 (7th
Cir. 1973).
The Model Penal Code, while recognizing the conceptual basis underlying the
Hand formulation, proposed an easy legislative solution to the problem. The drafts-
men suggested that the interstate requirement be viewed "not as an element of the
respective crimes but frankly as a basis for establishing federal jurisdiction." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.03, Comment at 116 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). In this manner,
the problem is overcome by simply omitting the jurisdictional requirement from the
definition of the basic crime. The jurisdictional elements are listed in separate sec-
tions. The Reform Commission accepted this proposal, and accordingly proceeded
to segregate the interstate commerce requirement from the remaining elements of the
federal statutory offenses. See, e.g., REFORM COMMN., H9 201, 203, 204, 1732, 1740.
This principle has been followed in S.1. See, e.g., §§ 201(c), 1731(c), 1733.
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spiracy prosecutions by rejecting the older analysis that required such
proof.263  Despite this reform in the federal courts, federal and state
prosecutors still face the difficult task of proving the remaining state
of mind requirements.
(i). The appropriate mens rea. Although the term "knowl-
edge" suggests an actual awareness of attendant circumstances,26 4 if
"receiving statutes required absolute certainty, there would be few
convictions, for one seldom knows anything to a certainty, and the
receiver in particular is careful not to learn the truth."265  Accord-
ingly, most jurisdictions require the prosecution to show only that
the defendant believed the goods were stolen, not that he knew this
fact with certainty.266  Even when framed in these terms, however,
jurisdictions have been unable to agree whether an objective test2 67
263. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). The Supreme Court held
"that where knowledge of the facts giving rise to federal jurisdiction is not necessary
for conviction of a substantive offense embodying a mens rea requirement, such
knowledge is equally irrelevant to questions of responsibility for conspiracy to com-
mit the offense." 420 U.S. at 696. Justice Blackmun quoted the Government's re-
sponse to the traffic light analogy: "The Government rather effectively exposes the
fallacy of the Crimmins traffic light analogy by recasting it in terms of a jurisdic-
tional element. The suggested example is a traffic light on an Indian reservation.
Surely, one may conspire with others to disobey the light but be ignorant of the fact
that it is on the reservation." 420 U.S. at 690 n.24.
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the first issue
is the proper characterization of the element, but that once it is characterized as juris-
dictional, then the requirement is irrelevant to the dual purposes of conspiracy the-
ory: (1) the "protection of society from the dangers of concerted criminal activity,"
and (2) the initiation of "preventive action" against the commission of crimes that
are still in a relatively inchoate stage. 420 U.S. at 693-94. Accordingly, Justice
Blackmun concluded that, "[g~iven the level of criminal intent necessary to sustain
conviction for the substantive offense, the act of agreement to commit the crime is
no less opprobrius and no less dangerous because of the absence of knowledge of a
fact unnecessary to the formation of criminal intent." 420 U.S. at 693.
264. "A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(1) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances ex-
ist . . . ." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (empha-
sis added). Note that the Model Penal Code modifies its scienter requirement in
receipt of stolen property cases. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.6(1) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft, 1962) ("or believing that [the property] has probably been stolen").
Courts are split as to whether suspicion is sufficient. Compare Commission of Pub.
Safety v. Treadway, - Mass. -, 330 N.E. 468, 472 (1975) (suspicion enough),
with State v. Goldman, 65 NJ.L. 394, 398, 47 A. 641, 643 (1900) (suspicion not
enough).
265. W. LAFAvE & A. Sco'r, supra note 14, at 685.
The receivers of stolen goods almost never "know" that they have been
stolen, in the sense that they could testify to it in a court room. The business
could not be so conducted, for those who sell the goods-the "fences"--must
keep up a more respectable front than is generally possible for the thieves. Nor
are we to suppose that the thieves will ordinarily admit their theft to the receiv-
ers: that would much impair their bargaining power.
United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441 (2nd Cir. 1947).
266. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 14, at 685.
267; A number of states have adopted legislation which expressly sets out an "ob-
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or subjective test26 of knowledge or belief is appropriate.
Since prosecutors face difficult evidentiary burdens, some miti-
gation of the stringent subjective test is warranted. Indeed, the so-
phistication of modem fencing operations compounds the difficulties
already inherent in proving even a defendant's belief as to whether
his goods are stolen.2 6 9  A possible response to these difficulties
would be the adoption of the less confining objective test. Such a
standard for criminal liability might be appropriate if it were limited
to retail and wholesale dealers.
A better reform, however, would be the adoption of a reckless-
ness standard,217 under which a defendant would have a culpable
state of mind if it were established that he purchased goods despite
being aware of a substantial risk that the property had been stolen.2 71
jective" standard of state of mind. Under this approach, the defendant is said to
have knowledge if he knew or should have known of the goods' stolen character.
See, e.g., Agiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-621 (Supp. 1975). A few courts have acknowl-
edged that an objective test is appropriate. See, e.g., Seymour v. State, 246 S.2d 155(Fla. App. 1971). This standard involves the imposition of a strict form of liability
based on what a reasonable person would have known. That a reasonable person
would have known is evidence that a particular person did know. But there is a
world of legal difference between circumstantial evidence of a fact and actual knowl-
edge of the fact itself. See United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441-42 (2d Cir.
1947). Of course, in trial, this difference would tend to blur during the process of
proof and the jury deliberations. The distinction, however, would have to be stated
in the judge's instruction.
268. The majority of jurisdictions have adopted the subjective approach articu-
lated by Judge Hand:
[Slome decisions even go so far as to hold that it is enough, if a responsible
man in the receiver's position would have supposed that the goods were stolen.That we think is wrong; and the better law is otherwise, although of course thefact that a reasonable man would have thought that they have been stolen, is
some basis for finding that the accused actually did think so. But that the jury
must find that the receiver did more than infer the theft from the circumstancehas never been demanded, so far as we know; and to demand more would
emasculate the statute, for the evil against which it is directed is exactly that:i.e., making a market for stolen goods which the purchaser believes to have prob-
ably been stolen.
United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1947) (footnotes omitted).
While recognizing that knowledge may be inferred from circumstances that would
give a hypothetical reasonable man knowledge of the goods' stolen character, thesejurisdictions nevertheless require a finding of actual knowledge on the part of the par-
ticular defendant involved. Any instruction suggesting the contrary is considered to
be reversible error. See, e.g., Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17, 23 (5th Cir.
1955).
269. The difficulties involved in proving knowledge are discussed in notes 274-
328, 389-97 inlra and accompanying text.
270. See MODEL THEFr AND FENCINo Acr § 2 n.2, Appendix B.
271. The Model Penal Code defines recklessness as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the mate-
rial element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that, considering thre nature and purpose of the actor's con-
duct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross devia-
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Use of a recklessness test would permit partial reconciliation of two
somewhat conflicting aims of the criminal law. First, by applying
a subjective test, a recklessness standard would hold the prosecu-
tion to a higher burden of proof than would an objective test, thus
limiting criminal punishment to only particularly blameworthy con-
duct. Second, such a standard, although not as favorable to the prose-
cution as an objective test, would facilitate the prosecution and con-
viction of fences since authorities would not be required to prove
actual knowledge.
An even more sophisticated refinement would be to incorporate
the recklessness standard into a continuum that would vary the pre-
scribed punishment with the state of mind proved by the prosecution.
Since a defendant who knowingly purchased stolen property is more
blameworthy than a defendant who made a reckless purchase, dis-
tinctions in the penalties imposed might be appropriate. 17  More
importantly, such a gradation of punishment would facilitate both
plea bargaining and the successful prosecution of fences whose cases
are taken to trial. For example, in exchange for lighter punishment,
a defendant could plead guilty to a lesser fencing offense than that
for which he might have been convicted had the case gone to trial.
Further, in cases actually tried, jurors would no longer have to elect
between convicting a fence of one offense or not convicting him at
all. By permitting prosecutors to bring separate charges alleging
actual knowledge and recklessness, similar to the procedure in many
jurisdictions where prosecutors charge a defendant with both first-
degree and second-degree murder, verdicts could more closely re-
flect the facts; jurors presumably would be less likely to acquit a de-
fendant who made a reckless purchase because they would no longer
have to mete out the same punishment as they would to a person
who knowingly purchased stolen goods.
Thus far, however, although a few courts have used the language
of a recklessness standard, -73 no jurisdiction has expressly modified
its state of mind requirement to include a recklessness standard or
tion from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.20(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Under S. 1, "[a]
person's state of mind is reckless with respect to: (1) an existing circumstance if
he is aware of a risk that the circumstance exists but disregards the risk ....
§ 303(c).
272. For a more detailed discussion of gradation principles, see notes 450-67 infra
and accompanying text.
273. See United States v. Brawer, 482 F.2d 117, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1973), alld.,
496 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant acted with reckless disregard by consciously
avoiding learning the truth).
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legislated a comprehensive state of mind continuum correlating pun-
ishment and blameworthiness. Consequently, prosecutors are usu-
ally left with the unenviable task of proving defendants had an actual
belief the goods purchased were stolen.
(ii). The availability of direct evidence establishing mens
rea. Proof of guilty knowledge under existing statutes is an inher-
ently difficult task because a sophisticated fence is able to "erect the
most elaborate defenses."27 4  A professional fence, for example,
"legitimizes" stolen property in his possession to make its positive
identification more difficult and falsifies sales receipts for use in re-
butting prosecutorial attempts to establish his knowledge that the
goods were stolen .27  Similarly, a master fence is well-insulated
from the complex redistribution process he operates, and thus rarely
leaves readily detectable direct evidence that can be used to establish
the requisite state of mind.27 6
Although this situation is dismaying, legislative action can, and
sometimes has, provided law enforcement officials with potentially
powerful evidence-gathering techniques. Most important are vari-
ous devices to encourage informants to come forward and the ex-
panded use of electronic surveillance. For example, the use of im-
munity grants may provide a viable means of compelling testimony
from informants, despite the widespread reluctance of thieves to tes-
tify against their fences. 277 At the federal level, title II of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970, permits judicial, administrative,
and congressional bodies to issue orders granting immunity in ex-
change for testimony with appropriate safeguards for individual lib-
erties.2 78  A grant of immunity is authorized whenever a recalcitrant
witness refuses to divulge information important to the public inter-
274. Hearings on Fencing 4.
275. See notes 132-38 supra and accompanying text. False receipts, in particular,
afford the offender the opportunity to create his own evidence by establishing that
he paid the market value price for the merchandise. See generally C. KLOCKARs, Su-
pra note 12, at 82 n.6.
276. See notes 142-49 supra and accompanying text.
277. '"he commentators, and this Court on several occasions, have characterized
immunity statutes as essential to the effective enforcement of various criminal stat-
utes. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, . . . such statutes have 'become part of
our constitutional fabric.'" Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 447 (1972) (ci-
tations and footnotes omitted). See 8 J. WI GmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2281 (3d ed. 1940).
For a good summary of the development and potential effectiveness of immunity
grants, see Blakey, supra note 148, in TAsK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 85-88.
278. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 6001-6005 (Supp. 1975). See Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972). For an analysis of the use of § 6002, see Testimony of H. Peter-
sen, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d
Cong., 2nd Sess. 544 (1972).
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est and claims his privilege against self-incrimination.7 9 Once im-
munity has been granted, the witness is required by law to disclose
whatever information is requested, but none of his testimony may
be used directly or indirectly against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. 2 0  This so-called use immunity of the federal statute
is an effective investigative technique, for a witness testifying under
it has a strong incentive to provide the prosecution with as much in-
formation as possible. In effect, the more information a witness pro-
vides under the compulsion of an order to testify, the more difficult
it is for the prosecution to gather independently, and to show it gath:
ered independently, evidence to convict the witness of the underly-
ing crime.281 Failure to comply with the order to testify is punish-
able as contempt, subjecting the witness to a potentially prolonged
period of imprisonment,2 2 and a grant of immunity does not protect
279. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 6002, 6003, 6004, 6005 (Supp. 1975),
280. 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (Supp. 1975). The negative implication of section
6002 is that the witness's testimony can be used against him in a civil suit. See
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974). For a detailed dis-
cussion of civil remedies in the fencing context, see notes 499-544 infra and accom-
panying text. Civil consequences were encompassed under the former standard trans-
action immunity language ("penalty or forfeiture"). See, e.g., Lee v. Civil Aeronau-
tics'Bd., 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
281. In a criminal proceeding brought against such a witness, the prosecution may
only utilize evidence that has been obtained independently of the subject's testimony.
See note 280 supra and accompanying text. Generally, a use-immunized witness is
entitled to a copy of the immunized testimony. In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154
(D.R.I. 1972). Access may also be had to the minutes of an indicting grand jury.
United States v. Dornau, 356 F. Supp. 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The prosecution's bur-
den to show no subsequent use may not be met with conclusionary assertions. United
States v. Seiffert, 463 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1972). Proof must be offered. United
States v. Seiffert, 357 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Tex. 1973). Mere exposure to a prosecutor
has been held to warrant dismissal of an indictment. See United States v. McDaniel,
482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). This seems to go too far since other prosecutors who had not been exposed
to the testimony could handle untainted evidence. Obviously, the government's bur-
den is heavy, but it is not insuperable. See WATERGATE: SPECIAL PRosEcUrIoN
FORCE REPoRT 208 (1975) (filing of "taint" papers in reference to John Dean).
282. Federal legislation provides that a noncomplying witness may be confined
for a period not to exceed 18 months. 28 U.S.C. § 1826. The witness may obtain
his release at any time by purging himself of his contempt. His confinement may
be renewed if he is subsequently called upon to testify, for example, before a new
grand jury, and he again refuses to comply. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364 (1966) (dicta); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Alphonse Persico, 522 F.2d 41
(2d Cir. 1975). At least one federal court, however, has expressed dicta to the effect
that, at some point, prolonged confinement may violate a person's due process rights.
See United States v. Doe, 405 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1968). New Jersey, too, has upheld
prolonged confinement (four years), but has recognized that the facts of each case
must determine its resolution. Catena v. Seidl, 65 N.J. 257, 262, 321 A.2d 225, 228
(1974) stated: 'The legal justification for commitment for civil contempt is to secure
compliance. Once it appears that the commitment has lost its coercive power, the
legal justification for it ends and further confinement cannot be tolerated." The test
used by the court to determine whether confinement should end was whether there
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a witness from prosecution for perjury.288
Immunity grants are also routinely authorized by state legisla-
tion.284  Nevertheless, despite the Supreme Court's decision in Kas-
tigar v. United States,28 5 which held that the federal "use immunity"
statute is coextensive with the scope of the fifth amendment's priv-
ilege against self-incrimination, 2 6 most state legislation only author-
izes prosecutors to grant witnesses "transaction immunity," or protec-
tion from prosecution for any crime to which the compelled testimony
relates.28 7 Transaction immunty offers considerably broader protec-
tion than that required by the fifth amendment privilege and is less
effective than use immunity as an investigative tool. Transaction im-
munity provides no inducement to the witness to provide maximum
information since it acts as an "immunity bath": A witness is always
immune from prosecution for the underlying offense once he testi-
fies, regardless of how much useful evidence he provides. 28   Fur-
ther, a grant of transaction immunity in a fencing investigation may
was "no substantial likelihood" that the witness would testify. 65 N.J. at 262, 321
A.2d at 228. For subsequent developments in Catena see N.Y. Times, Aug. 20. 1975,
at 1, col. 5 (late city ed.) (Gerardo Catena ordered released from confinement for
civil contempt) and 17 CuM. L. Rpm-. 2497 (1975).
283. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (Supp. 1975). Until recently, the perjury sanction
has been of limited effectiveness because of the traditional difficulties involved in
proving a violation. See Blakey, supra note 148, in TAsK FORCE REPORT, OR-
GANIZED CRIME 88-91. This problem has been ameliorated by the passage of legisla-
tion that requires only "proof that the defendant while under oath made irreconcil.
ably contradictory declarations material to the point in question . . . ." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1623 (Supp. 1975). The cases also make it clear that the immunity attaches only
to truthful testimony; untruthful responses may be used against the witness, for ex-
ample, to cross-examine and incriminate him under another charge. See, e.g., United
States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974).
284. A comprehensive list of state immunity legislation is provided in 8 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 277, § 2281, at 495 n.11. Thirty three states now provide for im-
munity in the fencing area. THE NATIONAL ASSN. OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, OR-
GANIZED CRIME CONTROL LEGISLATION 133-41 (1974).
285. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
286. 406 U.S. at 453.
287. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324 (West 1972). Only three states cur-
rently provide for the granting of "use immunity." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.468
(1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. 1 2 A. 81-17.3 (1968); OHIo R1v. CODE ANN. § 2945.44
(Page 1975). The New Jersey approach has been sustained as constitutional. See
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commn. of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
288. Once a witness has been granted transactional immunity, his cooperation is
by no means assured. See, e.g., Giancana v. United States, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965). The reluctant witness may provide the govern-
ment with some evidence, but not enough to sustain a conviction. He is, of course,
subject to the contempt sanction, but it is effective only if the government can estab-
lish that he is still withholding information. For a discussion of how some of those
who attended the infamous Appalachian gathering handled subsequent immunity
grants through evasive answers, see United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408, 418 n.27
(2d Cir. 1960).
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require a decision to forego prosecuting a thief and instead to convict
a fence, a decision many law enforcement agencies appear reluctant
to make.2"" No doubt this aversion reflects outmoded priorities that
should be changed,29 0 but since police often can independently
gather sufficient evidence to prosecute thieves successfully, the di-
lemma could be eliminated altogether by enacting legislation author-
izing the granting of "use immunity,"29 1 as is provided by Section
12(b) of the Model Act.292
Whether testimony elicited through the use of an immunity grant
can provide direct evidence establishing a fence's culpable state of
mind depends upon the thief's ability to give a detailed account of
his transactions with the fence. Sometimes thieves do not know the
identity of their fences, 293 but this obstacle can be overcome by a
series of immunity grants used to climb the chain of command of
sophisticated fencing operations. Inevitably, even a well-insulated
master fence can be convicted.294
Regardless of their potential as investigative tools, the effective-
ness of immunity grants is considerably hampered in many jurisdic-
tions by courts suspicious of the credibility of testimony favorable
to the prosecution given by a witness with an obvious interest in es-
caping punishment. 295  These courts have created the so-called cor-
289. The reluctance of law enforcement authorities to make this policy decision
is suggested by the widespread practice of tolerating fencing operations in exchange
for information concerning theft activity. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
This may be because "the most commonly used measure of police performance is the
rate at which crimes are 'cleared' by arrest." C. KYocKAs, supra note 12, at 28.
Given the importance of clearance by arrest statistics, the police may not be inclined
to grant a thief immunity, since the fence who might be convicted is usually capable
of producing a greater number of theft arrests.
290. See notes 15-49 supra and accompanying text.
291. See note 280 supra and accompanying text.
292. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING AcT § 12(b), Appendix B.
293. See notes 142-43, 163-66 supra and accompanying text.
294. In organized crime cases, however, witnesses may be completely intimidated
by the threat of physical injury. See note 148 supra. Fear of "underworld reprisals,"
however, will not warrant refusal to testify before a grand jury. See Latona v.
United States, 449 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1971). On the federal level this situation has
been somewhat ameliorated by provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 that were designed to afford maximum protective cover to potential witnesses.
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-005 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970). The program is ad-
ministered by the United States Marshall Service. The number of witnesses under
protection runs to approximately 100 per day. The "increasing number of major
crime figures who are volunteering to serve as witnesses is an indication of the suc-
cess of this program." Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Ap-
propriations, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. 1072 (1973). See How Business Shelters Witnesses
from the Mob, NATION's BUSINass, August, 1973, at 20.
295. The Supreme Court has characterized accomplice testimony as "inevitably
suspect" and unreliable. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968).
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roboration rule that requires either a cautionary jury instruction call-
ing for care in evaluating such testimony or a directed verdict of ac-
quittal whenever the testimony of an accomplice has not been cor-
roborated.2 9 6 Although initially conceived as "merely .. . a [dis-
cretionary] counsel of caution given by the judge to the jury,"210 the
practice has evolved into a strict rule of law in some jurisdictions. 218
Fortunately for prosecutors, however, a number of jurisdictions have
narrowly circumscribed application of the corroboration rule by
technically limiting the term "accomplice" to those criminals subject to
indictment for the same crime with which the defendant is charged.
In some receiving cases, this reasoning continues, the corroboration
rule is not applicable since a thief is not a receiver's accomplice; he
has instead technically committed a separate offense of theft and
therefore is not subject to indictment for the crime of receiving.
According to other courts, however, this view is patently superficial
since the conduct of both criminals is necessary for successful com-
mission of the theft and the receiving, and the testifying witness still
has an interest in escaping punishment by providing testimony favor-
able to the prosecution. 299 Regardless of which approach is taken, the
ultimate result on the evidentiary issue is frequently the same, however,
because even those jurisdictions that narrowly define "accomplice"
recognize an exception and apply the corroboration rule whenever
there has been a prior relationship between the fence and the thief.800
Given the number of fences who have regular contacts with thieves
and the high volume of the "steal-to-order" business, 01 the corrobo-
ration doctrine is obviously a potential problem in the prosecution
of all large-scale fencing activity.802
296. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 14, at 691; 7 J. WIoMORE, supra note
277, § 2056. An early discussion of this problem in the fencing context is provided
in J. HALL, supra note 5, at 176-85. Massachusetts has gone one step further. Ac-
complice testimony need not be corroborated. Commonwealth v. French, 357 Mass.
356, 395 (1970). But by statute, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 201 (1970), immu-
nized testimony must be. See Commonwealth v. DeBrosky. - Mass. -, 297 N.E
2d 496 (1973).
297. 7 J. WiGMonE, supra note 277, § 2056, at 315 (emphasis original).
298. Id. at 319-21.
299. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 817, 832-38 (1957).
300. See id. at 838-46. Federal law is reviewed in Stephenson v. United States,
211 F.2d 702, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1954) (plain error to fail to give instruction).
301. See notes 110, 139, 140, 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
302. More than theft or receiving is involved. If there is a prior relationship,
it is possible that the receiver is guilty of conspiracy to steal and receiving rather
than theft or receiving. See State v. VanderLave, 47 N.J. Super. 483, 487, 136 A.2d
296, 298 (1957), afId., 27 N.J. 313, 142 A.2d 609 (1958), where the court said:
The conspiratorial role of appellant, alleged and proven by the State, tran-
scended the function of a receiver of stolen goods, even one with foreknowledge
1566 [Vol. 74:1511
August 1976] Criminal Distribution of Stolen Property 1567
These difficulties could be avoided if courts and legislatures
would recognize that, although an accomplice's testimony is often de-
serving of skeptical treatment, the considerations that gave rise to
the corroboration rule no longer carry much force, 3  and that cred-
ibility should be an issue ultimately left to the jury.30 4 The federal
courts, for example, have correctly decided that an absolute bar
against convictions based upon an accomplice's uncorroborated testi-
mony is inappropriate since the defendant's rights are adequately
protected by the required cautionary instruction. 03 Similar action by
state legislatures would facilitate the conviction of fences by removing
a major obstacle to the prosecution's use of insiders to establish the
requisite state of mind.3 0 6 Fencing reform legislation that abolishes
the corroboration rule to the extent that it requires a directed verdict
of acquittal would obviate the need for the judiciary to draw what
are solely formal distinctions. But if such reform legislation is to
be effective, it must not preserve the directed verdict where there has
been a prior conspiracy or some participation by the receiver in the
larceny. 0 7 Such an exception is a potentially embarrassing loophole
of the intended theft. The conspiracy plan here was one of continuity; the pri-
mary thief and the appellant agreed upon details of the unlawful design and its
modus operandi; it is not an exaggeration to say that the proof was susceptible
of a finding that appellant had participated in supervising the detail, particularly
the timing, of certain larcenies, and showed a selectivity in pointing out the type
and quantity of material which should be stolen for his use, complaining at one
time that drums of stolen material were not filled to his liking . . . and in other
respects the conspirators were shown to have been en rapport, not in the naked
buy and sell relationship of a thief and his receiver, but in the clandestine and
consultative concert of planned action which is the hallmark of the criminal con-
spiracy.
303. The doctrine originated at a time when defendants were not permitted to
take the stand and the accomplice's testimony was admitted as an exception to the
rule of incompetence. See 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 277, § 2057.
304. See id. § 2056. The Supreme Court has suggested that it is in basic agree-
ment with this position. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966);
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1952).
305. In the federal courts, a typical jury instruction simply warns the jury that
"such testimony is always to be received with caution and weighed with great care."
E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE INSTRUCTIONS § 12.04, at 256
(2d ed. 1970). The government may also obtain, however, an instruction that the
jury is not to evaluate informant testimony in terms of their approval of this use and
that the government "must take the witnesses to the transactions as they are," particu-
larly in conspiracy cases. United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306, 1322 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
306. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT § 5b, Appendix B.
307. New York, for example, has purportedly eliminated the corroboration rule,
but the legislation has had a limited impact in enhancing the government's ability
to deal with major fences because of the exception applicable where the receiver has
"participated in the larceny." N.Y. PENAL L.w § 165.65 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
Cf. People v. Valinoti, 26 N.Y.2d 553, 260 N.E.2d 541, 311 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1970).
The New York corroboration rule had been established in People v. Kupperschmidt,
237 N.Y. 463, 143 N.9.2d 256 (1924) (thief held accomplice of receiver for corrobo-
ration purposes). See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 181-85. As a result of business pres-
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since it ironically protects sophisticated receivers who organize thefts
or who are otherwise involved in the larceny.308
Nonetheless, it is another investigative device, electronic surveil-
lance, that clearly affords law enforcement authorities the most direct
access to reliable evidence establishing culpable mens rea, 3 0  al-
though it has raised constitutional objections. 10 In 1967, the Su-
preme Court found no per se constitutional objection to the use of
electronic surveillance,311 and Congress responded by enacting legis-
sure, the Kupperschmidt decision was legislatively set aside. Id. at 184-85. Ironic-
ally, however, the corroboration rule still applies in theft prosecutions, so that the
reversal has had impact on a limited class of receivers; those who may be accomplices
of the thieves are still protected by the corroboration rule. THE N.Y. COMMN. ON
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 16 (1937) aptly
characterized the general rule as "a refuge of organized crime [that] protects the
principles [sic] in racketeering cases." Their recommendation that the general rule
be abolished, however, was not adopted, and it remains today an unwarranted obstacle
in the fencing area whenever prearranged theft or a continuous relationship is present.
308. "[rlhe moment that the fence enters into the actual conspiracy to steal the
property, thereby becoming legally culpable for the larceny itself. . . the People can
only obtain a conviction against the fence for the larceny or possession of the stolen
property if there is corroborative evidence." Hearings on Fencing 6. When char-
acterized in these terms, it is apparent that many fences do participate in the larceny
process. See notes 139-140, 143-46 supra and accompanying text. In the case of
a master fence who arranges the actual theft, the corroboration rule-or the excep-
tion in conspiracy cases-adds another layer of insulation to his protective network.
See notes 143, 146-49 supra and accompanying text.
It must be stressed, however, that legislative reform should not shelter from credi-
bility attack the testimony of either accomplices or informants. Such an attack is
properly part of the adversary process.
Finally, it should be emphasized that a thief generally cannot be convicted for
receiving the fruits of his own theft. Consequently, where a relationship exists be-
tween the "thief" and the "receiver," it is sometimes necessary to indict in the alter-
native, permitting the jury to convict for theft or receipt, but not both. See United
States v. Gaddis, 18 CRIM. L. RPTR. 3079, 3081 (Sup. Ct. 3-3-76).
309. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT § 12(b) (2), Appendix B.
310. Electronic surveillance has raised first, fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment
constitutional questions. See Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the
Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169 (1969); Schwartz, The
Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67
MIcH. L. REV. 455 (1969). Prior to the enactment of Title III (see notes 311-23
infra and accompanying text), it was felt by some that these constitutional problems
could be largely overcome. See Blakey, supra note 148, in TASK FORCE REPORT,
ORGANIZED CRiMn 95-104. See also A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS RELATING TO
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1974).
311. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967).
A per se fifth amendment argument based on the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion had been rejected in 1928 in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
and this aspect of Olmstead has not been overruled. In addition, an analogous argu-
ment, based on using an informant rather than a wiretap, was held to be without
merit in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). A sixth amendment violation
could occur only if electronic surveillance were used during a post-indictment period,
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), or in such a fashion so as to intrude
on the attorney-client relationship itself, Roberts v. United States, 389 U.S. 18
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lation, modeled after the Court's own guidelines, specifically de-
signed to meet the constitutional problems that had been raised in
earlier decisions.312  The enacted legislation, title M of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 313 authorizes fed-
eral and state electronic surveillance upon a court's finding of prob-
able cause and "sets up a system of strict judicial supervision that
imposes tight limitations on the scope of the investigation." '14  Title
III has received widespread judicial approval in various federal cir-
cuit courts310 and state courts;" 6 there seems to be little question
that it authorizes an investigative technique well-designed to attack
both organized crime ' 17 and sophisticated hijacking and fencing sys-
tems.318  By directing electronic surveillance at a professional
fence's place of business, investigators can overhear and record in-
criminating remarks. Such evidence is completely reliable so there
is little danger of a credibility attack at trial.$19 Numerous prosecu-
tions have been facilitated in this manner,$20 and it is apparent that
(1967). See Note, Government Interceptions of Attorney-Client Communications,
49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 87 (1974).
312. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968).
313. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-13, 2515-20 (1970).
314. United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 684 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 934 (1972).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Doolittle, 507 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1975).
316. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vitello, - Mass. -, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975).
Much of the litigation is reviewed in Cranwell, Judicial Fine-Tuning of Electronic
Surveillance, 6 SErON HALL L. REv. 225 (1975).
317. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1968); Blakey, supra note
148, in TAsK FORCE REPORT, ORGANIZED CRIME 92-95.
318. The federal legislation, however, authorizes an interception order in fencing
investigations only when violations of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 659, 2314, and 2315 are in-
volved. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (Supp. 1975). Authorization should be extended
to cover other federal fencing violations. See note 185 supra. There is also a cer-
tain unfortunate lack of clarity in the current draft of S.1. Section 3101(b) does
not explicitly authorize state surveillance in the theft and fencing area, and its gen-
eral language reads "crime of violence." See S.1, § 111. The legislative history indi-
cates that this phrase is used "in the broad sense as comprehending the present lan-
guage" of 18 U.S.C. § 2516 ("dangerous ...to ...property"). SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., 3 REPORT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE CODIFICA-
CATION, REVISION AND REFORM Acr OF 1974, at 942 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinaf-
ter S.1 REPORT] Obviously, there is no intent to eliminate this area of investigation
from the use of state surveillance, but it might have been hoped that this intent could
have been more clearly expressed.
319. The only possible credibility argument would concern whether the recording
has been tampered with in any way. Careful police enforcement procedures and the
use of a seal would completely obviate this defense. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (a)
(1970); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 104-05 (1968); United States v. Fal-
cone, 505 F.2d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1974) (seal to "insure integrity").
320. The following case study demonstrates the effectiveness of such techniques
in the fencing context:
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if this method were widely implemented professional fences would
run a substantially higher risk of conviction.
In addition to establishing the requisite state of mind, successful
electronic surveillance can also help establish "receipt," can locate
and identify other stolen property,32' and can provide authorities
Case Study
Kings County, New York-Forgery, Criminal
Possession of Forged Documents, Grand Larceny,
Criminal Possession of Stolen Property,
Criminal Usury
Background
This was a "target investigation," begun in 1971, directed against a high level
member of an organized crime "family" operating in Brooklyn. Physical surveil-
lance and two gambling wiretaps on public telephones in a local bar which the
target's associates frequented had pinpointed the target's headquarters as the
trailer office of a nearby busines.
Physical surveillance of the trailer was conducted for several months. During
this time, a pattern was established for meetings in the trailer between the target
and other persons with criminal histories. During this period of observation, it
was also learned that the FBI was engaged in an independent investigation of
the gambling activities of several of the target's associates. Following a meeting
between the District Attorney and FBI agents, it was decided to proceed with
a joint investigation.
At this time, the FBI produced an informant who had personally overheard
criminal conversations in the trailer and who described a stolen car racket, using
forged documents, which was being conducted there. Orders were then sought
to place wiretaps on the three telephones in the trailer and to place a "bug" with-
in the trailer itself.
Operation of the surveillance devices
The three wiretaps were installed on the day that the orders were signed. It
took a week, however, to install the bug, as the trailer was inside the lot, sur-
rounded by an eight foot high cyclone fence and guarded by a watch dog.
The wiretaps were initially approved for thirty days, but one extension on
each was granted, allowing each to run for sixty days. The order on the bug
was extended three times, giving it an authorized operational period of 120 days.
During this period, conversations apparently relating to a variety of criminal ac-
tivity, including bribery, were overheard.
Results
The investigation ultimately resulted in the arrest of seventy-one individuals,
including the target of the original investigation and several other alleged mem-bers of the same organized crime family. Of this number, thirty-seven pleaded,
guilty to minor charges and were given $100 fines. Of the thirty-four personsindicted, three have been convicted of perjury or criminal contempt and thirty-
one cases are pending.
Evaluation
This is an excellent example of the sophisticated use of electronic surveil-
lance by law enforcement agencies to combat organized crime. It points out the
value of federal-state agency cooperation, the interplay between electronic and
non-electronic surveillance techniques, and the usefulness of an investigation tar-geted against a specific organized crime figure, with the availability of reliable
informants close to the target.
NATL. COMMN. FOR THE REVIEW OF FED. AND STATE LAws RELATING TO WIRETAP-
PING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, STAFF STUDIES AND SURVEY 277-78 (1976). Fi-
nally, the use of electronic surveillance recently led to the successful prosecution of
Jack Mace, one of New York's most sophisticated fencing operators. See United
States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 770-71, 773-76 (2nd Cir. 1973); V. TERESA, supra
note 29, at 258-89. By intercepting conversations and tapping telephones at Mace's
place of business, the "Rio Coin Shop," investigators were able to secure his convic-
tion, as well as the convictions of several major organized crime figures.
321. DEPT. OF JusTICE REE.ASEs 13, 17 (May 2, 1974) (statement of Kevin T.
Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney 'General, Criminal Division, Before the Select
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with evidence and leverage to induce the testimony of potential wit-
nesses. For example, the apparently legitimate businessman who
initially denies his association with a major fence may be more will-
ing to cooperate once he has been confronted with a tape recording
of his self-incriminating remarks.822  At this point, the stage is set
for granting the businessman immunity in exchange for testimony
that may help trace the complex redistribution system of a master
fence.
Yet despite its demonstrated success, electronic surveillance has
rarely been used in the investigation of fencing cases. Only twenty-
three jurisdictions have enacted electronic surveillance statutes pur-
suant to title III authorization, 28 and of the 701 orders authorizing
wiretapping issued in 1975, only thirteen were issued to detect sus-
pected possession of stolen property.324 Instead, most so-called inter-
cept orders concern probable gambling and narcotics violations.825
Thus, because of both legislative omission or investigative oversight,
law enforcement authorities generally have failed to take advantage of
the most effective evidence-gathering device available to combat
large-scale fencing activity.126
Nevertheless, even if this were not the case, it must be acknowl-
edged that electronic surveillance is no panacea for existing deficien-
cies in evidence-gathering techniques. Electronic devices are partic-
ularly difficult to use where, for instance, a master fence does not
Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, Concerning the Criminal Redis-
tribution System).
322. The then Chief Counsel of the McClellan Committee, Robert F. Kennedy,
makes the point: "Me kind of proof makes a difference. He can say very forcefully
someone's a liar-that's easy, but here we had his own voice on the tapes. He
couldn't deny it." Quoted in 1. MAaum, EvImDNcE OF GuIrT 247 n.16 (1959).
323. U.S. ADmI, sTRAnvE OFFICE OF Tm U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICA-
TIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVINo THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL
COMMUNICATIONS HT (1975) [hereinafter ANNuA. REPORT 1975]. Among those
populous states identified by the ORGANIZED CRIME TASK FORCE: PRESmENT'S
COMMN. ON LAW AND ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 7 (1967) as
having organized crime problems, but that do not authorize surveillance, are the
following: California, Texas, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Even
among those states with surveillance legislation, the statutes leave something to be
desired in the fencing area. See WIRETAP REPORT 200-01 (concurrence of Commis-
sioner Blakey).
324. ANNUAL REPORT 1975 VIII. Out of the 13 intercept orders issued for the
investigation of possession of stolen property, nine were federal, two were granted
in New York, one was granted in New Jersey, and one was granted in Kansas. Id.
at VIII-IX. In addition, 3 orders were issued for burglary, 5 for larceny and theft,
and 6 for robbery. Id. Some of these may, in fact, have been issued in fencing in-
vestigations.
325. Id. at VIII.
326. The National Wiretap Commission has called for "more extensive" use of
surveillance in theft and fencing investigations. WnIRTAP REPORT 5.
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operate from a fixed place of business but instead conducts his trans-
actions from randomly selected telephone booths. 27 Such a re-
ceiver is vulnerable only if his purchaser's telephone has been
tapped or if for some reason his buyer decides to cooperate with
police. In addition, as with search warrants, logistical considerations
may delay or completely preclude a successful wire, z32  and once in-
stalled, reception is often marred by mechanical difficulties or back-
ground noises. These problems, combined with the demonstrated
reluctance of legislators and law enforcement authorities to use elec-
tronic surveillance, have caused investigators and prosecutors to at-
tempt the more difficult task of proving the requisite state of mind
by circumstantial, rather than by direct, evidence.
(iii). The use of circumstantial evidence to establish mens
rea. A prosecutor who cannot present direct testimony establish-
ing guilty knowledge must instead recreate circumstances surround-
ing the fence's receipt of stolen property from which a jury might
infer the requisite mens rea.829 Some courts have held that evidence
establishing that the defendant purchased goods at extremely low
prices, removed identification marks, or attempted to conceal the mer-
chandise upon receipt, is sufficient to support a finding that the defend-
ant knew the goods were stolen.330 In order to show that the defend-
ant's conduct was not the product of innocent mistake, successful
prosecutors often supplement this circumstantial evidence with proof
that the defendant has acted similarly in other transactions or has
previously been convicted of receiving.3 81
327. It is questionable that many master fences take such extraordinary precau-
tions. See generally DEPT. OF JUSTICE RELEAsES, supra note 321, at 13. Certainly,
the professional fence who is also involved in master fencing may tend to use the
phone at his place of business. This practice led to the downfall of one of New York
City's most sophisticated fences. See note 320 supra. On the other hand, the master
fence's work tends to be episodic rather than regular, in contrast to the activities of
those engaged in gambling and narcotics transactions. This sharply curtails the op-
portunities to establish the probable cause necessary to obtain a court order. Indeed,
the best hope of getting at the master fence through wire surveillance lies in over-
hearing his calls to a professional fence, when the professional needs the superior
resources and contacts of the master.
328. See note 320 supra; WETAP REPORT at 7-8, 55-62.
329. See W. LAFAvE, & A. ScoTT, supra note 14, at 686.
330. See, e.g., Torres v. United States, 270 F.2d 252, 259 (9th Cir. 1959). For
discussion of this issue, see W. LAFAVw & A. ScoTr, supra note 14, at 686-87; 2 J.
WrGMO., supra note 277, § 327.
331. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 186-89; W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note
14, at 687; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 277, §§ 324-26. Evidence of this nature is
admissible because it tends to establish intent by negating the possibility of an inno-
cent mistake or by demonstrating the existence of an on-going plan. Jurisdictional
rules vary concerning whether the same type of property must have been involved,
whether the goods must have been received from the same thief, and the requisite
1572 [Vol. 74:1511
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Persuasive circumstantial evidence establishing the guilty knowl-
edge of the most sophisticated fences, however, is usually not avail-
able. Instead, prosecutors must attempt to convict professional re-
ceivers masquerading as legitimate businessmen by introducing
somewhat less powerful evidence of conduct by the defendant that
deviates from normal business practices. By skillfully comparing a
fence's conduct with normal business practices, prosecutors may be
able to establish the requisite mens rea on the basis of such circum-
stantial evidence as proof of poor bookkeeping procedures, unre-
corded secret transactions, the failure to retain itemized receipts, un-
usual methods of payment, or the failure of the accused receiver to
make proper inquiry concerning the source of his seller's goods.83 2
sufficiency of the link between the present offense and the prior illegal transactions
sought to be offered into evidence. See Hearings on Criminal Laws 550. Hall ar-
gues that rules requiring delivery by the same thief are inappropriate, since "the
larger the business done, the greater are the probabilities that different thieves have
been dealt with, that the property was stolen from different places and persons, and
hence, that the receiving in question was with criminal knowledge." J. HALL, supra
note 5, at 187. Wigmore states that it is usually "necessary and sufficient to show
(a) former receipt and possession (and, perhaps, under suspicious circumstances) (b)
of goods similar as to the person bringing them or as to their kind or otherwise."
2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 277, § 324, at 228.
Evidence of prior criminal transactions, because of its highly prejudicial nature,
may only be introduced if "the evidence is substantially relevant for some other pur-
pose than to show a probability that [the accused] committed the crime on trial be-
cause he is a man of criminal character." MCCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 190, at 447 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
McCoRMICK]. Accordingly, such evidence may be admitted for purposes of demon-
strating the existence of a plan or for establishing that receipt was not without guilty
knowledge. Id. at 448-50. For a detailed listing of authorities which have analyzed
the prior similar act doctrine, see id. at 447 n.32.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 463 F.2d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1972)
(manner, timing and price of sale justified inference of knowledge); Henry v. United
States, 361 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967) (failure to
give or request customary bill of sale justified jury inference).
The Association of Grand Jurors of New York County has summarized these
characteristics as follows:
When a commodity is offered for sale to a business-wise merchant, firm or
corporation it is reasonable to presume that he or it knows or will ascertain, be-
fore buying, certain things. These are:
1. The market value of the commodity.
2. The cause for its price being disproportionately low.
3. That certain identification marks usually appearing on the article or its
container have not been removed or altered.
4. That the seller has the legal right to sell and conforms to the customs of
the trade in so doing.
5. That the seller represents a firm known to the trade or is personally
known to the buyer.
6. That the seller has a permanent address.
7. If the seller is a stranger to the buyer that he can furnish trade and other
reliable references as to his good standing.
8. That nothing connected with the seller or his goods indicates fraud.
PRISON COMM. OF THE ASSN. OF GRAND JURORS OF NEw YoRx COUNTY, CRIMINAL
RECEIVERS IN THE UNITED STATES 69-70 (1928).
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In this way, prosecutors can turn a fence's legitimate facade into a
weapon against him.
Yet the availability of such circumstantial evidence does not
guarantee conviction, for two accepted judicial doctrines restrict its
use and thus diminish its potency. First, most states restrict a trial
judge's right to comment on the evidence; consequently, jurors are
often unable to draw inferences of guilty knowledge they would oth-
erwise consider if the judge could share his expertise with them.888
Second, the quantum of incriminating circumstantial evidence
deemed necessary to establish an element of a crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is often high: In "the absence of direct evidence on
a controverted issue, almost all jurisdictions require the prosecution
to prove that all the circumstances are consistent with guilt and in-
consistent with any reasonble hypothesis of innocence. "884 Although
this rule is not applied in the federal courts, 85 it has had a profound
impact at the state level because it "imposes an unjustifiably heavier
burden on the state than does the reasonable doubt standard." 880
The Association of Grand Jurors also took notice of the additional recommenda.
tions of experts in the fencing area:
"Mr Leon Hoage of the New York office of the Holmes Electric Protection
Company. . . holds that an alleged Fence should be required to explain to thejury acts or omissions, such as the following:
1. Failure to keep bona fide books of account in connection with a business
enterprise.
2. Neglect of dealer to keep bills received with goods delivered to him, for
a reasonable period, such as two years.
3. Omission of the dealer to demand and keep as bills the receipts given in
his commercial transactions.
4. Lack of itemized bills of job lots of standard goods purchased, apart from
the balance of the items.
5. Inability or unwillingness of the possessor of goods ostensibly covered by
a bill of sale from a reputable firm, to communicate with the firm, at the time
the purchase is made, to corroborate the sale.
6. Presentation of a bill of sale, the billhead of which gives the name and
address of a non-existent firm.
7. Purchase of valuable merchandise from a push cart, or similarly unreli-
able vendor."
J. HALL, supra note 5, at 224-25 n. 72.
333. See A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 121-22 (1968) [hereinafter TRIAL BY JURY].
Although the rule against commentary grew out of an early American distrust of ju-
dicial power, Wigmore has maintained "[ihat the preservation of the pristine power
of the Court to comment and advise the jury is essential to the efficient working of
the jury system, and that the deprivation of that power is highly injurious." 9 J.
WGMoRE, supra note 277, § 2551a, at 509. For a detailed list of authorities who
have advocated such restoration, see id. at 512 and TRIAL BY JURY 122-24. The
power to comment must be seen in light of the possible decline in the ability of
average jurors to understand complex fact situations.
334. Note, Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence in a Criminal Case, 55
COLuM. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1955).
335. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954).
33g. Note, supra note 334, at 551.
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Courts and legislatures recognizing the difficulties inherent in
using primarily circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge have
attempted to facilitate convictions by developing several common-
law and statutory presumptions favorable to the prosecution.38 7  A
presumption (permissible inference) in the criminal law reflects a
determination that a certain set of circumstances should be given
special treatment because it tends to establish a particular element
of the crime, although such an inference might not otherwise have
been drawn by the trier of fact.8 8 In receiving cases, the most im-
portant presumption is that of guilty knowledge, which is triggered
by proof of the defendant's unexplained recent possession of stolen
property: "Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its com-
mission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty posses-
sion, and though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be of con-
trolling weight unless explained by the circumstances or accounted
for in some way consistent with innocence."88 9 Originally a com-
mon-law rule designed to aid the prosecution in larceny cases,3 40 the
so-called recent possession doctrine has been codified in several
337. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNrrED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, § 303[01], at
303-08 (1975) [hereinafter J. WEINSTEIN]. For an excellent discussion of the pre-
sumptions contained in recent federal legislative proposals directed toward organized
crime, see Note, Presumptions and Due Process: Congress Attacks Organized Crime,
68 Nw. L. Rv. 961 (1974).
Traditionally, these rules have been called presumptions, and that term will be
used here. Nevertheless, it might be more accurate and less confusing in criminal
cases to call them permissible inferences, and to distinguish them sharply from what
is best described as a mandatory or irrebutable presumption. A permissible inference
arises when A is thought normally to infer B. Prove A, and absent other proof, B
may be inferred and is thus proven. A mandatory presumption arises when A is
treated as proof of B, and, when A is proven, B must be found absent other proof.
An irrebuttable presumption arises when A is treated as the equivalent of B, and the
contrary may not be shown.
338. C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, H9 90-91 (13th ed. 1972); 9
J. WIGMORE, supra note 277, § 2491, at 288; J. WEINSTEIN § 300[02], at 300-07.
WORKING PAPERS 936, observes: "Use of the procedural device is appropriate when
Congress [or the state legislature] on the basis of special expertise and amassed em-
pirical evidence decides that certain facts are strong evidence of a crime and that
these facts should be given proof significance to assist the government in prosecuting
the crime." The best way to conceptualize a presumption is to see that by creating
a presumption the law is acting as an expert witness, because it is providing the jurors
with the basis for drawing an inference that is not necessarily compelled from the
ordinary experiences of their everyday lives. See notes 366-68 infra and accompany-
ing text. Since the law is injecting its own expertise into the fact-finding determina-
tion, any judicial or legislative presumption must comport with due process standards.
See notes 360-88 infra and accompanying text.
339 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 619 (1896) (murder case where
property of victim found on defendant used to prove guilt of murder).
340. 2 M. HALE, HIsToRY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CRowN 289 (1778 ed.); I. HALL,
supra note 5, at 175; 9 J. WiGMOME supra note 277, § 2513, at 417.
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jurisdictions,841 and extended to receiving cases in most jurisdic-
tions.3 2 The Model Act contains a presumption of recklessness, the
mens rea required by that proposal, on proof the defendant pos-
sessed recently stolen property. 48  Other presumptions that have
been developed to facilitate proof of guilty knowledge are raised on
evidence that the defendant purchased thp stolen goods from a
minor, failed to make a reasonable inquiry of proof of ownership,
purchased at a price substantially below reasonable market value, or
has purchased stolen property before.8 44  Unlike the recent posses-
341. See, e.g., Ky. REv. SrAT. ANN. 1 433.290 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1713 (Supp. 1975). The Oklahoma provision, however, has been declared uncon-
stitutional in a decision that incorrectly applied guidelines set down by the United
States Supreme Court. See note 380 infra and accompanying text.
342. See 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 277, § 2513, at 422. Only Georgia and North
Carolina have specifically refused to make this extension. See Gaskin v. State, 119
Ga. App. 593, 168 S.E.2d 183 (1969); State v. Hoskins, 236 N.C. 412, 72 S.E.2d
876 (1952). Nevertheless, despite seemingly clear language in the Georgia opinion
that suggests that the recent possession rule does not apply to receiving cases, the
law in Georgia still seems confused. See Comment, Criminal Law-Receiving Stolen
Goods-No Presumption in Recent Possession, 22 MERCER L. REV. 481 (1971 ).
"Without the inference it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict knowing
possessors or fences of stolen goods . . . ." New Jersey v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360,
374, 251 A.2d 99, 106 (1969). A comprehensive list of decisions that have applied
the rule to fencing cases may be found in 76 C.J.S. Receiving Stolen Property § 17,
at 34 n.67 (1952), and 9 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 277, § 2513, at 422 n.6 (C.J.S.
Receiving Stolen Property § 17, note 65 (Supp. 1976), lists a Colorado and a Mon-
tana decision that rejected the presumption in receiving cases. The Colorado deci-
sion, however, is incorrectly cited, and the Montana case seemed to turn on a mattex
of statutory interpretation.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected the presumption's applicability in
receiving cases because of its purported irrationality. See Commonwealth v. Owens,
441 Pa. 318, 271 A.2d 230 (1970). The Pennsylvania decision, however, may be
limited to its facts. See Note, Criminal Law-Presumption That Unexplained Posses-
sion of Recently Stolen Goods Is Sufficient Evidence of Guilt of Receiving Stolen
Goods Held Unconstitutional, 75 DIcKINsoN L. REv. 544 (1971). In any event, the
Supreme Court has recently given the doctrine constitutional approval in a case in-
volving the receipt of stolen property. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837
(1973). The question of rationality and the appropriate constitutional tests to be
applied in this context is analyzed in notes 360-84 infra and accompanying text.
343. See MODEL THEFr AND FENCING AcT § 5(a) (1), Appendix B.
344. CAL. PmN. CODE § 496(2) (West Supp. 1975) (presumption upon second-
hand dealer's failure to make inquiry); MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.535 (Supp.
1976) (presumption upon personal property dealer's failure to make inquiry); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. § 94.2721 (1969) (presumption upon purchase from a minor, un-
less sold at fixed place of business); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A.16.11 (1972) (posses-
sion of other stolen property; purchase at price far below reasonable value; dealers
presumed to know reasonable market value); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.55 (1975) (pre-
sumption upon pawnbroker's or dealer's failure to make reasonable inquiry); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1713 (Supp. 1975) (presumption from failure to make reason-
able inquiry).
California's statute creating a presumption upon the purchase of property from
a minor not operating at a fixed place of business was declared unconstitutional in
People v. Stevenson, 58 Cal. 2d 794, 376 P.2d 297, 26 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1962). A
similar, but more narrow, statutory presumption has recently been repealed by the
Arizona legislature. See Ariz. Laws of 1974, ch. 144, § 2,
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sion doctrine, however, these criminal-law presumptions are strictly
statutory creations that, despite their potential utility, have not been
enacted in most jurisdictions. 84 5
Considerable confusion has long surrounded the role of the re-
cent possession rule and other evidentiary presumptions in a criminal
case. 3  McCormick characterized the term "presumption" as one of
"the slipperiest member[s] of the family of legal terms,"347 and con-
cluded only that "a presumption is a standardized practice, under
which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect
to their effect as proof of other facts." '48 Unfortunately, both courts
and legislatures initially experienced difficulty determining what this
"uniform treatment" should be. 49 As a result, criminal presump-
tions at one time had a range of legal effects: some enabled the
prosecution to escape a directed verdict of acquittal; others allowed
a judge to give jury instructions as to what might permissibly be in-
ferred from the evidence; and a few effectuated a complete shift in
either the burden of producing evidence or the risk of nonpersua-
sion as to the presumed element.850
This wide range of potential legal effects was, however, eventu-
ally narrowed as constitutional constraints were recognized to pre-
clude the operation of a so-called "true presumption!' in criminal
cases.351 In civil cases, a true presumption shifts the burden of pro-
345. See Hearings on Fencing 164-71.
346. See MCCORMICK § 346. For example, one fencing case involving the recent
possession rule was erroneously decided partially because the court mistakenly as-
sumed that the presumption was effecting a shift in the burden of proof. See Carter
V. State, 82 Neb. 246, 249-50, 415 P.2d 325, 327 (1966). Carter was criticized in
State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 375-77, 251 A.2d 99, 107-08 (1969). In another
case, the recent possession rule was struck down, partially because of legislative lan-
guage that clearly suggested that the burden of going forward with the evidence was
being shifted upon the defendant's shoulders. See Payne v. State, 435 P.2d 424, 428
(Okla. Crim. App. 1967); note 380 infra. For a discussion outlining the extent to
which a criminal presumption may shift the various burdens, see notes 350-54 infra
and accompanying text.
347. MCCORMICK § 342, at 802-03.
348. Id. at 803. See Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presump-
tions, 52 MicH. L. RFv. 195, 196-207 (1953).
349. See Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1955); Comment, Tennessee Criminal Law-Larceny-
Effect of Possession of Recently Stolen Property, 3 MEMPHIs STATE L. Rev. 294, 297-
99 (1973); Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 34
U. Cm. L. REv. 141 (1966).
350. See W. LAFAV E & A. ScoTr, supra note 14, at 147-48; Comment, 34 U. CM
L. REV. 141, supra note 349, at 141-42.
351. A "true presumption," otherwise known as a mandatory presumption or a
presumption of law, "has the effect of forcing the jury to find the presumed fact if
the proved fact is believed and no evidence rebutting the presumed fact is produced
by the opposing party. However, the presumed fact may be disputed and need not
1577
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ducing evidence by requiring the jury to find the presumed fact in
the absence of rebutting evidence if the proved fact is believed.Y 2
In such a situation, the effect of a true presumption is mandatory
and requires a directed verdict for the proponent as to the presumed
fact. In a criminal case, however, a verdict cannot be directed
against the accused35 3 because such a procedure would violate a de-
fendant's constitutionally-protected rights to a jury trial and to have
the prosecution burdened with establishing each element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, although the lan-
guage of presumption is still frequently used in criminal cases, its
actual effect has been reduced to that of what may be called a "per-
missible inference": The jury is instructed that it may infer the pre-
sumed fact from the fact proved, but that it is not required to do
SO.8
54
Even though the burden of proof constitutionally must remain
on the prosecution,3 55 "[t]he practical effect of the inference is to
pressure the defendant into going forward with [exculpatory] evi-
dence," since once an instruction has been given "[a] silent defend-
ant assumes the risk that the jury will follow the natural probative
force of the proven facts."3 56  The source of this pressure is the
be found by the jury if evidence is introduced to rebut it." Note, The Unconstitu-
tionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L REv. 341, 342-43 (1970).
See McCoRmicK § 342, at 803; C. ToRcu, supra note 338, §§ 90-91; 9 J. WIoMonR,
supra note 277, § 2491, at 289.
352. See authorities cited note 351 supra. In addition, McCormick points out
that "many authorities state that a true presumption should not only shift the burden
of producing evidence, but also require that the party denying the existence of the
presumed fact assume the burden of persuasion on the issue as well." McCoRMrcK
§ 342, at 803. See generally id. at 824-26.
353. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 337, § 303[04), at 303-22. See Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); McCoIcK § 346, at 831.
354. See MCCORMICK § 342, at 804; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962) (presumption defined in terms of inference). For an excellent
example of a decision that applied this analysis in the context of a fencing prosecu-
tion, see State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 375-77, 251 A.2d 99, 107-08 (1969).
355. McCoRMic § 346, at 831; 1 H. UNDERHILL, CIUNAL EvMENcE § 50 (5th
ed. 1956); J. WEINSTEIN § 303[04], at 303-24 to 303-25.
356. Note, Due Process Requirements for Use of Non-Statutory Inferences in
Criminal Cases, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 897, 900 (1973). See J. WEINSTEIN § 303(04],
at 303-26. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the "practical effect" of a criminal
law presumption in the recent possession context:
It is true that the practical effect of instructing the jury on the inference arising
from unexplained possession of recently stolen property is to shift the burden
of going forward with evidence to the defendant. If the Government proves pos-
session and nothing more, this evidence remains unexplained unless the defend-
ant introduces evidence, since ordinarily the Government's evidence will not pro-
vide an explanation of his possession consistent with innocence.
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n.11 (1973). Note that the Court's dis-
cussion subsequently mentions that the burden of going forward may be shifted upon
the defendant. Once again, this statement must be analyzed in context. The Court
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judge's instructions to the jury concerning the effect of a judicial or
statutory inference, which permit, but do not compel, finding the
presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt even though jurors may
not have otherwise made such a finding.3 - 7 This effect is especially
pronounced where a statute authorizes a jury instruction to the ef-
fect that the law regards the proved fact as "strong evidence" of the
presumed fact.3 58 At least on the state level, then, presumptions
can mitigate the adverse impact on a criminal prosecutor's case that
flows from the rule prohibiting judges from commenting on the evi-
dence.359
To safeguard the rights of defendants, the Supreme Court has,
over time, formulated due process guidelines for criminal law pre-
sumptions. In Tot v. United States,""0 the Court held a statutory
presumption constitutional only if there is a reasonable connection
in common experience between the basic fact and the presumed
fact:
[A] statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed,
if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because
of lack of connection between the two in common experience. This
is not to say that a valid presumption may not be created upon a
view of relation broader than that a jury might take in a specific case.
But where the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable
relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not compe-
tent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the procedure
of courts.301
is speaking in terms of "practical effect," and not in terms of a formal shift that
would require a directed verdict in the absence of rebutting evidence. See note 346
supra. Justice Black, however, has argued that even a shift in terms of practical ef-
fect is unconstitutional. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 429-34 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 74-88 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting). See generally J. WEIsTIN § 303[01], at 303-08.
357. For a discussion of the relationship between presumptions and jury instruc-
tions in the criminal law, see notes 346-54, 369-75, 405-12 infra and accompanying
text.
358. For example, S.1 provides that "although the evidence as a whole must es-
tablish the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may arrive at that judg-
ment on the basis of the presumption alone, since the law regards the fact giving rise
to the presumption as strong evidence of the fact presumed." Rule 25.1(4)(ii).
When phrased in such terms, "the existence of a statutory presumption will probably
enhance the value of a basic fact for the prosecution beyond its purely inferential
significance." J. WEINSTEIN § 303[02], at 303-18. For a more detailed discussion
of the potential impact of different jury instructions, see text at notes 406-12 infra.
359. In the absence of a presumption, most states do not permit the judge to com-
ment on the evidence. See note 333 supra and accompanying text. While the pre-
sumption does not give him a right of comment, he is at least permitted to inform
the jury of the inferential weight which may be attributed to certain fact patterns.
360. 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (footnotes omitted).
361. 319 U.S. at 467-68. In United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), the
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The Court further developed the "rational connection" test in Leary
v. United States,3 62 which held that "a criminal statutory presump-
tion must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence uncon-
stitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact on which it is made to depend." ' In Leary, the Court
overturned a statute that authorized conviction of a person for pos-
session of marijuana with knowledge it was illegally imported and
that presumed such knowledge solely on proof of unexplained pos-
session.
When a presumption is not involved, due process, of course, re-
quires that the prosecution establish each element of a criminal of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt.3 04  One plausible reading of the
Leary Court's rational-connection analysis, however, would find it
constitutionally proper to submit a case to the jury when the evidence
supporting the presumed fact satisfied the "more likely than not" test
but was insufficient to permit a finding that the element existed be-
yond a reasonable doubt. At least one commentator has suggested
that a less restrictive evidentiary standard for presumptions is defen-
sible since "[t]here is ordinarily no need for a presumption where
the basic fact would, under ordinary methods of utilizing circumstan-
Court applied the Tot test in upholding a statute that provided that a defendant's un-
explained presence at an illegal still was sufficient evidence to authorize a conviction
for carrying on "the business of a distiller." 380 U.S. at 64. The Court reasoned
that the rationality test had been met, since "Congress was undoubtedly aware that
manufacturers of illegal liquor are notorious for the deftness with which they locate
arcane spots for plying their trade . . . [and] that strangers to the illegal business
rarely penetrate the curtain of secrecy." 380 U.S. at 67-68. An identical presump-
tion, but one that attempted to authorize a conviction for possession of an illegal still,
was subsequently struck down under the Tot analysis. See United States v. Romano,
382 U.S. 136 (1965).
Significantly, although Gainey, Romano, and other Supreme Court decisions ap-
plied the rational connection test to statutory presumptions, the Court's recent deci-
sion in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973), suggests that an identical analy-
sis is appropriate for judicial presumptions. 412 U.S. at 845 n.8. See notes 378-84
infra and accompanying text.
362. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
363. 395 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added). On this basis, the Court held constitu-
tional a statutory presumption providing that unexplained possession of marihuana
"shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction" for receiving, conceal-
ing, buying, selling, or transporting the substance with knowledge of its illegal
importation. 395 U.S. at 30 (quoting from 21 U.S.C. § 176a). "The Court con-
cluded that in view of the significant possibility that any given marihuana was do-
mestically grown and the improbability that a marihuana user would know whether
his marihuana was of domestic or imported origin, the inference did not meet the
standards set by Tot, Gainey, and Romano." Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837,
842 (1973). See 395 U.S. at 52-53.
364. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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tial evidence, result in a jury finding the presumed fact." ' 5  This
argument appears to be misconceived, however, because the primary
purpose of modem presumptions is not to lower the standard of
proof but only to facilitate the fact-finding process by providing
jurors with information concerning a possible relationship between
the fact proved and the presumed fact that may be beyond their com-
mon experience. 36 6 By creating a presumption, the legislature, in
effect, serves as an expert witness offering testimony through the
judge's instructions regarding the evidentiary significance of a par-
ticular fact pattern. 67  There is no reason for affording this particu-
lar type of "expert testimony" special treatment by subjecting it to
a different standard simply because it is a legislative or judicial pre-
sumption. Indeed, although Leary and subsequent cases have not
directly decided whether a presumption must satisfy the reasonable
doubt standard, one commentator has argued that the Court has in
fact adopted that evidentiary standard.3 68
365. J. WEINSTEIN § 303[02], at 303-12. "Requiring a lesser quantum of evi-
dence is, of course, the prime reason for resorting to presumptions." Id.
366. Legislatures are "permitted to create presumptions based, not only upon in-
ferences that might naturally be derived from the facts, but also upon information
that will never be given to the jury." McCoRMIcK 816. "[Criminal] presumptions
are based on empirical evidence that may be outside the expected knowledge of the
average juror. . . ." S.1 REPOR.T 1094. See note 338 supra and accompanying text.
"Unless the jurors are told of the value of the basic facts, which by hypothesis is
not readily available to them, they may acquit when conviction is justified." WoRK-
ING PAPERS 21. Nevertheless, since a presumption in the criminal law context oper-
ates only as a permissive inference, notes 351-54 supra and accompanying text, it of-
ten serves as an evidentiary device that "merely formalizes a natural inference which
one might expect reasonable jurors to draw on their own." S.1 REPORT 1904. See
C. TORCiA, supra note 338, § 90; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 277, § 2491, at 288. For
this reason, S.1 proposes the use of stronger jury instructions for statutory presump-
tions that embody the special expertise of the law. WORKING P~A'ERs 20-21, 24-25.
See notes 406-12 infra and accompanying text.
367. Thus "[i]n United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), the Court sug-
gested that in empirical matters 'not within specialized judicial competence or com-
pletely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded the capacity of Congress
to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it.' 380 U.S. at
67." WORKING PAPERS 20 n.52. See notes 338, 366 supra.
368. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTt, supra note 14, at 149. See J. WEiNsTEFN § 303[02],
at 303-12 to 303-13. Although the Supreme Court, in Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398 (1970), did not expressly adopt the beyond a reasonable doubt standard,
commentators have suggested that "the Court's frequent reference to that standard
in Turner, coupled with its decision in In re Winship [397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970]
recognizing that such a measure of proof is constitutionally required in criminal
cases, makes it likely that the reasonable doubt standard will be applied to test the
validity of presumptions in the future." MCCORMICK 816. See Christie & Pye, Pre-
sumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J.
919, 923. Since the Supreme Court's initial draft of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence contained a section that seemed to incorporate the reasonable doubt stand-
ard, the commentators' forecasts did not seem unreasonable. PROPOSED FEDERAL
RuLEs OF EVIDENCE, 56 F.R.D. 183, § 303(b) (1973). See J. WnmNsmN § 303[02],
Michigan Law Review
A more fundamental and potentially more important question,
however, is whether the federal courts have indeed been correct in
analyzing presumptions in terms of the due process requirements.
A presumption in the criminal law is not mandatory; it only triggers
a jury instruction concerning inferences that may be made if particu-
lar evidence is believed.309 Accordingly, in the federal courts, where
the trial judge still retains his common-law privilege to comment on
the evidence, 70 a presumption, in fact, adds nothing to the substance
and impact of a jury instruction. The discretionary right to comment
on the evidence permits the judge to "'analyze and dissect the evi-
dence . . . in order to give appropriate assistance to the jury,' ,871
and it is well within the traditional scope of this privilege to comment
on the significance of certain fact patterns.8 72 The judge's discretion
is, of course, not arbitrary and uncontrolled,873 but once a statutory
presumption in the criminal context is viewed as an exercise of dis-
cretion, the appropriate question concerns the propriety of the com-
mentary or, more specifically, whether it infringes upon the jury's
role as factfinder, and not whether a particular criminal presumption,
however tested, comports with due process. The results often will
be the same regardless of which analysis is applied, but this will not
always be so since the standard of review is more flexible when the
question is one of judicial discretion rather than one of due proc-
ess.
87 4
Currently, however, state restrictions on the trial judge's right to
at 303-16 to 303-18. Nevertheless, when the Court was subsequently given the
chance to adopt this standard, it declined to exercise this option. See Barnes v.
United States, 421 U.S. 837, 843 (1973).
Thus far, the reasonable doubt standard has not been adopted by Congress. Sec.
tion 303 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence was excised from the draft which
was ultimately enacted into law. See J. WEINSTEIN 303-1 to 303-6. S.1, however,
has proposed the enactment of this evidentiary standard. Rule 25.1 (a) (4). S.1 RE-
POPT 1093-94.
369. See notes 346-54 supra and accompanying text.
370. See note 333 supra.
371. TRIAL BY JURY 125 (quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470
(1933)). Since jurors naturally tend to equate the judge with their concept of "the
law," there is little practical difference between the effect achieved by a jury instruc-
tion concerning what "the law" regards as a permissible inference and the trial judge's
commentary regarding the significance of certain fact patterns.
372. In "exceptional cases," current federal law even permits "an expression of
belief in the defendant's guilt." Id. at 127.
373. Id. at 125.
374. "It would appear that the comment privilege of federal judges is not abused.
One study covering 12 years noted that of 5,781 federal criminal cases tried to juries
and appealed, in only 85 cases was any complaint made about the judge's comments.
The comments were held to be reversible error in but 30 of these cases, and were
criticized in but two others." Id.
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comment on the evidence inhibit the adoption of this approach at
the state level;3 75 at the federal level, unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has shown no tendency to depart from the well-established ra-
tional-connection line of analysis. Thus, legislative bodies must
enact statutory presumptions that are consistent with a due process
line of analysis, with the probable result that only those inferences
that enable a jury to find the presumed fact beyond a reasonable
doubt will ultimately be held constitutional.
Yet, even though the trend is to a more rigorous constitutional
standard, the Supreme Court has indicated courts may defer in some
instances to the expertise or judgment of legislatures in enacting pre-
sumptions. In United States v. Gainey, 7 6 the Court stated that in
empirical matters "not within specialized judicial competence or
completely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded the
capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull
conclusions from it."' 877 This approach was reiterated in Leary and,
more recently, appears to have been adopted in Barnes v. United
States,878 where the Court considered the constitutionality of the re-
cent possession doctrine. 79  Before Barnes, several state courts had
held the doctrine constitutionally deficient under the Leary stand-
ard,880 even though it had been considered virtually a universally rec-
375. Since most states prohibit or restrict any judicial commentary, note 333 su-
pra, any guidance to the jury concerning the significance of a particular fact pattern
must be accomplished through the use of criminal presumptions. Even this goes too
far in some jurisdictions. For example, Arkansas has traditionally equated comment
and presumptions and condemned both as an invasion of the province of the jury.
See Lott v. State, 223 Ark. 841, 268 S.W.2d 891 (1954); Blankenship v. State, 55
Ark. 244, 247-48, 18 S.W. 54, 55 (1891).
376. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
377. 380 U.S. at 67.
378. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
379. Many decisions involving criminal presumptions related to fencing activity
have been concerned with the sale of property by minors. Compare People v. Steven-
son, 58 Cal. 2d 794, 376 P.2d 297, 26 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1962) (en bane), with State
v. Bundy, %1 Ariz. 325, 372 P.2d 329 (1962) (en bane). See generally Note, Statu-
tory Criminal Presumptions: Judicial Slight of Hand, 53 VA. L. Rav. 702, 723-29
(1967).
380. See Carter v. State, 82 Nev. 246, 248-50, 415 P.2d 325, 326-27 (1966);
Payne v. State, 435 P.2d 424, 427-28 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968); Commonwealth v.
Owens, 441 Pa. 318, 323-26, 271 A.2d 230, 233 (1970). Contra, Steve v. DiRienzo,
53 N.J. 360, 251 A.2d 99 (1969). The Carter and Payne decisions may have been
made in part on the basis of a judicial concern with what was perceived to be an
unconstitutional shifting of the burden of persuasion. See note 346 supra. Neverthe-
less, a similar concern did not furnish the basis for the Owens decision. There, the
Pennsylvania supreme court seemingly focused on the general insufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence and on-statistics suggesting that the presumption was arbitrary
in the particular context applied (a stolen handgun). 441 Pa. at 324-25, 271 A.2d
at 233-34. The court erroneously cited authority purportedly demonstrating that a
majority of jurisdictions have rejected the recent possession doctrine. 441 Pa. at 326
1583
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ognized presumption.a8 1 The Barnes Court, however, recognized
the "impressive historical basis" underlying the recent possession
rule and considered "[t]his longstanding and constant judicial approval
of the instruction, reflecting accumulated common experience, [as
providing] . . . strong indication that the instruction comports with
due process." 8 2 Nevertheless, the Court considered historical con-
siderations alone insufficient to warrant automatic constitutional ap-
proval, and thus proceeded independently to examine the presump-
tion "in light of present-day experience,118 3 holding the presump-
tion comports with due process regardless of the evidentiary standard
applied. 8 4
The analysis offered in Barnes has at least three important com-
ponents. First, it suggests that legislatures enacting criminal pre.
sumptions should gather extensive empirical data and hold hearings
examining all issues involved. Legislatures can make such studies
more efficiently than can courts, and if an adequate record is devel-
oped, courts should be willing to defer to legislative determinations.
Second, by testing the constitutionality of criminal presumptions with
reference to the modem context, the Court has seemingly introduced
the potential for much needed flexibility in law enforcement efforts.
It is constitutionally permissible for legislatures to draft new pre-
sumptions to handle ever changing, increasingly sophisticated fenc-
ing techniques885 provided the appropriate evidentiary standard is
satisfied. Third, the Court has reaffirmed the principle that a pre-
sumption in a criminal case does not violate a defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination provided the jury is
instructed that the accused has a constitutional right not to take the
stand and that the basic incriminating fact "could be satisfactorily ex-
plained by evidence independent of petitioner's testimony."'8 0 The
tendency of a presumption to implicate the defendant and increase
the pressure on him to testify was considered a consequence of the
n.5, 271 A.2d at 234 n.5. The cited authority, however, merely states the well ac-
cepted principle that the recent possession rule is inapplicable in the absence of addi-
tional incriminating circumstantial evidence. See note 391 infra and accompanying
text.
381. Christie & Pye, supra note 347, at 925. See, e.g., United States v. Jones,
418 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1969).
382. 412 U.S. at 844.
383. 412 U.S. at 844.
384. 412 U.S. at 844-45.
385. Note, supra note 379, at 702. The sophisticated techniques employed by
modem fences are discussed in notes 137-52 supra and accompanying text.
386. 412 U.S. at 846-47.
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adversary process not in violation of fifth amendment privilege.3 87
If the defendant is the only party with access to facts capable of re-
butting the inference, his misfortune is "inherent in the case" and
not necessarily created by the evidentiary presumption .38
The Barnes approach to criminal presumptions is especially wel-
comed, for it has become increasingly apparent that the long-used
recent possession doctrine alone is unable to cope with sophisticated
receivers.8s  Prosecutors have the task of establishing that the de-
fendant had unexplained, exclusive possession of stolen property. 90
The difficulties they encounter in doing this are inherent in the very
formulation of the rule. First, proof of recent possession, in the ab-
sence of other affirmative evidence tending to establish guilt, is not
sufficient in many jurisdictions to sustain a conviction. 91 Second,
although not every explanation a defendant offers precludes a jury
instruction,392 the more sophisticated fences can take precautionary
measures that enable them to give reasonable explanations consistent
with innocence. 91 Third, even when no such explanation is forth-
coming, some jurisdictions hold that the rule does not apply where
the prosecution is able to establish only constructive possession. 89 4
This approach directly impedes, for example, the successful prosecu-
387. 412 U.S. at 847. Nor would the Court consider the trial judge's instruction
concerning the effect of the recent possession rule to constitute an impermissible
"comment on the defendant's failure to testify." 412 U.S. at 846 n.12, quoting
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70-71 (1965).
388. The Court here cited with approval Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178,
185 (1925), which said that a statutory presumption does not compel a defendant
to be a witness against himself.
389. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 189-93.
390. 9 J. WIGMORF, supra note 277, § 2513, at 422.
391. See, e.g., State v. Long, 243 Ore. 561, 565, 415 P.2d 171, 173 (1966).
"Whether possession plus additional circumstances is sufficient to show knowledge is
a matter which must be considered on a case to case basis." Torres v. United States,
270 F.2d 252, 258 (9th Cir. 1959). See also Annot., 68 A.LR. 187, 187-88 (1930).
392. "The mere fact that there is some evidence tending to explain a defend-
ant's possession consistent with innocence does not bar instructing the jury on the
inference. The jury must weigh the explanation to determine whether it is 'satisfac-
tory.'" Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845 n.9 (1973).
393. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
394. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 123 F.2d 420, 422 (3rd Cir. 1941). Some
courts have held that constructive possession merely serves to weaken the presump-
tion's inferential strength, while others have seemingly ignored this question com-
pletely. Compare United States v. Casalinuovo, 350 F.2d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 1965),
and United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929, 935 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 979 (1966), with Boehm v. United States, 271 F. 454, 457 (1921). It is easy
to see how a reconsideration of the presumption field in light of the power of judges
to comment on the evidence would facilitate the proper resolution of this split. So-
phisticated analysis of "inference on an inference" would be inappropriate; the issue
would be abuse of discretion. See TRIAL By JuRy 125. See generally C. ToRncA, su-
pra note 338, § 91, at 148-51.
1585
1586 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1511
tion of master fences who avoid physical contact with stolen goods.805
Fourth, the recent possession doctrine is not applicable where the
defendant establishes that the possession was nonexclusive because
other persons, not involved in the theft or fencing, also had access
to the goods.896 Finally, since courts recognize the inferential value
of proof of possession of stolen property weakens as the time of the
theft becomes more remote, the doctrine's effectiveness as a prose-
cutorial tool is always limited by the fence's potential ability to con-
ceal the goods until the court "must hold that as a matter of law
possession is no longer 'recent.' ,,397
These deficiencies in the recent possession rule, combined with
the increasing sophistication of the modem fencing process and the
declining ability of present-day jury panels to deal with complex is-
sues, 9 8 necessitate the enactment of more effective criminal presump-
tions to help establish the mens rea. The Model Penal Code, for
example, includes a presumption that would apply to any retailer or
wholesaler who acquires property "for a consideration which he
knows is far below its reasonable market value."899 Such a pre-
sumption, which appropriately focuses upon a designated class of in-
dividuals whose fencing activities have had a profound impact on the
national economy, 400 is included in section 5 of the Model Act.4 0
395. See notes 142-47 supra and accompanying text.
396. See C. TORCIA, supra note 338, § 139, at 237 n.40. Some courts have re-
fused to recognize the inference where the stolen goods were found "in a place where
persons other than the defendant had an equal right and facility of access thereto."
Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 727, § 48(b), at 811 (1973). In general, however, "the requi-
site of 'exclusive possession' is anything but strictly applied in the defendant's favor.
In case after case, the courts have considered all the circumstances in determining
whether a jury might raise an inference of guilt from whatever degree of possession
might be attributed to the defendant." Id. § 2, at 732. Thus, the "jointness" ap-
proach is widely applied, id. § 48(a), at 810 and possession is often considered ex-
clusive where other persons have equal access under circumstances that suggest that
the defendant knew that their right to access would probably not be exercised. See
United States v. Casalinuovo, 350 F.2d 207, 210-11 (2d Cir. 1965).
397. STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BusrNFss 9-10 (footnote omitted). Cf. C. ToncIA,
supra note 338, § 139, at 239. Most fences naturally prefer to dispose of their goods
quite quickly, which they are generally able to do. See notes 131, 171 supra and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, when necessary, "[c]ertain types of property likejewelry and securities can be easily concealed for an indefinite period of time." J.
HALL, supra note 5, at 191. Even when long-term concealment is not contemplated,
modem tracing techniques are so rudimentary that the interval between theft and re-
covery is frequently quite long. Id.
398. See authorities cited note 138 supra.
399. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.6(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The
Code defines "dealer" as "a person in the business of buying or selling goods." Id.
400. See generally notes 31-60, 48-49, 115-16, 118-20, 188 supra and accompany-
ing text. The Code's proposal would apply to professional fences and to all so-
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Nevertheless, since this provision would require the prosecution to
establish a purchase price far below market value, a more sophisti-
cated criminal presumption might be necessary to handle, for exam-
ple, those situations where adequate business records are not avail-
able to help establish the purchase price. Accordingly, the Model
Act contains a companion presumption that would give rise to an
inference of recklessness whenever a dealer has made an unex-
plained purchase out of the ordinary course of business. 40 2 This pre-
sumption would apply on proof of unrecorded transactions, the re-
tention of nonitemized or bogus receipts, the possession of altered
merchandise, unusual methods of payment, purchases from noninsti-
tutional sources, or similar conduct, that is viewed as purchasing be-
havior not in the "usual course of trade. ' 403 Since normal trade prac-
tices tend to vary by business, the presumption is cast in generalized
terms to include the five preceding examples, yet also to retain suf-
ficient flexibility to cover other unusual practices.40 4  Similar pre-
sumptions should be enacted to help prosecutors establish the guilty
state of mind in those jurisdictions that retain the stricter standard of
criminal liability.
These statutory presumptions would, it is hoped, encounter little
or no difficulty receiving judicial approval regardless of which evi-
dentiary standard is applied.40 5 In drafting such presumptions, it
must be recognized that the constitutional constraints that preclude
the operation of so-called true presumptions in criminal cases 40 6 do
not prohibit legislatures from authorizing jury instructions that give
additional strength to any particular statutory presumption.40 7 Thus,
although Congress408 and state legislatures have been reluctant to
called "legitimate" businesses. Master fences would be indirectly affected, since they
frequently funnel stolen goods to these establishments.
401. MODEL THEFr AND FNq iNG AcT § 5(a) (2), Appendix B.
402. See MODEL TnFr AND FENCING AC § 5(a)(3), Appendix B. A similar
proposal was initially suggested over twenty years ago in Hall's classic study. See
J. HALL, supra note 5, at 224.
403. Id. See notes 331-33 supra and accompanying text. In particular, note 332
supra contains Hall's detailed list of circumstances that are often out of the ordinary
course of business. On occasion, with respect to certain types of dealers (i.e., junk
merchants or pawnbrokers), the law may require that certain procedures, such as rec-
ord-keeping, be made part of the ordinary course of business, and attach specific con-
sequences for failure to comply. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.051 (Supp. 1975).
404. By analogy, note that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code did not
consider it necessary to provide a detailed definition of the term "buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business." See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(9).
405. See note 330 supra and accompanying text.
406. See notes 350-54 supra and accompanying text.
407. See WoRmNG PAPERs 23.
408. Currently, none of the federal statutes concerned with fencing provide any
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exercise this power, it ought to be held constitutionally proper to
provide that a jury be instructed, for example, that "although the
evidence as a whole must establish the presumed fact beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the jury may arrive at that judgment on the basis of
the presumption alone, since the law regards the fact giving rise to
the presumption as strong evidence of the fact presumed. '40 9
This carefully-worded charge to the jury ought to be held satis-
factory under the relevant constitutional limitations. First, an instruc-
tion that "the evidence as a whole must establish the presumed fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt" assures that the presumption is not given
undue significance and protects a defendant's right to have the pros-
ecution establish all elements of the alleged crime beyond a reason-
able doubt. Second, a defendant's constitutional right to jury trial
of all elements of the crime is guaranteed since the jury is not re-
quired to find the presumed fact on proof of the proved fact. Third,
even though the "strong evidence" portion of the jury instruction cer-
tainly creates more pressure on the defendant to come forward and
testify, his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination still
criminal presumptions to assist in proof of substantive elements of the offense. The
only statutory presumption included in any of these statutes is concerned exclusively
with interstate commerce, a jurisdictional element. 18 U.S.C.A. § 659 (Supp. 1976).
See WoRnGo PAPERS 26-31. S.1 has finally proposed that, in the absence of a rea-
sonable explanation, both "possession of property recently stolen" and the "purchase
... of stolen property at a price substantially below its market value," constitute
prima facie evidence of the knowledge element. S.1, § 101, at 148 (proposed § 1738
(b)). Nevertheless, since S.1 distinguishes between prima facie evidence and statutory
presumptions by attributing strong inferential weight and authorizing a strong jury in-
struction only for presumptions, characterizing these fact patterns merely as prima
facie evidence subordinates their evidentiary significance and eliminates a real oppor-
tunity for facilitating the prosecutorial effort. See S.1, § 102, at 345 (proposed Rule
25.1(a)). The present congressional proposal represents a reversal from the position
initially advocated by the original drafters. See WOlNG PAPERS, supra note 262,
at 22, 935-37.
409. S.1, § 102, at 12 (proposed Rule 25.1(a)(4) (A)(ii)) (emphasis added).
Although the Supreme Court in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 71 n.7 (1965),
has suggested that "the better practice would be to instruct the jurors that they may
draw the inference unless the evidence in the case provides a satisfactory explanation
... omitting any explicit reference to the statute itself in the charge" this has not
been viewed as a constitutional requirement. See J. WEINSTEIN § 303[07], at 303-
36. The drafters of S.1 viewed rule 25.1 and its required jury instruction as "a care-
ful reconciliation of the prosecution's and the defendant's interests." See WoRuINo
PAPERS 24. Since the "strong evidence" language used by the section does not
achieve a significantly greater inferential effect than the statute approved by the
Court in Gainey (providing that certain evidence "shall be deemed sufficient. . . to
authorize conviction"), the proposed instructions probably do not go beyond the
scope of current fifth amendment limitations. But see MCCORMICK 832. Signifi-
cantly, Justice Black, dissenting in Gainey, maintained that "[flew jurors could have
failed to believe that it was their duty to convict under" a jury instruction to the ef-
fect that proof of the basic fact shall be deemed sufficient to authorize conviction.
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 77 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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has not been violated.41 0 If a trial judge commenting on the evi-
dence could, in the exercise of discretion, opine that a particular fact
pattern is strong evidence of incriminating conduct, the legislature
should have the right to make a similar observation through a statu-
tory presumption read to the jury.411 The pressure that would be
exerted upon the defendant is essentially the same as that which
would be applied if the inferential significance of the proved facts
had been explained by an independent expert witness during the
course of the trial, although where a witness testified it is true that
the defendant would have an opportunity for cross-examination. In
effect, once a statutory presumption has satisfied the relevant due
process test, the fifth amendment challenge necessarily dissolves.
(iv). Strict liability. Although the enactment of more mod-
em criminal presumptions should facilitate proof of guilty knowl-
edge, legislatures might alternatively abandon the state of mind ele-
ment and treat possession of stolen property as a strict liability of-
fense.41 2 Imposition of strict liability for the receipt of stolen prop-
erty on all classes of potential violators might encounter serious pol-
icy and due process objections, but it does not necessarily follow that
similar objections would preclude a strict liability statute from being
applicable only to retail and wholesale dealers.413 While the Supreme
410. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 70-71; 1. WEiNsmIN § 303[07],
at 303-36.
411. While it is still generally thought that the older common law-position sup-
porting comment obtains in the federal courts, note 333 supra, the issue was clouded
by the Supreme Court's opinion in Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933),
a decision soundly criticized by Wigmore. 9 J. WiGMORE, supra note 277, § 2551,
at 508 n.7. The traditional rule of the Supreme Court was correctly stated in Vicks-
burg & Meridian R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886) (discretion to comment
on evidence that is ultimately submitted to jury).
412. Strict liability for fencing offenses was considered and rejected by the federal
government in 1930. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 228-29. Currently, S.1, "recog-
niz[ing] the force of arguments against the imposition of criminal liability where a
person engages in conduct without culpability," has required that any legislation cre-
ating a title 18 strict liability offense "be manifest" S.1 REPORT 54. A provision
that simply omits any reference to state of mind will not be considered a strict lia-
bility offense. See S.1, § 303, at 15. This formulation is probably consistent with
the policy behind the Supreme Court's statutory construction decision in Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), where the Court essentially said "that mens rea
was presumptively to be implied in the statutory redefinition of offenses taken over
from the common law." Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Cr.
REV. 107, 120. It is probably fair to say that receipt is a "common law" offense, even
though it developed late and only through statutory enactment.
413. One New York decision struck down on due process grounds a statute that
imposed strict liability upon junk dealers. People v. Estreich, 272 App. Div. 698,
75 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1947), affd. mem., 297 N.Y. 910, 79 N.E.2d 742 (1948). This
position, however, seems to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's modem ap-
proach to the question of strict liability. See notes 415-17 infra and accompanying
text. But see State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 376, 251 A.2d 99, 107 (1969) ("vul-
nerable to constitutional attack")..
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Court has acknowledged that the concept of mens rea is a well-estab-
lished ingredient of the common law,414 the principle does not yet have
independent constitutional significance. Instead, the Court has char-
acterized the strict liability issue as a question of legislative policy"15
and, in the absence of constitutional infringements, 416 has stated that
"[t]here is wide latitude in the lawmakers to declare an offense and
to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its defini-
tion."'41
The power to legislate strict liability crimes has been repeatedly
upheld in a series of so-called public welfare cases. 41 8  Emphasizing
414. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952): "The contention
that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial
or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as
belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil." Similarly, it has been-said that "[the
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles
of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
500 (1951). But see Packer, supra note 412, at 145-46 (deeply imbedded "principle
that ignorance of the law is no excuse" is fundamentally "inconsistent with the as-
serted universality of mens rea").
415. Supreme Court decisions involving questions of strict liability have con-
sistently focused on questions of legislative intent. See United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658, 666-73 (1975); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1951);
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279-85 (1943); United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250, 252-54 (1922); W. IAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 14, at 218-19. Leg-
islative intent has generally been subordinated only when strict liability has threat-
ened the exercise of first amendment freedoms. See note 416 infra and accompany-
ing text.
416. The Court has stated that, on occasion, "doctrines, in most applications con-
sistent with the Constitution . . .cannot be applied in settings where they have the
collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual the
more reluctant to exercise it." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959).
Thus, in Smith, a strict liability obscenity statute was struck down because it in-
fringed upon the first amendment rights of booksellers and the public by inducing
sellers to be extremely cautious with regard to the books they make available for pub-
lic consumption. 361 U.S. at 152-55.
417. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). See United States v. In-
ternational Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1970).
418. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUm. L. REv. 55 (1933), observes:
"[W]e are witnessing today a steadily growing stream of offenses punishable without
any criminal intent whatsoever. Convictions may be had for the sales of adulterated
or impure food, violations of the liquor laws, infractions of anti-narcotic acts, ana
many other offenses based upon conduct alone without regard to the mind or intent
of the actor." See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (shipment of
adulterated drugs); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (improper sale of
narcotics); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910) (cutting of tim-
ber on state lands). See also United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp.,
402 U.S. 558 (1971) (application of ignorantia legis to transportation of dangerous
acids); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, rehearing denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971)
(application of ignorantia legis to registration of dangerous firearms); United States
v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (strict and vicarious liability of president of food chain
for rodent contamination). Strict liability statutes have generally received constitu-
tional approval. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scors, supra note 14, at 221-22. Even so,
the constitutionality of such legislation has been a favorite subject of debate among
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the need to protect important public interests, these decisions have
considered it appropriate for legislatures to require selected individ-
uals to take extreme precautions against illegal acts and to assume
the risk of a strict liability conviction for "innocent" wrongdoing. 41
9
Conviction under these statutes usually carries relatively light punish-
ment,420 although this is not always the case.42
1
leading scholars. See, e.g., Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 401, 422-25 (1958); Packer, supra note 412, at 147-52,
Thus far, however, the only Supreme Court decision that has raised serious con-
stitutional questions concerning the validity of strict liability legislation is Lambert
v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). In declaring unconstitutional a city ordinance
that penalized the failure of ex-felons to register with police authorities, the Court
distinguished the Dotterweich, Balint, and Shevlin-Carpenter Co. line of authority:
"But we deal here with conduct that is wholly passive-mere failure to register. It
is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should
alert the doer to the consequences of his deed." 355 U.S. at 228. This rationale,
however, is inapplicable to fencing cases involving dealers, because such situations
generally involve both affirmative conduct and circumstances that would alert the
purchaser that he was buying stolen goods. See notes 123-25, 329-33 supra and ac-
companying text. Moreover, in applying the principles articulated in Dotterweich,
even in the absence of such circumstances, a corporate officer could be held vicari-
ously liable for the illegal conduct of one of his department store's buyers, where that
buyer himself was being held strictly liable. Finally, the Lambert decision may be
completely inapplicable to the question of strict liability with respect to attendant cir-
cumstances, since the case arguably involved an exception to the principle of ignoran-
tia legis; the defendant had no knowledge of the law in question and could not, the
court thought, be reasonably expected to inform himself. 355 U.S. at 229.
419. The Supreme Court's language in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 280-81 (1943), is precisely on point:
The prosecution to which Dotterweich was subjected is based on a now familiar
type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation. Such
legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-
awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in re-
sponsible relation to a public danger. United States v. Balint. And so it is clear
that shipments like those now in issue are "punished by the statute if the article
is misbranded [or adulterated], and that the article may be misbranded [or
adulterated] without any conscious fraud at all. It was natural enough to throw
this risk on shippers with regard to the identity of their wares .... " (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1922). The court's explanation
of Dotterweich in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975), merits atten-
tion:
The [Food and Drug] Act does not, as we observed in Dotterweich, make crimi-
nal liability turn on "awareness of some wrongdoing." . . . The duty imposed
by Congress on responsible corporate agents is, we emphasize, one that requires
the highest standard of foresight and vigilance, but the Act, in its criminal as-
pect, does not require that which is objectively impossible. . . . If such a claim
[of objective impossibility] is made, the defendant has the burden of coming for-
ward with evidence, but this does not alter the Government's ultimate burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's guilt, including his power
. . . to prevent or correct the prohibited condition.
420. See S.1 REPORT 54-55.
421. In United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), "the Court showed no con-
cern about the imposition of severe criminal sanctions without proof of blameworthi-
ness. There was not a whisper in the opinion about the maximum penalty under
the Act: five years' imprisonment . . . ." Packer, supra note 412, at 114 (emphasis
added).
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The felony-muder doctrine and statutory-rape provisions are ex-
amples of instances where strict liability principles are extended to
more traditional crimes and where severe penal sanctions are pro-
vided.42 2  Thus, there is precedent for developing a strict liability
approach to a nonregulatory offense such as fencing. The imposi-
tion of strict liability, however, even upon a limited category of indi-
viduals, is somewhat of an anomaly in a criminal justice system that
generally punishes only blameworthy individuals. 2 3 Since the con-
stitutionality of such an approach does not necessarily mean that the
approach is wise,424 legislators must carefully evaluate whether the
supposed increase in effective law enforcement, if any, will be won
at the expense of society's normative standards. The Model Act
does not adopt a strict liability approach, for the Act's provisions al-
ready greatly facilitate control of fencing schemes without abridging
basic principles of criminal punishment. 25
422. Misdemeanor-manslaughter and bigamy are also traditionally strict liability
crimes that carry heavy penalties. Parker, supra note 412, at 140-42. See W. LA-
FAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 14, at 220.
423. The role of mens rea in the criminal law has been the subject of much
discussion. The consensus can be summarily stated: to punish conduct without
reference to the actor's state of mind is both inefficacious and unjust. It is in-
efficacious because conduct unaccompanied by an awareness of the factors mak-
ing it criminal does not mark the actor as one who needs to be subjected to pun-
ishment in order to deter him or others from behaving similarly in the future,
nor does it single him out as a socially dangerous individual who needs to be
incapacitated or reformed. It is unjust because the actor is subjected to the
stigma of a criminal conviction without being morally blameworthy. Conse-
quently, on either a preventive or a retributive theory of criminal punishment,
the criminal sanction is inappropriate in the absence of mens rea.
Packer, supra note 412, at 109. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, Comment, at 140
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). For an interesting discussion that attempts to reconcile
these difficulties by limiting the applicability and impact of strict liability offenses,
see Brady, Strict Liability Offenses: A Justification, 8 CluM. L. BULL. 217 (1972).
Significantly, since strict liability may not achieve any deterrent effect if the penalty
imposed is too slight, Bradey proposes the adoption of a gradation continuum that
would impose sanctions according to the degree of culpability proved. Id. at 222-
24. For a more detailed discussion of gradation principles, see notes 450-67 infra
and accompanying text. While general Supreme Court jurisprudence would seem to
argue that a strict liability offense here would be constitutional, there is authority
pointing the other way. Compare People v. Estreich, 272 App. Div. 698, 701, 75
N.Y.S.2d 267, 270 (1947) ("illegal and arbitrary interference with a lawful busi-
ness"), affd. mem., 297 N.Y. 910, 79 N.E.2d 742 (1948), with Kilbourne v. State,
84 Ohio St. 247, 95 N.E. 824 (1911). Estreich, however, is of questionable modem
authority, since it is a "liberty of contract" due-process decision.
424. See Dennis v. United States, 341 US. 494, 555-56 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
425. A gradation scheme that imposes minimal penalties upon strict liability of-
fenders could potentially be more effective if special sanctions were provided for re-
cidivists. Thus, the recidivist could be subjected to increased penal sanctions and to
revocation of his operating license. Moreover, even under a modified gradation sys-
tem, strict liability might serve as a powerful incentive to take preventative steps,
since a criminal prosecution would have an important collateral estoppel effect in the
event of a subsequent civil suit for treble damages. See note 481 infra and accom-
panying text.
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(v). Affirmative defense. A final possible approach to the
mens rea problem would adopt the strict liability definition of receiv-
ing for retailers and wholesalers, but would provide an affirmative
defense of due diligence.426 Under such a statute, the prosecution
would have a sufficient case for conviction on proof of the receipt
of stolen property, but the defendant could still be acquitted by dem-
onstrating his compliance with a legislatively-defined standard of
care when purchasing the goods. Legislatures have traditionally
been accorded considerable latitude in defining the elements of
criminal conduct,427 and since strict liability criminal statutes have
received judicial approval, 428 a strict liability statute that provides an
affirmative defense arguably should receive similar treatment.
Nevertheless, the affirmative defense technique in the past has
been attacked as an unconstitutional shift of both the burden of pro-
ducing evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion to the defendant
4 29
in violation of due process.480 While it has now been clearly decided
that states may constitutionally place the burden of producing evi-
dence on the defendant, since it would be unreasonable to require
the prosecution to introduce evidence negating every possible affirm-
ative defense,43 1 considerable controversy still surrounds allocation
432 rm or' rdtoaof the risk of nonpersuasion. The Supreme Court's traditional
position on whether the burden of persuasion may be shifted has
been quite flexible:
The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fair-
ness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal pros-
ecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in substance these,
that the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defend-
426. Due diligence could be defined as adherence to reasonable commercial
standards, or, if this is still too demanding, as the absence of recklessness (defined
in note 271 supra). Note, however, that even the reasonable commercial standards
formulation may be too relaxed an approach, since prevailing commercial standards
may be quite low. Accordingly, consideration should be given to imposing an even
higher standard of care. See generally Bradly, supra note 423, at 224-26.
427. "[IThe courts have long been loath to interfere with the power of legisla-
tures to define criminal conduct." S.1 REPORT 1092 (footnote omitted). See note
412 supra and accompanying text. But see Mullaney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)
(impermissible to shift burden of persuasion on issue of passion in homicide case);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (impermissible to punish status of drug
addiction).
428. See notes 415-22 supra and accompanying text.
429. MCCORMIcK, supra note 331, at 800-02, 830; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13,
Comment, at 110-12 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
430. See MCCORMICK 801; Christie & Pye, supra note 368, at 933-38.
431. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 14, at 47; C. TORCIA, supra note
338, § 19.
432. W. LAFAvR & A. ScoTr, supra note 14, at 47-48. For an extensive listing
of cases pro and con, see id. at 47 nn. 24 & 25.
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ant to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or ex-
planation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the
opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found
to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship
or oppression. 433
Until recently, the leading decision on the constitutionality of
shifting the burden of proof was Leland v. Oregon,"84 which mani-
fested this flexibility. In Leland, the Court approved a state statute
that required the defendant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his
affirmative defense of insanity to a first-degree murder charge. Le-
land's precedential value is less certain, however, after In re Win-
ship,'35 which held that the prosecution must establish each element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and Mullaney v. Wilbur,
8 0
which held that the state cannot shift to the defendant the burden
of persuasion on the issue of "heat of passion" as a mitigating factor
in a homicide prosecution. An affirmative defense that denies the
existence of an essential element of the prosecution's case would ap-
pear to be governed by Winship:487 "For example, it is clearly a
433. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934). See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.13, Comment, at 110-11 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). It is unclear whether
Morrison's approach is still good law. See note 435 infra.
434. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
435. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See W. LAFAvE & A. Scotr, supra note 14, at
48. It has been observed:
However, Leland does suggest that the constitutionality of a defense on which
the defendant has the burden of persuasion is measured under a broad, due proc-
ess standard. Thus, the ultimate question is whether the allocation of proof is
reasonable. In an appropriate case it should be possible to make a strong show-
ing of legality. If such an affirmative defense is an integral part of a reasonable
legislative solution to a difficult problem, and the evidence on the matter is par-
ticularly within the control of the defendant, it is submitted that due process
standards are met.
WORKING PAPERS 18-19 (footnote omitted). On the continuing validity of Leland,
see People ex rel. Juhan v. District Ct., 165 Colo. 253, 260-61, 439 P.2d 741, 745
(1968) (insanity preponderance rule violated state constitution's due process clause);
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 9, 268 A.2d 89, 93-94 (1970) (Jones, J., concur-
ring); 440 Pa. at 14-15, 268 A.2d at 90 (Roberts, J., concurring).
436. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with whom the Chief Justice
concurred, joined in the Mullaney majority opinion and observed: "I see no incon-
sistency between . . . [Winship] and the holding of Leland v. Oregon." 421 U.S.
at 705 (citations omitted). Presumably, they would see no inconsistency between
Mullaney and Leland. On Mullaney and affirmative defenses, compare People v. Ba-
logun, 17 Cims. L. R 'R. 2486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 1975), with People v. Long,
18 CRim. L. RPm-. 2031 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 1975).
437. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 14, at 48. The most recent attempt of
the Supreme Court to essay the scope of Winship is Mullaney. The State argued
that Winship should be limited to elements that bear on guilt, but not degree of guilt.
The court rejected this distinction, observing that Winship was concerned with sub-
stance and not form, and illustrated its point by noting that otherwise the state would
be wholly free "to redefine the elements that constitute different crimes, characteriz-
ing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment." 421 U.S. at 698.
The Court then held that the defendant's stake in liberty outweighed the state's inter-
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denial of due process to characterize alibi as a defense and then
place the burden of persuasion on the defendant, for an alibi defense
is nothing more than a denial that the defendant committed the
crime." 488 It would be consistent, under this reasoning, to argue
that the risk of nonpersuasion on the issue of insanity ought to re-
main on the prosecution since the defendant is in fact denying the
requisite mens rea exists. 4 9 Yet the Winship rational need not nec-
essarily be applicable where the affirmative defense does not deny
the existence of an essential element of the crime but rather is more
appropriately characterized as an excuse or justification for it-that
is, as a form of confession and an avoidance. In this case, it may
be constitutional to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant
since all elements of the crime have been established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.440
Although the distinction between affirmative defenses denying
an element of the crime and those purporting to justify it is not al-
ways clear, 4  this approach has been adopted by several proposals
to reform the criminal code and approved by some commentators.
The Model Penal Code, for example, requires "the defendant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence" 442 any affirmative de-
est in facilitating its prosecutive burden. 421 U.S. at 701-02.
It is not clear how Mullaney would affect an affirmative defense of lack of knowl-
edge of the stolen character of the property in a fencing prosecution. Clearly, the
history of the due process clause would argue that knowledge is the essence of the
"crime" of receiving. See 421 U.S. at 696. Shifting the burden of persuasion on
that issue to the defendant would be hard to distinguish from Mullaney. Ironically,
it may well be, therefore, that the Constitution here seen in an historical perspective
is consistent, as presently interpreted, with strict liability on the issue of knowledge,
but is not consistent with an affirmative defense on that issue. See State v. Gior-
dano, 121 N.J.L. 469, 3 A.2d 290 (1939), where affirmative defense language of a
New Jersey statute was construed to be a clarification of a common-law presumption
in order to avoid declaring the statute an unconstitutional shift of the burden of per-
suasion. This demonstrates the general difficulty that is experienced when an effort
is made to integrate the Supreme Court's strict liability cases with traditional notions
of due process. It is ironic, too, that Mullaney and United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658 (1975), the Supreme Court's most recent reaffirmations of the concept of strict
liability, were handed down on the same day. This, in turn, argues for a different
reading of Mullaney keyed to the distinction between a defense seen as a negation
of an element of the offense and an affirmative defense seen as a form of confession
and avoidance. See text at note 440 infra.
438. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 14, at 48. See MCCORMiCK, supra note
331, at 801; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 277, § 2512, at 415; S.1 REPORT 1091.
439. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 14, at 48.
440. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13, Comment, at 110-11 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). This argument, however, has not gone uncriticized, and may represent a mi-
nority view. See McCoRMicK 801-02.
441. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 Comment, at 111 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
442. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2) (b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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fense which "involves a matter of excuse or justification peculiarly
within . . . [his] knowledge . . . on which he can fairly be required
to adduce supporting evidence. '448  A similar affirmative defense
provision is contained in S.1, the proposal to reform the federal crim-
inal code. 444  Although the S.1 proposal is not expressly limited to
cases of excuse or justification, the bill's legislative history clearly
indicates the burden of persuasion is to be shifted only when these
defenses are involved.445 Interestingly, both the Model Penal Code
and S.1 require that a defendant prove his affirmative defense by
only a preponderance of the evidence. This formulation apparently
is partly the product of tension between proponents of shifting the
burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt and those who
would require that the prosecution establish beyond a reasonable
doubt every element of the defendant's guilt, which includes proving
all elements of its case as well as the lack of any affirmative defense
once the defendant's production burden has been satisfied.
As an alternative to the negation-excuse or justification distinc-
tion, at least one commentator suggests it is constitutionally permis-
sible to shift the risk of nonpersuasion where it is a "sensible middle
position between a much broader statute or strict-liability-type of
statute, on the one hand, and, on the other, a statute recognizing
the defense and placing an impossible burden on the prosecution to
establish the existence of facts within the special knowledge of the
defendant. 4 46  Such an approach merits consideration because it
properly recognizes the underlying substantive issues-the due proc-
ess rights of the defendant and the need to facilitate effective law
enforcement-often masked by the somewhat artificial negation-ex-
cuse or justification distinction. Under this approach, a strict liability
statute for dealers coupled with an affirmative defense should re-
ceive constitutional acceptance because of the difficulties in proving
guilty knowledge, the defendant's ready access to any exculpatory
evidence, and the likelihood that statutory penalties will be light.
443. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(3)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The
Code's Commentary, however, indicates that its drafters did "not favor such a shift-
ing of the burden in the absence of the most exceptional considerations." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.13 Comment, at 112 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
444. S.1, Proposed Rule 25.1. Under S.1, any defense designated as an affirma-
tive defense involves a shifting of the burden of persuasion. All other defenses
merely require the defendant to go forward with evidence "to support a reasonable
belief as to its existence." Id. In this case, once the defendant has successfully
raised a reasonable belief, "the government has the burden of proving the nonex-
istence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
445. See S.1 REPORT 1091.
446. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 14, at 49. See WoryaNo PAPERs 17-
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One argument against the use of an affirmative defense ap-
proach is that it may be a legislative subterfuge functionally equiv-
alent to an impermissible statutory presumption that effects an un-
constitutional shifting of the burden of persuasion. 447  A response
to this criticism can be made on both analytical and policy grounds.
While the courts surely will not hesitate to expose a subterfuge for
what it is, there should be different due process tests for a substan-
tive approach that involves redefining the elements of the crime on
the one hand and for a merely procedural approach on the other.
Accordingly, in the case of affirmative defenses, the appropriate ju-
dicial focus for due process should concern whether the relevant pro-
vision is impermissibly designed to negate an element of the offense,
and not whether it achieves the same procedural consequences as
a statutory presumption. 4 s More fundamentally, since legislatures
have a large measure of freedom to abandon the mens rea ele-
ment,440 an analysis that applies the procedural due process test may
leave defendants "materially worse off" by forcing the enactment of
strict liability statutes with no provision for affirmative defenses.
450
Although the affirmative defense approach ought to satisfy due proc-
ess, no such approach is taken in the Model Act because of serious
doubts as to its constitutionality under prevailing analysis.
3. Sentencing Convicted Receivers
Redefining the substantive and procedural criminal law of fenc-
ing is a necessary first step but it will not bring about improved law
447. See J. WEiNmsTiN § 303[04], at 303-23-24. Indeed, courts have construed
apparent "affirmative defenses" as "permissible inferences" to avoid constitutional
difficulties. See State v. Giordano, 121 N.J.L. 469, 3 A.2d 290 (1939); Mantell v.
Jones, 150 Neb. 785, 36 N.W.2d 115 (1949). In addition to effecting a shift in
the burden of persuasion, an affirmative defense provision may not have to comply
with the rational connection test. See note 430 supra. But see Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
448. In other words, a different due process test ought to be applicable, depending
upon whether a procedural or substantive enactment is involved. Nevertheless, while
it is clear that statutory presumptions are procedural devices, affirmative defenses
may be in somewhat of an intermediary position, particularly in light of their pro-
cedural consequences. It is not without significance, therefore, that the Supreme
Court in Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 702 n.31 saw fit to rely on the presumption cases
in striking down an affirmative defense. The Court seemed to feel that a "more ex-
acting standard" was required in the affirmative defense area than in the presumption
area.
449. See notes 259-63 supra and accompanying text.
450. Although this argument is sound on policy grounds, the Supreme Court has
twice indicated that the mere fact that Congress has the "greater" power to define
criminal conduct in a certain way is not determinative. The Court's constitutional
analysis has traditionally focused on what Congress has done rather than on what
that body could have done. See United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 144 (1965);
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943).
1597
1598 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1511
enforcement unless accompanied by revision in sentencing procedures.
Legislative and judicial attitudes to the punishment of convicted re-
ceivers exhibit the same fundamental misunderstanding of the sig-
nificance of fencing that characterizes society's definition of the sub-
stantive crime.451 In almost every state, criminal receivers and thieves
are subject to the same penalties,4 2 an approach that continues "to
denigrate the role of the fence in the theft microcosm."' 4"8  Further,
there is evidence that in exercising their discretion under sentencing
statutes, most judges frequently treat receivers leniently. 4  Funda-
mental to an effective criminal law of receiving, however, is a realiza-
tion that fences are a major cause of theft,"5 that fencing is a more
serious crime than theft, and that, accordingly, the law ought to im-
pose more severe penal sanctions upon criminal receivers,4 0 at least
where the goods are not received for personal consumption.
New legislation providing stiffer penalties for receivers would
convey to judges the legislature's determination that fencing crimes
are, indeed, serious and that lighter sentences for receivers are no
longer appropriate.457 Although modernization of sentencing provi-
sions along these lines is a necessary reform, it alone is not sufficient.
The criminal law of receiving must also make sophisticated distinc-
451. See notes 174-90 supra and accompanying text. For example, in eighteenth
century England, thieves were punished more severely than fences. See Chappell &
Walsh, "No Questions Asked" 162-63.
452. See REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CrIME 21; Hearings on Fencing 163-71. S.1
would continue this practice for those who traffic in stolen property (§ 1732) and
lessen the penalties for those who merely possess it (§ 1733), presumably for per-
sonal consumption. Only the special sentencing provisions of § 2302(b) would work
to impose higher penalties on certain offenders. See note 465 infra.
453. REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 21.
454. Id. Convicted fences are too often given suspended sentences, put on proba-
tion, or merely fined. "MIlronically, 'burglars like to plead guilty to being receivers.
Apparently, they are not as stigmatized by being receivers.'" Id. at 22 (quoting Los
Angeles District Attorney).
455. Id. See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text.
456. See REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 21.
457. One possibility is the use of mandatory sentences. Mandatory sentences,
though often believed to be unwise, are generally thought to be a matter of legislative
judgment. See, e.g., People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.
2d 471 (1975) (mandatory life for drug offender upheld). Appellate review by the
prosecution would probably not be unconstitutional under the double jeopardy clause
in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332 (1975) (appeal possible except where retrial of facts required). Nor would gen-
eral due process considerations seem to militate against it. See generally Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). The
policy considerations supporting a "mutual review" concept are ably set out in Testi-
mony of Professor Livingston Hall on behalf of the A.B.A., Hearings on Reform of
the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laivs and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5364-69 (1973). On
balance, appellate review seems preferable to mandatory sentencing.
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tions among fences according to the degree of their culpability. 45 8
Illustrative of such a scheme is the Model Act, which sanctions dif-
ferently receivers who purchase for consumption only,459 those who
purchase for resale,460 and fences who both initiate thefts and ar-
range the redistribution of stolen merchandise. 0 1
These suggested penal provisions have at least two somewhat in-
terrelated advantages. First, by drafting three sets of penalty provi-
sions instead of one, legislatures can better communicate to judges
their determination of the relative seriousness of various fencing
crimes. Second, multiple penal provisions would give judges more
flexibility to tailor punishment to the crime, thereby presumably
maximizing incapacitation, increasing deterrence, and reducing the
risk of nullification by a jury not wishing, for example, to subject
a consumer of stolen goods to the harsh sanction more properly re-
served for a master fence.
Attempts to distinguish among receivers solely on the value of
the stolen property received, the traditional approach to grading pun-
ishment in theft crimes, is inadequate for several reasons. First, es-
tablishing precisely how much stolen property a particular receiver
has handled is often difficult, thus undermining the very basis of this
approach to sentencing. Second, a scheme that emphasizes the par-
ticular economic function of the fence is a more accurate method
of allocating punishment since, on the whole, it is highly probable
that the value and volume of stolen property handled by a master
fence is greater than that redistributed by a professional fence even
though this may be difficult to prove. Third, a scheme that allocates
punishment according to the value of the property stolen obscures
distinctions based on 'personal blameworthiness. The occasional
consumer of stolen goods is not generally an organizer of theft activ-
ity, and, by definition, his purchase is not for resale purposes. Con-
sequently, his overall conduct is less blameworthy than that of an
outlet fence or master fence because his adverse impact on society
is considerably smaller. This difference in culpability, however, may
not as a practical matter result in different penal treatment in a crim-
inal code that looks only at value of the property handled. Thus,
while it may often be true that distinctions based on value furnish
458. This proposal was initially made by Hall, but there has been little action
on either the state or federal level. See J. HALL, supra note 5, at 155-57, 217-19.
Hall, however, never went further to distinguish between a fence who was a mere
dealer and one who was engaged in the trafficking of stolen goods.
459. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING AcT § 2, Appendix B.
460. See MODEL THEFr AND FENCING Act § 4(b) (1), Appendix B.
461. See MODEL THEFT AND FENcING AcT § 4(b)(2), Appendix B.
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a preliminary means for evaluating the gravity of criminal conduct,
value alone should not be determinative. Instead, the law ought to
use distinctions based on value as a basis for differentiating sanctions
within each category of receiver.462
Despite the obvious benefits of a scheme that grades criminal
offenses more discriminatingly, most recent proposals for reforming
the criminal laws have eschewed such an approach. Ironically, the
Model Penal Code may have contributed to this failure. That pro-
posal consolidates theft and receiving and then distinguishes various
classes of thieves and receivers,163 but treats identically thieves and
receivers who are consumers, dealers, or brokers of stolen goods
once a minimum level of value ($500) is involved. 464  Similar de-
ficiencies are present in S.1, which generally provides equal penal
treatment for thieves and fences and makes no enhancing distinction
for penal purposes between categories of receivers for resale.4 0
Ironically, S.1 does recognize a functional distinction between re-
ceiving and trafficking in stolen property,4 0 but little effort is made
to reflect the distinction in penal sanctions.
At the federal level, under current law such deficiencies are not
as serious as they otherwise would be because title X of the Oran-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970 provides for sentences of up to
462. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING Acr § 2(b)(2), Appendix B.
463. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) provides
as follows:
Grading of Theft Offenses.
(a) Theft constitutes a felony of the third degree if the amount involved ex-
ceeds $500, or if the property stolen is a firearm, automobile, or other motor-
propelled vehicle, or in the case of theft by receiving stolen property, if the re-
ceiver is in the business of buying or selling stolen property.
(b) Theft not within the preceding paragraph constitutes a misdemeanor.
TIis provision singles out dealers for particular treatment only when less than $500
is involved; the proposed statute also makes no attempt to impose heavier penalties
on big-time fences when larger amounts are involved. Unfortunately, a similar, al-
though more complicated, proposal was made by the National Commission on Re-
form of Federal Criminal Laws. See REFORM COMMN., supra note 190, § 1735(2)
(f). The Model Penal Code, at least, has already lead, albeit unintentionally, to un-
wise reform at the state level. See note 190 supra. It remains to be seen whether
the recommendations of the reform commission will be carried into law in a simi-
larly unsophisticated fashion. See note 465 infra.
464. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); notes
190, 452 supra and accompanying text. Provision is made, however, for an extended
term. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.07 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (authorizing
extended terms), § 7.03 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (criteria for extended
terms).
465. See S.1, §§ 1731-1733. Provision is made, however, for an extended term.
S.1, § 2301(c) (authorizing extended terms); S.1, § 2302(b) (criteria for extended
terms). See also S.1, § 1801 (operating a racketeering syndicate); S.1, § 1802
(racketeering).
466. Compare S.1, §§ 111 & 1732, with § 1733.
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twenty-five years for certain "special offenders," a category that
would include professional fences and large-scale organizers.46 7 Not
all criminal dealers are covered, however, and title X is, of course,
not applicable to those convicted in state courts on state charges.
Until reformers of the criminal law of receiving recognize and correct
the existing inadequacies of our penal codes, therefore, the full ben-
efits of any substantive and procedural reforms will not be realized.
B. Civil Remedies for Fencing Crimes
The only adequate approach to the criminal receiver is that which
deals with him as an established participant in the economic life of
society, whose behavior has been institutionalized over a span of more
than two centuries in Anglo-American experience.4 8
Although modernization of the criminal law of fencing should
facilitate enforcement, an exclusively criminal law approach to the
problem is insufficient because it ignores the opportunities for im-
proved social control offered by civil sanctions. Appropriate provi-
sions for civil liability can both directly reinforce the effects of newly-
enacted criminal statutes and add new dimensions to law enforce-
ment efforts. As discussed in earlier sections, a comprehensive re-
definition of the substantive criminal law of theft and fencing is nec-
essary to make redistribution financially less profitable. 4 9 Civil stat-
utes can play an important' supplementary role in this process in at
least two ways. First, by permitting and encouraging victims of theft
to initiate civil suits under fencing statutes to recover damages
against purchasers of their stolen goods, appropriately drafted civil
provisions will increase the likelihood a violator will be discovered
and will thus greatly enlarge his penalties. Second, at least to the
extent that punitive damages are awarded, civil suits provide a means
for sanctioning those receivers who cannot be convicted under crimi-
nal statutes. Private plaintiffs seeking damages from receivers enjoy
important substantive and procedural advantages not available to the
prosecution in criminal actions since most of the constitutional pro-
tections accorded a criminal defendant are not applicable in civil
litigation.47 °
467. 18 U.S.C. § 3575-3578 (1970) provides procedures by which designated spe-
cial offenders may be sentenced to a maximum of 25 years' imprisonment. See J.
MCCLELLAN, The Organized Crime Control Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 55, 146-88 (1970).
468. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 155 (emphasis added).
469. See text at notes 191-273 supra.
470. STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BusiNEss 13. See generally Comment, Organized
Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal
Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REV. 124 (1975).
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In most jurisdictions, only the common-law action for conversion
is available to theft victims seeking recovery. A successful suit for
conversion permits recovery of the market value of the goods at the
time and place of their conversion on proof the defendant interfered
with the plaintiff's control of the property.471 Actions in conversion,
however, have significant deficiencies in receiving cases that seri-
ously impair the role of private enforcement as a method of control.
The most significant obstacle to civil actions in conversion is the
problem of proof that permeates many criminal fencing cases: A
civil plaintiff generally finds it difficult to establish that his property
has been converted since receivers legitimize and dispose of the
goods rapidly. As a practical matter, therefore, if a civil suit is at
all possible, a plaintiff's recovery is limited to the market value of
those goods actually found in the defendant's possession.472 Fur-
ther, since plaintiffs in conversion cannot recover expenses of the
suit, such as the costs of investigation and attorney's fees, victimized
plaintiffs are never fully compensated. Punitive damages, although
theoretically recoverable, are rarely awarded because of the diffi-
culties in establishing the requisite aggravated state of mind.478 The
unfortunate result is that theft victims increasingly recover on insur-
471. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 403 (1973); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 123, at 463 (1935) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES]. Under the market value formula, the defendant would
most often be liable for the wholesale value of the goods. Retail value would only
apply when the goods were stolen from a noncommercial victim. To do otherwise
would automatically give the commercial victim a guaranteed profit on every item
converted. This would not be appropriate, since every merchant purchasing goods
at wholesale prices incurs a risk that he will not be able to sell the items for a profit.
Assuming that problems of proof could be overcome, see note 472 infra, the victim
would, however, be able to recover the selling price of those goods that a commercial
defendant had sold for profit. Although sometimes limited to the bad faith con-
verter, this rule is an application of the common law doctrine of "waiver of the tort
and suit in assumpsit," that is designed to prevent unjust enrichment. D. DonBs, Su-
pra, § 5.15, at 414. See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrtTON § 154 (1937).
Finally, since the typical commercial defendant is normally not able to recover
money from the thief or fence who made the initial. sale, some deterrent effect is
achieved because the receiver is effectively forced to pay twice for the same goods.
472. Immediate resale is an important attribute of any successful fencing op-
eration. See note 131 supra and accompanying text. If the business purposefully
avoids maintaining detailed records of its transactions, tracing the stolen goods that
have already been resold may be impossible. Even when records have been main-
tained, if the stolen goods have been mixed with legitimate merchandise, tracing the
goods so that the plaintiff can recover the defendant's sale price (waiving the tort
and suing in assumpsit, see D. DOBBS, supra note 471, § 5.15, at 414) may be an
equally difficult task. See notes 137, 226-32 supra and accompanying text.
473. See D. DOBBS, supra note 471, § 3.9, at 205; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAw OF TORTS 9-10 (4th ed. 1971). In at least one case, however, purchase
at a price substantially below market value and at an unusual hour of the night was
considered sufficient to result in a jury award of punitive damages. See Hearings on
Criminal Laws 310.
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ance contracts, a convenient, less expensive alternative to civil litiga-
tion, and pass along increased insurance costs to consumers. 7 4
Thus, the increase in deterrence expected from private law enforce-
ment is not realized.
Clearly, then, a new cause of action more favorable to plaintiffs
needs to be created if private civil litigation is to play a substantial
role in curbing fencing operations. The Model Act provides such
a civil action by adopting an approach used by the federal antitrust
statutes475 and imposing civil liability on proof of the elements of
a criminal violation.476 Under the proposed statute, a receiver is
liable for damages if the plaintiff establishes the receipt, requisite
mens rea, and ownership of the property by a preponderance of the
evidence. This lower evidentiary standard is especially important
in cases where the prosecution decides not to file criminal charges
against a purchaser of stolen goods because of the difficulties in es-
tablishing guilty state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt. The pro-
visions for civil liability make it less likely that receivers will escape
sanction since it is usually considerably easier for plaintiffs to estab-
lish the mens rea by a preponderance of the evidence.477  To ease
the burden of proof in civil cases, the statute extends to the civil
context the presumption of recklessness 4 78 on proof of the possession
of recently stolen property, of the purchase or sale of stolen property
at a price substantially below fair market value, or of the purchase
or sale of stolen property out of the regular course of business. 479
Finally, the proposed statute toils the civil statute of limitations dur-
474. The Department of Commerce has recognized that "small firms are less able
to afford the overhead required for extensive protective measures to absorb . . .
losses [attributed to theft and fencing]." Hearings on Criminal Laws 374. Eventu-
ally, the pressure of increased insurance rates, which these competitive smaller firms
cannot pass along to the public, may force many businesses to close. See note 51
supra and accompanying text. Unfortunately, insurance policies themselves do not
achieve any deterrent effect. See CARGo THEFT AND ORGANIZED CRIME 12 (money
paid by insurers enriches criminal element of society).
475. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
476. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT § 10(a), Appendix B.
477. See McCoRMIcK 793; Hearings on Criminal Laws 310.
478. Although the civil remedy provision may incorporate the same state of mind
requirement contained in the criminal statute, this is not an absolute prerequisite.
Liability could be imposed on the basis of a civil negligence standard, that is, a fail-
ure to exercise due care. See STAFF REPORT ON SMALL BusINEss 13. Indeed, strict
liability in a civil context should be given serious consideration. See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 473, at 493-95. In reality, the law already imposes strict liabil-
ity with respect to attendant circumstances in conversion actions. Id. at 83. Signifi-
cantly, a series of recent statutes authorizes the recovery of treble damages against
any receiver of stolen property. For the source of this legislation see 33 SUGGESTED
STATE LEGISLATIo N 111 (Council of State Governments 1974).
479. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT § 10 (incorporating § 5) Appendix B.
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ing criminal prosecutions 480 and gives collateral estoppel effect to is-
sues resolved against the defendant in a prior criminal trial on the
same facts. 481  The effect of these last two provisions is to ensure
that civil damage suits follow successful criminal prosecutions.
This statutory cause of action is not designed to replace the com-
mon law action in conversion, which would still be available to plain-
tiffs who could not prove the requisite state of mind by a preponder-
ance of the evidence but could show a substantial interference with
control of their property. Nevertheless, a most significant difference
between the two causes of action that makes the statutory one more
desirable is the measure of damages. As a financial incentive to
sue, section 10 of the Model Act authorizes recovery of treble dam-
ages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of investigation and lltiga-
tion.4 s2  The treble damages provision, a concept borrowed from
480. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT § 11(c), Appendix B.
481. Although most courts rejected extension of a collateral estoppel effect to a
subsequent civil case because of the absence of mutuality, a few jurisdictions have
refused to follow this reasoning. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.35, at 607
(1965). In any event, mutuality should no longer be a bar to the application of col-
lateral estoppel because the doctrine of mutuality itself has declined considerably.
See R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 859
(1973). Even so, many jurisdictions have been reluctant to apply collateral estoppel
in this context. Consequently, a prior criminal conviction will often have no effect.
Nevertheless, although not yet the majority rule, the trend of decisions "manifest[s]
an increasing reluctance to reject in toto the validity of the law's factfinding processes
outside the confines of res judicata and collateral estoppel." FEDERAL RULES OF EvI-
DENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 803(22), Advisory Com-
mittee Notes, at 132 (West 1975). Accordingly, these eases have permitted prior
criminal judgments (or particular issues decided therein) to be admitted in evidence
for consideration by the fact-finder. Id. See F. JAMES, supra, § 11.35, at 607; Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 331, at 740; Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1299-1307 (1951).
482. The concept of treble damages for theft is not new. Its origins lie in Ro-
man criminal law. See 1 J. STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 10 (1888).
It can also be found in early American law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Andrews,
2 Mass. 13 (1806). More is required, however, than the mere authorization
of recovery. Although the spur provided by the possibility of treble damage suits
would motivate many individual victims to institute civil proceedings, their ability to
do so would be constrained by resource limitations. The investigation of theft and
fencing activity and any subsequent litigation efforts would inevitably entail expend-
ing considerable time and resources. Since not every investigation or litigation effort
will successfully result in a judgment awarding treble damages, costs, and fees, the
individual victim may not be willing to risk his limited financial resources. Conse-
quently, an industry-wide approach would seem to provide a more realistic way of
coping with the inevitable investigatory and legal expenses inherent in any litigation
effort. For example, an association of common carriers or shippers could maintain
a separate fund to finance this type of litigation. Wherever successful, most of the
resulting proceeds would be paid to the individual victim, while the remainder, a pre-
determined percentage, could be returned to the fund to finance future investigation
and civil proceedings. Insurance companies would also have the resources necessary
to investigate illicit activity and to bring suit against retail or wholesale receivers.
An important question is whether an insurer, suing under subrogation principles,
would be entitled to those damages that go beyond the amount paid in compensation
to the insured-that is, whether an insurance company is entitled to the additional
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federal antitrust statutes, s3 provides for triple recovery of actual
damages, including consequential and incidental losses, 484 instead of
the mere market value of the converted goods.
Yet as a practical matter, this financial incentive to sue would
not be adequately realized in many cases if a defendant's potential
liability were limited to three times the value of stolen goods actually
received. 8 Such an approach would permit networks of thieves
gains of a treble damages action. Five different rules, ranging from one that gives
the insurer the complete addition to one that grants the insured the complete addition,
have been discussed by the courts. See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW,
§ 3.10(c), at 160-62. For obvious policy reasons, however, in the context of theft and
fencing, the insurance company should be allowed to retain the additional gain. To
do otherwise would remove the insurer's incentive to sue, an undesirable result since
private parties may lack the resources necessary for this type of litigation. Moreover,
if insurance companies were granted the profits of a treble damages action, they
would be given the motivation to initiate prosecutions against fences instead of, as
is the prevailing practice today, attempting to buy the goods back from them at a
good price.
483. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
484. Of course, special damages must be proven, but in view of the extensive indi-
rect costs that theft and fencing activity generate, the potential recovery will always
be quite large. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text. Under the language
of some legislation, business competitors who have -suffered no theft loss could con-
ceivably bring suit on unfair competition grounds against an establishment dealing
in stolen goods. See S.13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § (2)(i) (1973); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 496 (West Supp. 1975). In such a case, the plaintiff would be entitled to three
times his lost profits. Most often, however, problems of proof would preclude re-
covery, since the plaintiff must be able to establish both his relative share of the mar-
ket in comparison to the defendant's and the extent to which the defendant's sales
at lower prices resulted in decreased profits. Such an effort would only be worth-
while when the amount of lost profits was high. The plaintiff committed to this
mode of action would attempt to apply an antitrust-type measure of damages. See
Hearings on Criminal Laws 328-31.
In many cases, the size of the recovery will simply reflect a measure of threefold
the wholesale value of the stolen goods, a direct application of the conversion market
value formula. See authorities cited note 471 supra. Currently, once a loss has oc-
curred, the prevailing practice is for the shipper to file a claim with his insurer. The
insurer pays the claim and then proceeds against the carrier or the carrier's insurance
company. The matter is then settled by these parties, by court action or otherwise.
Under the treble damages approach, any of these parties-the shipper, his insurer,
the carrier, or its insurance company--depending on which one incurs the ultimate
loss, could sue the receiver on a conversion theory. The shipper's right to sue would
be based simply on its status as the owner of converted property. The right of the
shipper's insurance company to sue would be based on traditional subrogation princi-
ples. See generally R. KEETON, supra note 482, § 3.10 (1971). If necessary, the
carrier's right to sue could be based on his status as a bailor. See McCORMICK ON
DAMAGES, § 123, at 463-65; The Winkfield, Court of Appeal, 1901 [1902], at 42.
Finally, his insurance company's right to sue could also be based on subrogation prin-
ciples. In the event that the carrier's liability to the shipper is limited to a designated
amount by law or by contract, the thief or criminal receiver would not be able to
limit his liability to this amount, since well-established bailment principles hold that
this is a matter strictly between the bailor and bailee. The Winkfield, Court of Ap-
peal, 1901 [1902], at 42.
485. At least two potential measures of damages could be applied, depending on
the statutory language. If the statute authorizes a recovery based on the value of
the goods, and the law limits the defendant's liability merely to goods received rather
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and fences to avoid the impact of the treble-damages provision by
channeling the stolen merchandise through a large number of receiv-
ers. Thus, there would be little incentive to sue unless a substantial
number of these receivers were located. One possible solution to
this problem is to hold each receiver jointly and severally liable for
the value of the entire shipment on proof it redistributed some of
the stolen goods. Under this approach, a producer need only locate
one large receiver with sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment. A
drawback to such an approach, however, might be the apparent un-
fairness of imposing treble-damages liability on a receiver of only
a small part of the total shipment.
The proposed statute attempts to provide the financial incentives
needed to realize the deterrence value of private enforcement and
yet minimize the inequities of excessive liability. For purposes of
analysis, it is necessary to consider, on the one hand, receivers who
purchase stolen property for personal consumption, and those who
purchase for redistribution, and, on the other, receivers who both
participate in the theft and redistribute the property. According to
section 10 of the Model Act, receivers who purchase for personal
consumption or redistribution, and who did not participate in the
theft, are treated similarly: they are liable in treble damages for the
value of the property actually received or redistributed. On the
other hand, receivers who both participate in the theft and purchase
for redistribution are liable for three times the value of the total
amount stolen. These receivers are treated as joint tortfeasors with
their thieves and are therefore jointly and severally liable for the
entire theft.48 6  One crucial determination for purposes of liability,
than all of the goods stolen, the measure of damages would be three times the value
of the goods received. If the statute authorizes a recovery based on actual damages,
but imposes liability only to the extent of goods received, the measure of damages
would be based on the plaintiff's actual losses on a prorated basis reflecting the de-
fendant's proportionate share of responsibility for the victim's damages. Either
formulation based on limited liability is so impractical, from a societal viewpoint, that
no serious legislative consideration should be given to it. In the absence of a specific
legislative directive authorizing such limited liability, the contrary legislative intent
should be presumed. Anti-trust damages are joint. See, e.g., Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc. v. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, 166 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1958),
revd. on other grounds, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). A similar rule should be followed
here. In addition, given the role played by receipt, particularly receipt for resale,
it does not seem unreasonable to hold him who receives as a joint tortfeasor, for
the full value of what was stolen, rather than merely for the part that was received.
It would not be necessary to apportion damages among joint tortfeasors. W. Paos-
SER, supra note 473, § 52, at 314. Here, it is only necessary to conceptualize the
tort as "theft-receipt" rather than "receipt" to achieve this result. Clearly, this is the
better view both economically and legally.
486. See W. PROSSER, supra note 473, § 46, at 291-92. The traditional rule was
that there could not be contribution between joint tortfeasors. Id. § 50, at 306.
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therefore, is whether the receiver "initiates, organizes, plans, fi-
nances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft. 48 7 A professional
fence, however, may also be liable for the entire theft if he has estab-
lished a working relationship with the thieves, even though he was
unaware of the particular theft beforehand. This aspect of civil lia-
bility under the Model Act recognizes that as a practical matter
an established fencing relationship is an incentive for theft. Hence,
it follows that if the thief and receiver deal at "arm's length," the
fence will not be liable for the entire theft. This would be the case
for a legitimate businessman who only infrequently trades in stolen
goods and never has an interest in a particular theft.
If the model statute is enacted, the prospect of treble-damages
recovery and corresponding large legal fees will probably spur the
growth of a substantial body of private attorneys specializing in plain-
tiffs' fencing claims, similar to the growth of plaintiffs' antitrust attor-
neys. A private fencing bar may develop improved litigation and
investigation techniques and thereby help facilitate enforcement of
the fencing laws. By the same token, plaintiffs' attorneys may sup-
ply law enforcement officials with information to help convict receiv-
ers in the hope of benefiting by collateral estoppel from a criminal
prosecution. While law enforcement officials might not be as able
or as willing to reciprocate with valuable information until they have
successfully prosecuted the defendants, the evidence should eventu-
ally be turned over in the interest of achieving maximum deter-
rence,488 as is frequently done by the Justice Department after an
investigation into criminal antitrust violations. Ultimately, once the
full deterrent effect of this dual approach to the problem of theft
and fencing is recognized, prosecutors will probably routinely name
retail and wholesale businesses in prosecutions for receiving, even
if their successful prosecution may not be possible, since merely list-
Among conscious wrongdoers, the law would not help the parties share the damages.
Id. § 46, at 291-92. A full recovery, for example, for treble damages against one
department store for the entire value of a theft would obviously end the matter. Yet
it seems clear that the others who received part of the goods stolen should be given
an incentive not to participate in the trade in stolen property. Suit by the first store
against the others would provide the extra push that is needed. Consequently, here,
if not elsewhere, the "no contribution" rule should be relaxed.
487. See MODEL THEFr mD FENcING Acr § 4(a) (2), Appendix B.
488. Since a lower burden of proof governs civil cases, note 477 supra, prose-
cutors may turn materials over to private parties at an early stage, because a criminal
conviction may be too difficult to attain under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt stand-
ard. Such material is not always easy to uncover, even by public bodies. See Appli-
cation of State of California to Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas, 195F. Supp. 37 (E.D.
Pa. 1961).
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iug them will give private attorneys notice of their potential vulner-
ability to a civil suit.489
Realizing, the potential benefits from private law enforcement,
a few states have, in fact, recently enacted legislation that subjects
criminal receivers to a civil liability for treble damages, court costs,
and reasonable attorney's fees.490 At the federal level, congres-
sional enactment of title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act,
which provides that any person or entity whose business is injured
by so-called racketeer-inflenced organizations may recover treble
damages, costs and fees,49' indicates at least a preliminary acknowl-
edgement of the role of civil suits in controlling serious crime prob-
lems. In addition to allowing treble damages, title IX authorizes
the attorney general to institute civil proceedings for the purpose of
obtaining injunctive relief against any act that violates the statute.492
If necessary to restrain violations of this act, the court may order any
person (or entity) "to divest himself of any interest . . . in any en-
terprise" and may prohibit any individual from engaging in any busi-
ness activity that comes within the scope of the legislative prohibi-
tion.408 The statute further provides that prior criminal convictions
are to be given a collateral estoppel effect "in any subsequent civil
proceedings brought by the United States. '49 4  Finally, to remove
unduly burdensome jurisdictional and procedural constraints to civil
actions by the attorney general, the statute contains liberal venue and
subpoena-power provisions and permits nationwide service of proc-
ess.
49 5
489. See note 488 supra. The traditional practice of some prosecutors of securing
the names of unindicted co-conspirators may present legal problems. See United
States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975) (beyond the power of the grand jury).
It may be necessary in light of Briggs to name the unindicted person as "John Doe"
and to reveal his name, if at all, only through the bill of particulars.
490. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West Supp. 1976). Arizona passed simi-
lar legislation providing for costs and fees, but only for a sum twofold the market
value of the property. It is also not apparent whether the measure of loss in Arizona
is limited to those stolen goods actually received by the defendant, or whether liabil-
ity extends to the entire stolen shipment. ARiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13-621B (Supp.
1975).
Some states have authorized the recovery of damages without providing any treble
damage incentive to sue. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-1 (Supp. 1975); Note,
Torts-Recovery of Damages for Interference with Property Rights Under G.S.
99A-1, 10 WAxE FoREsr L REV. 340 (1974).
491. 18 U.S.C. H9 1961-68 (1970). See King v. Veseo, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
492. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)(b) (1970). See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d
1351 (7th Cir. 1974) (constitutionality upheld).
493. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1970).
494. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1970).
495. 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1970).
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Title IX, however, is primarily concerned with curbing the infil-
tration of legitimate businesses by organized crime.496  Conse-
quently, any derivative civil attack on fencing activity under this stat-
ute can be accomplished only in an oblique manner.49 7 Neverthe-
less, the statute's extensive substantive and procedural provisions for
civil relief have provided a basic model for recent congressional pro-
posals designed to deal more directly with the problem of theft and
fencing. 4 8
Prior to the drafting of S.1, a bill called S.13 was introduced in an
attempt to amend both 18 U.S.C. § 1964, the civil remedies section
of title IX, and 18 U.S.C. § 659, the most commonly used federal
anti-fencing provision. 499  The bill proposed that section 1964 retain
its basic provisions authorizing treble damages and appropriate judi-
cial relief to prevent violations of title IX, and that section 659 be
amended to provide treble damages recovery and injunctive relief
and include liberal venue and process procedures. 00 Other pro-
posed amendments to both sections would have allowed the federal
government to sue for actual damages whenever it has been "injured
in its business or property by reason of any [statutory] violation" 50 1
permitted the attorney general to "intervene in any [privately initi-
ated] civil action or proceeding" that he considers to be of "gen-
eral public importance;" 502 authorized private injunctive relief, in-
cluding divestiture, "to prevent and restrain violations" of either sec-
496. Despite this principal orientation, neither the civil nor the criminal provi-
sions of this legislation are limited to the infiltration of legitimate business by or-
ganized crime. Notwithstanding a recent federal decision to the contrary, Barr v.
WIUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (limited to organized crime),
these provisions encompass "any person" who comes within their prohibition. See
United States v. Campanole, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir. 1975) (not limited to or-
ganized crime). This is why the term "person" was so broadly defined. See 18
U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1970). See United States v. Altese, 19 CRrM. L. RPTP. 2319 (2d
Cir. July 21, 1976) (not limited to legitimate business).
497. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970) (emphasis added) makes it unlawful for any per-
son, through a pattern of racketeering activity or any income derived therefrom, to
acquire any interest or control of any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce.
Racketeering activity is defined to include any conduct that is indictable under three
federal statutes dealing with theft and fencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1970).
See generally note 185 supra. "'[P]attem of racketeering activity' requires at least
two acts of racketeering activity. .. " within a ten-year period. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961
(5) (1970).
498. For example, the treble damage concept is embodied in S.2221, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975). See 121 CONG. Ruc. S14383 (daily ed. July 30, 1975).
499. S.13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See Hearings on Criminal Laws 323-36
(comparing S.13 and antitrust laws).
500. S.13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. H9 1, 2(e), (f), (i), (j), (k), (1) (1973.).
501. S.13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. H§ I(d), 2(h) (1973).
502. S.13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §9 l(f), 2(n) (1973).
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tion;50 3 and given collateral estoppel effect to previous criminal con-
victions of defendant in civil actions instituted by private parties. 04
Nevertheless, because of inaction by the House Committee on the
Judiciary, S.13 never became law despite unanimous approval by the
Senate.505
The proposals contained in S.13 are potentially important means
for controlling criminal activity through civil litigation, and they have
been adopted in modified form by the Model Act. 06 The availabil-
ity of injunctive relief to "any person"50 7 threatened by theft activity,
for example, would allow businesses to take steps to avoid theft.
Thus, under the broad language of these amendments, shippers could
conceivably obtain injunctions requiring carriers to take appropriate
security measures against theft, and carriers could seek injunctive re-
lief directing shippers to identify their goods with appropriate mark-
ings. 10 Although S.1 would authorize injunctive relief upon peti-
tion by the attorney general, as well as the recovery of treble dam-
ages, costs, and fees by victims of crime, neither the four amend-
ments contained in S.13, nor the proposed extension of procedural
benefits to private parties suing under section 659, are contained in
the new proposal. 00  The failure to give collateral estoppel effect
to criminal convictions in private litigation and to provide for private
injunctive relief may not be of major significance since they are argu-
ably available under the present common law. 10 But the failure
503. S.13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(e) (1973).
504. S.13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ I(g), 2(o) (1973).
505. S.13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (119 CONG. REC. 10319 (1973)).
506. See MODEL THEFr AND FENcING AcT § § 9, 11 (a), 11 (b), Appendix B.
507. See MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACr § 9(c), Appendix B.
508. In seeking injunctive relief, both the carrier and the shipper would base their
arguments on parallel grounds. The shipper would argue that his business could not
survive if his goods could not be shipped. Since there are only a limited number
of carriers, all of whom have demonstrated their failure to take adequate security pre-
cautions, the court should require that appropriate precautionary measures be taken
as a condition of doing business. Similarly, the carrier seeking injunctive relief
would argue that since he is required to accept all goods delivered to him for ship-
ment, the court should require proper packaging and identification as a condition for
any shipper doing business with the carrier.
509. S.13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4101 (1973).
510. For a discussion of the current common law with respect to the collateral
estoppel effect of issues decided in a prior criminal case, see note 481 supra.
Whether there is a right to private injunctive relief in this context is not clear. A
well-established rule is that equity will not enjoin criminal conduct. D. DOns, supra
note 471, at 115-16. This reluctance was based on the theory that an adequate rem-
edy was available at law in the form of a criminal prosecution, and that an injunc-
tion, enforceable by contempt, will usually be granted only after a nonjury trial. Id.
at 117-18. An early exception developed in both public and private nuisance cases
"where a plaintiff sought to enjoin a crime that invaded his property interest." Id.
at 116 (emphasis added). When a public nuisance was involved, plaintiff had stand-
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to extend liberal venue and process rules to private parties will in-
evitably hamper their litigation efforts.
IM. CONCLUSION: BASIC TACTICS AND STRATEGY
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
Successful control of crimes against property ultimately requires
a realization that the redistribution of stolen property is not a victim-
less white-collar crime."' Current misunderstandings concerning
the impact of theft and fencing understandably reflect the same
shortsighted economic view of receiving long conspicuous in our sub-
stantive laws. The private business sector must voluntarily under-
take reforms on an industry-wide basis to supplement public enforce-
ment efforts,512 and consumers must not remain indifferent to the
ing to sue only if he could demonstrate "special damage, in addition to that suffered
by the public at large." Note, Equitable Devices for Controlling Organized Vice, 48
J. CrtM. L.C. & P.S. 623, 627 (1958). Today, injunctions against crime seem to be
granted whenever the court is willing to characterize the conduct as a nuisance. D.
DOBBS, supra note 471, at 116. Since there has been no hesitancy in allowing the
state to enjoin the operation of houses of gambling and prostitution, it would seem
that a private citizen asserting special damages to a property interest could similarly
obtain injunctive relief against such a public nuisance. See Note, supra, at 624-27.
By characterizing fencing activity as a public nuisance, it would not be inappropriate
for a court, drawing an analogy between fencing and a continuous trespass, to enjoin
this type of conduct. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 471, at 59-60, 348-49.
In the case of a shipper seeking an injunction against a carrier, or vice versa, the
case for private injunctive relief is even stronger, since the court would not be enjoin-
ing the commission of a criminal act, but, rather, would be prohibiting conduct that
facilitates the commission of theft and fencing activity. The party subject to the in-
junction obviously would not be a criminal defendant; he would be a shipper, or a
carrier who is responsible for transporting the goods. Note that in either case, ade-
quate relief might not be available at law, since stolen goods are often impossible
to locate or identify. In the absence of proper identification, criminal prosecutions
are doomed to failure and civil relief will not be available. See notes 226-34 supra
and accompanying text.
511. See REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRiME 28. The public may tend to view the
fence as "providing a much-needed social service for the hard-pressed consumer."
Chappell & Walsh, Receiving Stolen Property 492. See notes 45-47, 49 supra and
accompanying text. Expressions of public approval, demonstrated by the consumer's
continued willingness to buy stolen goods, have caused at least some fences to view
their activity as a victimless crime. See C. KLocsARs, supra note 12, at 147-50.
512. For example, recent Senate committee hearings, investigating criminal fenc-
ing systems, elicited the following observation:
No greater truism has been highlighted in this committee's extensive hearings
on cargo theft and fencing than the fact that law enforcement working alone
cannot get the job done in this area of crime. The transportation industry must
assume the responsibility for preventing thefts and accounting for the goods left
in its care for transfer. Without industry's help, law enforcement's job of appre-
hending and successfully prosecuting thieves-not to mention the fences who in-
duce and encourage thievery-is a most difficult task at best.
REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 12.
Appropriate industry reforms should be initiated in at least the following areas:
hiring practices, personnel policies, packaging techniques, cargo verification proce-
dures, inventory control, accounting and bookkeeping, employee supervision, and
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economic consequences of their illegal purchases. 18
Legislatures should assume responsibility for encouraging new
attitudes5 14 and give private citizens a significant financial stake in
detecting and reporting fencing activity. Thus, a modernization of
our fencing laws to recognize that redistribution systems operate on
traditional economic principles and vary considerably in sophistica-
tion and impact is a prerequisite to more effective control of modem
theft and fencing operations.
Nevertheless, legislative reform alone will not guarantee success
because these reforms, however well-designed, will have to be prop-
erly implemented. For instance, since fencing is now to a significant
extent an interstate crime, effective investigations require increased
cooperation between federal and state enforcement agencies.5 16
More fundamentally, however, law enforcement agencies must re-
structure their priorities so that emphasis is placed on convicting the
fence rather than the thief. This will frequently mean granting so-
called use immunity to thieves in order to gather incriminating evi-
dence against major fences. Additionally, law enforcement agencies
must assign different priorities to the different types of receivers.
No special effort should be made against neighborhood fences, since
their economic impact is relatively slight and they are often detected
in the course of other investigations anyway. Master fences have
the gravest consequences for our society, but they are by far the most
physical plant security. A detailed discussion of security-oriented proposals for in-
dustry-wide adoption is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, extensive rec-
ommendations have been made for the transportation and securities industries. See
CARGO THEFr AND ORGANIZED CRIME 43-61; Dept. of Justice Release, Suggestions by
the Dept. of Justice for Safe Handling of Marketable Securities by Financial Institu-
tions, Including Hints for Detecting Counterfeit, Forged, Worthless, and Spurious Se-
curities (Dec. 23, 1974); A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE NATIONAL CARGo
SECURITY PROGRAM 4-6 (1976).
To the extent that industry is unwilling to implement the necessary reforms, legis-
lative consideration should be given to establishing administrative controls. Compli-
ance with administrative regulations could be made a condition of doing business. On
the federal level, agencies currently regulating the transportation industry and the se-
curity field provide an existing structure from which controls could be imposed.
513. But see C. KLocKAxs, supra note 12, at 150.
514. Gallup Polls have repeatedly indicated that Americans consider crime one
of the most important national problems, even more important than economic issues.
See, e.g., Richmond Times Dispatch, July 27, 1975, at A-20, col. 1 (number one).
Political leadership seems unable to translate that concern into more effective crime
control programs. For a number of concrete proposals, see J. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME (1975).
515. "[Fjences . . . are no respectors of boundaries established by local and
State criminal justice agencies. Vast amounts of stolen property are regularly trans-
ported across State and even National borders. . . as part of a redistribution system
developed by fences." REPORT, THE IMPACT OF CRIME 11. See Chappell & Walsh,
"No Questions Asked" 167. The National Wiretap Commission called for such coop-
eration. WmR REPORT 6.
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difficult to convict. To gather the evidence necessary to convict
these receivers, police must frequently employ extensive undercover
and electronic surveillance operations. As a practical matter, there-
fore, enforcement efforts are best directed at professional fences
since their apparently legitimate operations can be pierced relatively
easily with the help of informants and with electronic surveillance.51
Preliminary investigation is obviously needed to obtain the probable
cause required for a court order authorizing electronic surveillance,
but this should not be a major barrier because professional receivers
lack the protective insulation of master fences. Concentrating on
professional fences also should result in the apprehension of their
suppliers, who are themselves a potentially valuable source of infor-
mation about other fences. Consequently, by establishing priorities
along these lines, authorities can employ their limited resources in
the most efficient manner.
This review of the history and development of theft and fencing
has documented the need for reform in the substantive law and in
law enforcement practices. The current state of the law is simply
not equipped to cope with a problem that is already extremely se-
rious, and that can only get worse. America has too much crime
of all kinds. It is time that action be taken to control it. What needs
to be done is relatively clear. All that stands in the way of reform
is political will.
516. A "bug," rather than a wiretap, should be used because the professional
fence usually conducts his illegal transactions on a person-to-person basis in his store.
the telephone is not as frequently used for fencing matters.
1613
Michigan Law Review
APPENDIX A
Analysis of Uniform Crime Reports Statistics:
Stolen and Recovered Property 1960-75
For a number of years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.)
has collected, on a limited basis, statistics on the amount of property stolen
and recovered annually. This information, however, has apparently
never been comprehensively analyzed. This appendix, based on F.B.I.
statistics for the years 1960 through 1975,' attempts to identify the major
trends in the incidence of crimes against property and to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of existing law enforcement efforts to recover stolen property.
The F.B.I. statistics analyzed in this appendix were collected each year
from various local and state law enforcement agencies. 2 Six categories of
statistics are reported: clothing, currency, fur, jewelry and precious
metals, locally stolen automobiles, and "miscellaneous." The "miscellane-
ous" category includes all property not included in the other categories,
such as office equipment, televisions, radios, stereophonic equipment, fire-
arms, household goods, consumable goods, and livestock.
For purposes of this appendix, the statistics have been grouped into
three broad categories: (1) automobiles; (2) miscellaneous; and (3) "all
other," which includes clothing, furs, currency, and jewelry. To facilitate
comparison of yearly figures, the absolute dollar amounts first have been
adjusted to report the dollar value per 100 persons, in order to account
for increases in population, and then converted into "constant 1960 dol-
lars" to account for inflation." Where appropriate, however, values are
* The assistance of Mr. Gregory Baldwin (J.D. 1975, Cornell Law School), Mr.
Robert Elmore (J.D. 1975, Cornell Law School), Mr. William Waller (J.D. 1976,
Cornell Law School) and Mr. Mark Sargent (Cornell Law School) in the preparation
of this appendix is hereby acknowledged.
1. These statistics are reported annually by the F.B.I. in its series of Uniform
Crime Reports under the title CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (as part of the Uniform
Crime Reporting Program which was initiated in 1930). All figures are taken from
the table, entitled 'Type and Value of Property Stolen and Recovered."
2. During the fifteen year period under study, the number of local enforcement
agencies reporting to the F.B.I. increased significantly. In 1960, reporting agencies
represented a population base of only 120.8 million people; by 1975, this population
base had increased to 162.4 million. Before 1969, only statistics from cities with a
population of at least 25,000 were reported, but the F.B.I.'s yearly statistical reports
since then have included data from cities of at least 2,500 persons. It is also possible
to use these F.B.I. data to estimate a total crime against property figures. The popu-
lation for the United States in 1974 was, for example, 211.9 million people. U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1975 Table No. 2, at 5 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 95th ed. 1974).
This projects to a total figure of $336,285,300. It is less than the estimate employed
by the Department of Commerce. See note 32 supra. Its estimate included more
factors. F.B.I. figures are limited to index offenses (burglary, robbery, larceny over
$50, and auto theft); the Commerce Department made an effort to be comprehensive.
Finally, it is recognized that the F.B.I. figures are subject to substantial understate-
ment. See Appendix A, note 4 infra.
3. These factors were derived from the information pertaining to consumer prices
reflected in U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AD-
sTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES, 1975, at 414 (96th ed. 1975) (Purchasing Power of
the Dollar: 1940 to 1975, Table No. 678).
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quoted in both "current 1975 dollars," that is, dollar amounts not adjusted
to reflect inflation, and "constant 1960 dollars."
A. The Statistics Presented
Graph 1 and tables 1 and 2 report that the current 1975 dollar value
of property stolen per 100 persons rose from 502 dollars in 1960 to 1979
dollars in 1975, an increase of approximately 294 per cent. Measured
in terms of constant 1960 dollars, the value of property stolen per 100
persons increased from 502 dollars to 1061 dollars, or approximately 111
per cent. Table 3 gives percentage composition of total goods stolen.
The increase in the value of stolen property reflects an across-the-
board increase in all three categories reported in tables 1 and 2. Very
significantly, however, the data in table 2 show the increase in the value
of miscellaneous items stolen was. by far the most pronounced. The value
of miscellaneous property stolen in constant dollars per 100 people in-
creased from 112 dollars to 435 dollars, or 288 per cent, during the fifteen
year period. In sharp contrast, the increases in the value of stolen auto-
mobiles and "all other" items were, respectively, 60 per cent and 59 per
cent.
Table 4 represents the percentage of stolen property recovered during
the fifteen-year period. It shows a decline from 52.4 per cent to 29.9
per cent. Between 1960 and 1966, however, the recovery rate actually
increased to a high of 55 per cent; but since then the rate has dropped by
an average of more than 2.5 per cent per year.
Table 5 illustrates that the relative composition of stolen property re-
covered has remained remarkably similar. In 1960, automobiles ac-
counted for 87 per cent of stolen property recovered, miscellaneous items
accounted for 8.3 per cent, and "all other" property accounted for 4.7 per
cent. In 1975, these percentages were 77.3 per cent for autos, 16.6 per
cent for miscellaneous, and 6.1 per cent for "all other" property stolen.
B. Observations4
(1) There is a high correlation between increases and decreases in
the value of miscellaneous property stolen and increases and decreases in
4. When analyzing this material, several factors necessarily qualify any conclu-
sions. First, it can safely be assumed that since 1960 improvements in crime detec-
tion techniques and in the collection of statistics are responsible for some part of the
apparent increase in crime, although the F.B.I. has tried to minimize this factor.
Second, since F.B.I. figures necessarily reflect only those crimes that are actually re-
ported to law enforcement agencies, the data used are not completely accurate indi-
cators of the incidence of particular crimes. Recently, the Law Enforcement As-
sistance Administration and the Bureau of the Census have endeavored to calculate
the extent of unreported crime, but until their work is completed and carefully
analyzed it must be assumed that the theft of personal property is one area where
this phenomenon is most apparent. See CIaMIA. ViCrim.iAnoN: STRvEYs IN 13
AMERICAN CrMEs (U.S. Dept. of Justice: LEAA 1975). The rate of reported crime
in Boston was, for example, robbery, 33 per cent; theft, 28 per cent, burglary, 56
per cent; and auto theft, 68 per cent. Id. at 22. Finally, statistics are gathered from
only the most heavily populated and highest crime areas. This means the results may
overstate theft rates and understate recovery rates.
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the total value of property stolen. This correlation is most dramatically
revealed by the data since 1966, which shows that a sharp rise in the theft
rate for miscellaneous property accounts for a substantial, simultaneous in-
crease in the overall property theft rate.
(2) By 1973, the value of miscellaneous property stolen was almost
as large as the value of automobiles stolen. This is a significant reversal
of a trend observable in the first half of the period studied, when the value
of automobiles stolen was approximately twice as large as the value of mis-
cellaneous items stolen. Significantly, this reversal may be largely ex-
plained by the very rapid increase in the theft of miscellaneous items.
(3) The recovery rate was constant until 1966, when it began to
drop significantly. This continuous decline in the recovery rate during
1967-1975 coincides with the sharply increasing theft of miscellaneous
property stolen.
(4) Despite the changes in the composition of stolen property be-
tween 1960 and 1975, the composition of property recovered has remained
relatively similar. The primary explanation for this difference is the in-
ability of law enforcement agencies to recover a substantially greater
amount of stolen miscellaneous and other property even though thefts of
this type of property have increased significantly.
(5) The recovery of automobiles consistently accounts for the great-
est percentage of recovered property. The relative success of police in
recovering stolen automobiles, however, is a misleading indicator of the
ability of authorities to deal with theft for resale purposes. Very few auto-
mobiles are in fact taken with an intent permanently to deprive their own-
ers of possession, and F.B.I. statistics include automobiles taken by joy-
riders or other persons needing quick, temporary transportation. After a
brief time, these vehicles are abandoned and recovered. Further, stolen
automobiles cannot be easily concealed because of their size; cannot be
easily legitimized because they are required by statute to be marked with
several permanent serial numbers; and can be relatively easily identified
because they must be registered with state agencies and because there ex-
ists a national system to identify and recover stolen vehicles.6
(6) The theft of miscellaneous and other property is a better indi-
cator of the incidence of theft for resale. The sudden upsurge in the theft
of these items is undoubtedly the result of many factors. 6 Unlike auto-
mobiles, most miscellaneous and other items are small and therefore easy
to conceal and to transport; most are not marked with serial numbers
and therefore can be easily legitimized and resold without detection. Fur-
ther, most of these kinds of thefts are not reported to the National Crime
Information Center.
5. These observations are not meant to underrate the increasing problem of auto
theft for profit. Statistics indicate that only 62 per cent of the cars stolen in 1975
were recovered, whereas more than 90 per cent were recovered in 1960. The sharp
decrease in percentage of recovered stolen autos would seem to be related largely to
two factors: the smaller percentage of joy ride thefts that has accompanied the in-
stallation of wheel locks and the growing practice of theft by professionals of autos
for stripping that has accompanied the use of computer assisted auto part sales.
6. Of course, different factors will not affect all items (e.g., firearms, stereo
equipment, etc.) in the same way.
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Table 1
Stolen Property in Dollars per 100 People
in Current Dollars
Total Auto Misc.
502 246 112
508 249 112
535 267 124
679 346 159
824 445 190
840 445 190
831 457 190
991 535 276
1152 588 305
1287 656 375
1356 637 445
1483 653 525
1349 588 490
1375 558 549
1587 579 664
1979 737 812
Table 2
Stolen Property in Dollars per 100 People
in Constant "1960" Dollars
Total Auto Misc.
502
503
524
657
787
789
759
879
981
1040
1035
1084
956
917
952
1061
246
247
262
335
425
418
417
475
501
530
486
477
417
372
347
395
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
All Other
144
147
144
174
189
205
184
180
259
256
275
305
271
268
344
428
All Other
144
146
141
168
180
192
168
160
221
207
209
223
192
179
206
229
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Table 3
Percentage Composition of Total Goods Stolen
Year Auto Misc. All Other
1960 49.0 22.4 28.6
1961 49.0 22.4 28.6
1962 50.0 27.0 28.0
1963 51.0 23.5 25.5
1964 54.0 23.5 22.5
1965 52.0 23.1 24.0
1966 55.3 23.7 21.0
1967 53.5 25.1 21.4
1968 51.2 27.3 21.5
1969 51.0 28.9 20.1
1970 47.4 32.6 20.0
1971 44.3 35.6 20.1
1972 43.1 36.4 20.5
1973 40.6 39.9 19.5
1974 36.5 41.8 21.7
1975 37.3 41.1 21.6
Table 4
Yearly Percentages of the Total Recovery
of Stolen Property
Year Year Year
1960 52.4 1965 52.0 1970 42.0
1961 52.0 1966 55.0 1971 39.0
1962 51.0 1967 51.0 1972 38.0
1963 54.0 1968 50.0 1973 37.0
1964 52.0 1969 47.0 1974 31.0
1975 , 29.9
Table 5
Percentage Composition of Total Goods Recovered
Year 7 Auto % Misc. % All Other
1960 87.0 8.3 4.7
1961 87.0 8.6 4.4
1962 88.0 7.6 4.4
1963 86.0 9.7 4.3
1964 89.0 7.3 3.7
1965 89.0 6.8 4.2
1966 89.0 6.9 4.1
1967 90.0 6.4 3.6
1968 89.0 6.6 4.4
1969 88.0 8.0 4.0
1970 87.0 8.8 4.2
1971 84.0 11.2 4.8
1972 84.0 10.7 5.3
1973 79.6 14.6 5.8
1974 76.5 17.2 6.2
1975 77.3 16.6 6.1
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APPENDIX B
MODEL THEFT AND FENCING ACT'
[Insert appropriate enacting clause].
[Statement of Purpose and Intent]
[It is the purpose of this Act to curtail theft and dealing in stolen
property through the imposition of appropriate criminal sanctions and the
provision of suitable civil remedies.]
[It is intended that this Act be construed neither strictly nor liberally,
but in light of its purpose, and that its moderate sanctions be fully utilized.]
Sec. 1 [Short Title] This Act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Theft and Fencing Control Act of [insert date]."
Part A
Sec. 2 ![Theft]
(a) [Offense] A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or uses [, or
endeavors 2 to obtain or use,] the property of another, with intent: 3
(1) to deprive the other person of a right to the property or a ben-
efit of the property; or
(2) to appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of
another person.
(b) [Grading] A person who commits theft:
(1) shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both, if the property stolen has a value in excess of
$100,000;
(2) shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both, if the property stolen has a value in excess of $500
but not more than $100,000 or, regardless of its value, the property con-
sists of:
(i) a firearm, ammunition, or a deadly weapon;
(ii) a vehicle, except as provided in subsection (b) (4);
(3) shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both, if the property stolen has a value in excess of $100
but not more than $500; or
(4) shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more
than 6 months, or both, if:
(i) the property has a value of $100 or less; or
(ii) the property is an airplane, a motor vehicle or a vessel,
the defendant is less than eighteen-years-old, and the defend-
1. The legislation proposed here in a slightly different form has been endorsed
by the National Association of Attorneys General for inclusion in its program of rec-
ommended legislation.
2. The optional use of the word "endeavor" here and elsewhere in the Act avoids
the incorporation of the common-law learning on impossibility. See United States
v. Osborn, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
3. Unless otherwise stated, the statute is drafted on the assumption that the state
of mind requirement to be implied for conduct is "knowing" and for attendant cir-
cumstances is "recklessness." Compare MODEL PENAL CODE art. 2 (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962); S.1, ch. 3.
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ant intended to deprive or appropriate the property only tem-
porarily rather than permanently.4
Sec. 3 [Possession of Altered Property]
(a) [Offense] A person is guilty of possession of altered property
if he is a dealer in property and he possesses property the identifying fea-
tures of which, including serial numbers or labels, have been removed or
in any fashion altered, without the consent of the manufacturer of the
property.
(b) [Grading] A person who commits possession of altered property
shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
See. 4 [Dealing in Stolen Property]
(a) [Offense] A person is guilty of dealing in stolen property if he:
(1) traffics in [,or endeavors to traffic in,]; or
(2) initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or super-
vises the theft, and traffics in [, or endeavors to traffic in,] the property
of another that has been stolen.
(b) [Grading] A person who deals in stolen property in violation of:
(1) subsection (a)(1) shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or
(2) subsection (a)(2) shall be fined not more than $15,000 or
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
Sec. 5 [Evidence]
(a) [Permissible inferences] In an action for theft or dealing in stolen
property:
(1) Proof of possession of property recently stolen, unless satisfac-
torily explained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession
of the property was aware of the risk5 that it had been stolen or that the
person in some way participated in its theft;
(2) Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property at a price sub-
stantially below its fair market value, unless satisfactorily explained, gives
rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the property was
aware of the risk that it had been stolen;
(3) Proof of the purchase or sale of stolen property by a dealer
in property, out of the regular course of business, or without the usual in-
dicia of ownership other than mere possession, unless satisfactorily ex-
plained, gives rise to an inference that the person buying or selling the
property was aware of the risk that it had been stolen.
(b) [Accomplice Testimony] The testimony of an accomplice, if
4. Not all states key the grading of their conspiracy statutes to the substantive
offense. Where conspiracy is a misdemeanor, it is recommended that a special felony
level conspiracy provision be drafted. In addition, consideration should be given, if
necessary, to abolishing any common-law rule that would make the receiver's convic-
tion dependent upon the conviction of the thief.
5. On the constitutionality of this and other similar statutory presumptions, see
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973), holding that a recent possession infer-
ence is constitutional.
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believed beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient for a conviction for con-
duct constituting an offense in violation of this Act.6
Sec. 6 [Entrapment]
It does not constitute a defense to a prosecution for conduct constitut-
ing an offense in violation of this Act that:
(1) strategem or deception, including the use of an undercover op-
erative or law enforcement officer, was employed;
(2) a facility or an opportunity to engage in such conduct, includ-
ing offering for sale of property not stolen as if it were stolen, was pro-
vided; or
(3) mere solicitation that would not induce an ordinary law-abid-
ing person to engage in such conduct was made by a law enforcement offi-
cer to gain evidence against a person predisposed to engage in such con-
duct. 7
Sec. 7 [Definitions]
As used in this part:
(a) "dealer in property" means a person who buys and sells property
as a business.
(b) "obtains or uses" means any manner of:
(1) taking or exercising control over property;
(2) making an unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of prop-
erty; or
(3) obtaining property by fraud, and includes conduct previously
known as theft, stealing, larceny, purloining, abstracting, embezzlement,
misapplication, misappropriation, conversion, obtaining money or property
by false pretenses, fraud, deception, and all other conduct similar in na-
ture.
(c) "property" means anything of value, and includes:
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and
found in land;
(2) tangible or intangible personal property, including rights, priv-
ileges, interests, and claims; or
(3) services.
(d) "property of another" means property in which a person has an
interest upon which another person is not privileged to infringe without
consent, whether or not the other person also has an interest in the prop-
erty.
(e) "services" means anything of value resulting from a person's
physical or mental labor or skill, or from the use, possession, or presence
of property, and includes:
6. Some jurisdictions follow the rule that an accomplice's testimony in a theft or
fencing prosecution must be corroborated to be sufficient for conviction. This provi-
sion should, if necessary, be included in the Act to preclude the application of this
rule to prosecutions under this Act.
7. This provision guarantees that mistaken interpretations of the law will not
frustrate legitimate law enforcement efforts to investigate the operations of profes-
sional fences.
8. The phrase is broad enough to cover the situation where property stolen in an-
other jurisdiction is brought into a state. It would also include possession.
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(1) repairs or improvements to property;
(2) professional services;
(3) private or public or government communication, transporta-
tion, power, water, or sanitation services;
(4) lodging accommodations; or
(5) admissions to places of exhibition or entertainment.
(f) "stolen property" means property that has been the subject of
any criminally wrongful taking.
(g) "traffic" means:
(1) to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of to
another person;
(2) to buy, receive, possess, or obtain control of or use with in-
tent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of to another
person.
(h) "value" means value determined according to the following:
(1) Except as otherwise provided, value means the market value
of the property at the time and place of the offense, or if such cannot
be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within
a reasonable time after the offense.
(2) The value of a written instrument which does not have a read-
ily ascertainable market value shall, in the case of an instrument such as
a check, draft or promissory note, be deemed the amount due or collectible
on it, and shall, in the case of any other instrument which creates, re-
leases, discharges, or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege
or obligation, be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the
owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of
the instrument.
(3) The value of a trade secret that does not have a readily as-
certainable market value shall be deemed any reasonable value represent-
ing the damage to the owner suffered by reason of losing an advantage
over those who do not know of or use the trade secret.
(4) If the value of property cannot be ascertained beyond a rea-
sonable doubt pursuant to the standards set forth above, the trier of fact
may find the value to be not less than a certain amount, and if no such
minimum value can be thus ascertained, the value shall be deemed to be
an amount less than $500.
(5) Amounts of value involved in thefts committed pursuant to
one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several
persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.
Part B
Sec. 8 [Alternative Fine]
(a) [Twice Gain or Loss] In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized
by law, a defendant who has been found guilty of conduct constituting an
offense in violation of this Act through which he derived pecuniary value
or by which he caused personal injury or property damage or other loss,
may, upon motion of the [insert appropriate phrase] be sentenced to pay a
fine that does not exceed twice the gross value gained or twice the gross
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loss caused, whichever is the greater, plus the costs of investigation and
prosecution.
(b) [Hearing] The court9 shall hold a hearing to determine the
amount of the fine to be imposed under subsection (a).
(c) [Pecuniary Value] As used in this section, "pecuniary value"
means:
(1) anything of value in the form of money, a negotiable instru-
ment, a commercial interest, or anything else the primary significance of
which is economic advantage; or
(2) any other property or service that has a value in excess of
$100.
Part C: Injunctions and Damages
Sec. 9 [Injunctions]
(a) [General] In addition to what is otherwise authorized by law,
the [insert appropriate phrase] shall have jurisdiction to prevent and re-
strain conduct constituting an offense in violation of this Act. The [insert
appropriate phrase] may issue appropriate orders, including:
(1) ordering any person to divest himself of any interest in any
organization;
(2) imposing reasonable restraints on the future conduct of any
person, including making investments or prohibiting any person from en-
gaging in the same type of organization involved in the offense; or
(3) ordering the dissolution or reorganization of any organization,
making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) [Application by [insert appropriate phrase]] The [insert appro-
priate phrase] may institute proceedings under subsection (a). In any
such proceeding, the [insert appropriate phrase] shall move as soon as
practicable to a hearing and determination. Pending final determination,
the [insert appropriate phrase] may at any time enter such restraining
orders or prohibitions or take such other actions as are in the interest of
justice.
(c) [Application by Private Party] Any person may institute a pro-
ceeding under subsection (a). In such proceeding, relief shall be granted
in conformity with the principles that govern the granting of injunctive re-
lief from threatened loss or damage in other civil cases, except that no
showing of special or irreparable damage to the person shall have to be
made. Upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunc-
tion improvidently granted and a showing of immediate danger of signif-
icant loss or damage, a temporary restraining order and a preliminary in-
junction may be issued in any such action before a final determination
on the merits.
Sec. 10 [Damages]
(a) [Suit by the [insert appropriate phrase]] If the [insert appropriate
phrase] is injured by reason of any conduct constituting an offense in
violation of this Act, the [insert appropriate phrase] may bring a civil
9. Where jury sentencing is in effect, this clause would have to be altered.
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action and recover damages as specified in subsection (c) and the cost
of the action.
(b) [Suit by a Private Person] If a private person is injured by
reason of any conduct constituting an offense in violation of this Act, the
private person may bring a civil action and recover damages as specified
in subsection (c), attorney's fees and costs of investigation and litigation,
reasonably incurred.
(c) [Treble Damages] Damages recoverable in action brought
under subsection (a) and (b) shall be threefold the actual damages sus-
tained, and, where appropriate, punitive damages.
See. 11 [Procedure]'0
(a) [Intervention] The ;[insert appropriate phrase] may, upon timely
application, intervene in any civil action or proceeding brought under this
part if [insert appropriate phrase] certifies that in his opinion the action
or proceeding is of general public importance. In such action or proceed-
ing, the [insert appropriate phrase] shall be entitled to the same relief as
if the [insert appropriate phrase] had instituted the action or proceeding.
(b) [Estoppel] A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the
[insert appropriate phrase] in any criminal action or proceeding under this
Act shall estop the defendant in such action or proceeding in any subse-
quent civil action or proceeding under this Act as to all matters as to which
such judgment or decree in such action or proceeding would be an estoppel
as between the parties to it.
(c) [Limitations] No civil cause of action shall be brought under this
Act more than five years after such action accrues. If a criminal prosecu-
tion, civil action or other proceeding is brought or intervened in by the
[insert appropriate phrase] to punish, prevent or restrain any conduct
constituting an offense in violation of this Act, the running of the period
of limitations provided by this subsection with respect to any civil cause
of action arising under this Act, which is based in whole or in part on
any matter complained of in any such prosecution, action, or proceeding
brought by the .[insert appropriate phrase], shall be suspended during the
pendency of such prosecution, action or proceeding and for two years fol-
lowing its termination.
Part D
Sec. 12 [General Provisions]
(a) [Severability Clause] [Insert appropriate severability clause.]
(b) [Amendments to Other Acts]
(1) [Immunity] [Whenever, in the judgment of [insert appropriate
phrase], testimony or production of other evidence by any person in any
criminal prosecution, civil action or other proceeding under this Act is
necessary, such [insert appropriate phrase] may make application to [in-
sert appropriate phrase] that the person be instructed to testify or produce
evidence, and upon order of the [insert appropriate phrase], such person
shall not be excused from testifying or otherwise producing evidence on
10. Consideration should be given to the breadth of the jurisdiction's long-arm
statute to insure that out-of-state tortfeasors can be reached easily.
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the ground that the testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate him,
provided that no testimony or other evidence compelled under such order
or any evidence directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other evidence may be used against such person in any criminal case,
except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.]1 '
(2) [Electronic Surveillance] [Insert, if necessary, an appropriate
amendment to existing legislation authorizing electronic surveillance to
provide for such surveillance in investigations and prosecutions under this
Act.]12
(c) [Repealers] [Insert appropriate repealers.]
(d) [Effective Date] [Insert effective date.]
11. Authorization to grant immunity is essential in complex fencing investiga-
tions. Existing legislation does not always make it available. If necessary, this pro-
vision should be included in the Act to remedy this defect. For a collection of the
laws of the various states, see THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYs GENERAL,
COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL LEOis-
LATION 140-48 (Jan. 1975).
12. Authorization to employ electronic surveillance is essential in complex fenc-
ing investigations. Existing legislation does not always make it clearly available. See
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra Appendix B, note 11, at
34-36. While twenty-three states authorize electronic surveillance in specific instances,
surveillance in fencing investigations may not be permitted in all situations. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.07 (1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 133.725(1)(a) (1975). Clari-
fying and authorizing legislation is needed.
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